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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 



Chap. Copyright No..., 

Shelf._j.iL3 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



GOD REVEALED 



OR 



Nature's Best Word 



\*> BY 
Rev. C. W. GALLAGHER, D.D. 




NEW YORK : EATON & MAINS 

CINCINNATI : CURTS & JENNINGS 

1899 



SECOND ^OPV, 
1899. 







40209 

Copyright by 

EATON & MAINS, 

J899. 



-*> d o S> £ 



LC Control Number 



tmp96 027054 



PREFACE. 



The plan of this book is to bring its subject 
into such compass and put it in such untech- 
nical language, without sacrificing the essen- 
tial requirements of the argument, that it will 
commend itself to busy people and to those who 
do not have the time or patience to read the 
larger works. 

It is thought that four classes may be bene- 
fited by the use of this volume. 

There are many thoughtful and studious 
young people in all our churches whose educa- 
tional opportunities have been limited, but 
whose desire to be informed upon such a sub- 
ject is very great. They do not have time at 
their disposal for a study of elaborate works and 
are unable to obtain a complete and well defined 
view of the arguments employed to show how 
revelation is confirmed by the unobtrusive teach- 
ings of nature. They might easily be induced 
to undertake the work which promised to give 
them intelligent outline of a great truth. The 
practical value of such a study for the young 
people of the church will be inestimable. 



4 Preface. 

It is possible that, in our larger churches es- 
pecially, reading circles might be formed during 
the winter months for a regular study of the 
subject. A pastor with such a class, preparing 
himself to give explanations at various points, 
and emphasizing particular views, might make 
an hour a week profitable to his young people. 
It would greatly enlarge and strengthen their 
views of truth and lay the foundation for a broad 
religious culture. 

Many young ministers, who have not had the 
opportunity of a collegiate or theological train- 
ing, will find in it a brief summary which may 
be easily appropriated and made available both 
as a guide to a farther study of the subject and 
as furnishing useful suggestions of practical 
value. 

The book may be of use in literary institu- 
tions in which the subject is regularly taught. 
While every argument is complete, there is 
opportunity for the instructor to supplement the 
statements made with facts and illustrations 
trom his own reading. Thus he will be able to 
teach without surrendering his own individ- 
uality. The student will have an outline to 
guide and assist him in his investigations, and 
to enable him the more easily to remember the 
course of the argument. 



CONTENTS. 



STUDY I.— Nature Questioned. 

Man, the questioner — The world of nature responds — The answer 
takes the form of Theism, or Natural Theology — Dr. Flint — A con- 
trary conception — Philosophy of Religion — Prejudice against the 
natural method of seeking a knowledge of God — Nature and Chris- 
tianity — Independent — Related — Theism and Ethics — Science of re- 
ligion — Value of this Study — For those who reject Christianity — For 
those who accept Christianity — How to study the subject T3-19 

STUDY II.— Religion. 

Essential characteristics of religion-^-Religion as a universal fact — 
Definition — Its elements — Belief in God — Fetichism — Totemism, or 
nature worship — Shammanism, or the worship of magic — Idolatry — 
Pantheism — Polytheism—Henotheism, or tribal worship— Monotheism, 
or the doctrine of one God — Diversity of conceptions of God — John 
Fiske — The relation of the world to God — Prayer — Sense of depend- 
ence — Moral idea — Man the offspring of God — Summary 20-26 

STUDY III.— The Origin of Religion. 

Its place in Theism — The most satisfactory explanation — Natural- 
istic explanation — Fear — Personification — Imagination — Dreams — 
Death — Objections — Explanations inadequate — Mankind think that 
they have found God — Intuition — Professor Calderwood — Dr. John 
Caird — Psychological difficulties in the way of intuition — Primitive 
revelation — Religious susceptibility — Dr. Bowne 27-33 



6 Contents. 

STUDY IV.— What is Man? 

Significance of the question — Man the test and interpreter of 
facts — Automatic or mechanical theory — Descartes — Dr. Hodgson — 
Professor Huxley — Professor Clifford — John Stuart Mill — Objections 
— Endowed atoms — Professor Tyndall — Units of feeling — Units of 
force — Herbert Spencer 34~4i 

STUDY V.— Consciousness in Man. 

Definition of Consciousness — Dr. Bowne — Dr. Harris — Self in 
consciousness — Consciousness continuous — Consciousness unified — 
Related to intelligence acts — Inseparable from life — Relation to 
thought — Abiding among the changeable — Self and not-self — Memory 
— Attention — Freedom — Soul 42-48 

STUDY VI.— Matter and Mind. 

Common sense does not confuse them — Distinguishes between 
them — Investigation confirms this distinction — Collusion of atoms — 
Matter and mind unlike — Psychological effects not traceable to 
physical stimuli — No exact correlation between the two — No evi- 
dence that physical force ever becomes a thought — Atoms endowed 
— No definite end conceivable — Nascent consciousness — No purpose 
possible even then — Du Bois-Reymond — Different sensations, sight, 
hearing, smell — Only unified by the soul 49~50 

STUDY VII.— Mind the Test of Reality. 

The place of reason — Practical matters — Self-evidence — Necessity 
— Universality — The sense perception and reality — No one doubts 
reality — Science built on rational principles — Dr. Harris — The intu- 
itions — The denial of the rational powers — The denial of all knowl- 
edge — Rational processes trustworthy — Dr. Bowne 57-°4 

STUDY VIII.— Categories of Thought. 

The necessary laws of thought — Substance and attributes — Cause 
and effect — Knowledge of self — The not-self — Freedom — Personal 
identity — Order — Presuppositions of thought — Consequence of the 
denial of intelligence — Force of the argument °5 - 7I 



Contents. 7 

STUDY IX. — Ontological Argument. 

Statement of the argument — Its history — Anselm — Descartes — 
Clarke — Cousin— Bishop Butler — Lotze — Dr. Harris — Dr. Valentine 
— Professor Flint 72-78 



STUDY X. — Cosmological Argument. 

Nature of the argument — Cause and sequence — Efficient, material, 
and final cause — Effect — The universe an effect — Principle of con- 
nection — How originated — Mechanical theory — Hume — Mill — Pro- 
fessor Diman — First cause 79-86 

STUDY XL — Argument from Design. 

The form of the argument — Definition of design — End — Means — 
Intelligent application of means to end — Seen in works of art — In 
nature — Objections — Evolution and the design argument — Universal 
purpose — Dr. Bowne — Immanence and transcendence of the first 
cause — The value of the argument 87-93 

STUDY XII. — Intelligence in the World. 

Supplementary to the design argument — Rational character of the 
world — Law — Order — System — Meaning of law — Evolution illus- 
trates law — Laws of thought — The world a logic — The world a 
mental discipline — The first cause therefore intelligent — No expla- 
nation in Materialism — It annihilates intelligence — Intelligence gives 
a meaning to the world — Right attitude to the truth — Intelligence or 
nonintelligence ? — Admit intelligence in the first cause and the 
world is intelligible 94-100 

STUDY XIIL— Moral Argument. 

Nature of the argument — Sensibilities and intellect — Conditions 
of a moral act — Self-consciousness — Self-determination — Results of 
the conditions — Force of the argument — Ought — First explanation — 
Objection to it — Rational explanation — Moral ideal — How found — 
Significance — Conclusion 101-108 



8 Contents. 

STUDY XIV.— Moral Argument Continued. 

Evolution a progressive movement — Whither? — Farther physical 
development improbable except in brain cells — Moral evolution an- 
tagonistic to physical evolution — Huxley on Evolution and Ethics — 
The moral sphere foreign to evolution — Significance of the ought 
in this connection — Moral order in the world — An intelligent creator 
its only answer 109-1 1 5 

STUDY XV.— Unity of the First Cause. 

The first cause one or many ? — Positions of Materialism — Atoms 
— Two suppositions — Definite arrangements — Sciences built accord- 
ing to law — No explanation except in universal mind — The watch — 
Lotze — Dr. Bowne 116-122 



STUDY XVI.— A Personal First Cause. 

Personality in man— Definition— Self-knowledge— Self-determina- 
tion — Moral character — Dr. Harris — Dr. Bowne — First cause per- 
sonal—Objections—First cause free— Materialistic difficulties— Im- 
personal reason — Conclusion 123-130 



STUDY XVII.— Agnosticism. 

Agnosticism— Definition— The Absolute ?— Infinite?— Dr. Mansel 
—Origin of Agnosticism— Limitations of human thought— Relativity 
of thought— Sir William Hamilton— Spencer— Objections— The Un- 
knowable unknown— The Absolute a logical fiction— Dr. Caird— 
The doctrine of Agnosticism destructive of all knowledge— To know 
is not to comprehend— Agnosticism a failure 131-137 

STUDY XVIIL— Pantheism and Theism. 

Pantheism defined— History of Pantheism— Assumptions— Spinoza 
—Descartes— Leibnitz— Kant— Schelling— Fichte— God the sum of 
all things— Self-consciousness— Freedom — Personality — Pantheism 
contradicts all the assumptions of Theism 138-144 



Contents. 9 

STUDY XIX.— First Cause and the World. 

Ancient beliefs — Pantheistic — Polytheistic — Difficulties involved — 
Infinite spirit — Theistic position — Immanence — Transcendence — 
Mode of creation — Source of the world — Preservation of the world — 
Second causes — Relation of first cause to men 145-152 

STUDY XX.— Theism and Evolution. 

Evolution — Mechanical Evolution — Philosophic Evolution — The- 
istic Evolution — John Fiske — Le Conte — Dana — Gray — These posi- 
tions to be distinguished — First two positions compared — The 
objections of Theism to mechanical Evolution — Existence of life 
unexplained — Dr. Bascom — Principles of Evolution violated — Le 
Conte — Difficulties of interaction — Origin and growth of different 
organs — Correlation of parts — The laws of variation — Selection — 
Utility inexplicable — Origin of sexes — Order of evolution — Demands 
of Theism — Conclusion 153-162 

STUDY XXL— Is the First Cause Ethical? 

Men not satisfied with a metaphysical God — They require ethical 
qualities — Inference from perfection of the first cause — Moral na- 
ture of man — Implies what ? — Dr. Mansel — Structure of human 
society — Course of history — Presence of God in histoiy — Professor 
Morris 163-170 

STUDY XXIL— Miracles. 

Claims of Theism regarding the nature of first cause — Are mir- 
acles conceivable ? — Not inconsistent with the doctrine of the first 
cause — They depend upon the will of the deity — Three views : 
interference with law ; expression of a hidden law ; the will of the 
first cause 171-177 

STUDY XXIII.— Revelation. 

Revelation miraculous — Christian Scriptures — Revelation condi- 
tioned by the will and purposes of the Deity — No presumption in 



io Contents. 

Theism against a Revelation — The ethical nature of the deity an 
argument — Man's moral weakness — His intellectual inability — His- 
tory of human struggle — Religious truth only partially learned in na- 
ture — Sin— Redemption 174-184 

STUDY XXIV.— Immortality. 

Is man immortal ? — Importance of the question — Its discussion 
necessary — Preceding arguments favor it — Difference between phys- 
ical and spiritual facts — Presumptions in its favor — Incompleteness 
of human life — Moral necessity for it — Mental and physical decay 
not parallel — Universal belief — John Fiske — Consequences. 185-193 



GOD REVEALED; 

OR, 

NATURE'S BEST WORD. 



ARGUMENT. 

As in the material sciences, so in Theism, we be- 
gin with the facts to be explained. These facts are 
found in the phenomena of religion. These phenom- 
ena, since they are characteristic of man, must be ex- 
plained in accordance with his nature. Their worth 
and significance will depend upon what he is. For 
instance, a belief in God will be forceless unless there 
is enough in man to give it force. In the same man- 
ner prayer must be estimated. The analysis of man's 
nature is carefully made. He is found to be more 
than a machine or a combination of endowed atoms. 
He is a thinking, self-conscious, free, and active 
being, whose reason is the test and interpretation of 
all things. The phenomena of religion must be un- 
derstood in the light of man's reason. It is neces- 
sary, then, to inquire what the demands and laws of 
his reason require in relation to these religious be- 
liefs. Do they necessitate an intelligent, free, all- 
powerful, ethical, and personal First Cause to meet 
all the problems involved in man and the world ? 



12 God Revealed; 

The first argument follows from the demand 
made by reason that back of the material world there 
must be a Perfect Being. 

The second argument springs from the rational 
principle of cause and effect. 

The third argument arises from the necessity un- 
der which the mind is placed of ascribing all evi- 
dences of purpose and design to an intelligent 
designer. 

The fourth argument is the discovery in the nat- 
ural world of the same laws of thought that regulate 
the thinking of all intelligent beings. 

The fifth argument is the recognition of a moral 
purpose whose only answer is an intelligent God. 

The question of the unity, personality, and know- 
ableness of God arises and is answered in the light 
of human reason. 

The objections from the point of view of agnos- 
tic and pantheistic philosophy are presented and 
met. 

The relation of the First Cause to the World, and 
especially as affected by the doctrine of Evolution, 
is examined. 

Man's own moral nature raises the question of the 
moral nature of the First Cause, and it is seen that 
man's reason is only satisfied in an ethical Creator 
and Governor. 

The possibility of miracles and a revelation is 
justified, and man is seen to be immortal as his 
nature demands. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 13 



STUDY I. 
Nature Questioned. 

No sooner does man, in the possession of the 
ordinary faculties of his being, open his eyes upon 
this world and observe its forms and forces com- 
bining for definite and useful ends, and responding 
with wonderful richness of variety and adaptation 
to the possibilities and demands of his nature, than 
the inquiry is raised whence and how all these things 
have come to pass. t When, also, he turns his thought 
inward upon himself, upon his feelings and powers 
of thinking and willing, and contemplates that world 
of conviction and desire of which even the dullest is 
conscious, the same question of origin and source 
presents itself to his imagination. The evidence of 
the correctness of these statements is found in an 
appeal to every one's experience, and to the litera- 
tures of all nations and ages. 

It seems quite impossible that the world should 
fail to give some intimation of the source of its ex- 
istence and the nature of that source. Its simplest 
forms and movements must necessarily be an ex- 
pression of something, and that expression, of what- 
ever kind, must be an explanation of its origin. 
Even a piece of board, smoothly planed and shaped, 
expresses intelligent action. If together with other 
boards and materials it is formed into an intricate 

2 



14 God Revealed; 

machine, it expresses intelligent skill and action in 
a very high degree, and these in turn are referred 
back to a skillful and intelligent author. If this 
mechanism is found to be a beautiful and useful 
means of contributing to the happiness and welfare 
of individuals, kindness and benevolence are added 
to intelligent skill and action, both in the contrivance 
and the author. To say, then, that the world ex- 
presses nothing is to contradict the rational beliefs 
of mankind. To affirm, what is equally offensive 
to human thought, that the world actually means 
nothing that it seems to mean, is to charge nature 
with universal falsehood. Either one sets a limit 
to knowledge, and that limit must be an habitual 
doubt. No one but a philosopher ever comes to these 
conclusions, and he reaches them rather as a victim 
of his logical methods than as a follower of rational 
convictions. 

Naturally enough, men in general, thinking that 
all nature, both the world within them and the world 
external to them, expresses some meaning, have un- 
ceasingly sought to trace nature to its origin and 
source. The science which does this is called The- 
ism. It is known also as Natural Theology, or the 
theology which has its source in nature. The latter 
title is the older of the two, but is now less frequently 
used. Either term may be appropriately employed 
to designate the proofs of the existence and attri- 
butes of God as found in the natural world of both 
mind and matter. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 15 

With this statement Dr. Flint agrees, in his The- 
ism: "Theism may be defined in a few words as the 
doctrine that the universe owes its existence to the 
reason and will of a self-existent Being who is in- 
finitely powerful, wise and good. It is the doctrine 
that nature has a creator and preserver, the nations 
a governor, men a heavenly father and judge." 1 

Theism must not be confused with Deism. The 
derivation of both words would imply the same 
meaning; for each is derived from a word which 
signifies God. While the two, however, have pri- 
marily the same meaning, usage has established a 
great difference between them. Deism represents 
God not only as different from the world, but wholly 
separated from it, except, perhaps, in the act of cre- 
ation. Its history includes doctrines that are prac- 
tically atheistic. Theism, on the contrary, repre- 
sents God as holding an internal and real relation 
to the world as creator, preserver, governor, in his 
character as a personal, intelligent, omnipotent, and 
righteous being. 

The Philosophy of Religion is a title which covers 
the same ground. If there is any difference between 
it and Theism, it may be said that it emphasizes the 
method pursued; namely, the philosophical method. 
It seeks to trace all religious facts to a first cause, 
and ascertain in the light of philosophy the nature 
of this first cause. Dr. Ladd says: "The first 
problem of the Philosophy of Religion is to deter- 

1 Baird Lectures, 1877, p. 18. 



16 God Revealed; 

mine the reality of that being whom, under the 
imagery derived from its experience with human 
personality, religion believes in and worships as 
God." 1 

Not a little prejudice is felt against this natural 
method of arriving at a knowledge of God through 
his works. It is confidently affirmed that Chris- 
tianity has given a full and satisfactory answer to 
all questions that may be awakened by a study of 
nature; the Bible is the Christian's handbook of in- 
formation. From one point of view, the two sources 
of knowledge are quite distinct. The natural method 
is an effort, by means of the human reason alone, to 
ascertain the nature and attributes of God. Chris- 
tianity is supernatural, and through the inspiration 
and revelation of the divine mind discloses to man 
the inmost truths regarding God, man, and the 
world. The two are, therefore, quite independent 
of each other in their origin and methods of discov- 
ering and teaching truth. 

From another point of view, they are very closely 
related. The fundamental principles of the natural 
method are entirely harmonious with the great and 
essential doctrines of Christianity. The former 
believes in a personal being who is infinite in power, 
wisdom, and goodness. It teaches the intimate 
relation between man and God, and the dependence 
of the world upon God. So far it agrees with 
Christianity. It arrives at its conclusions from a 

1 Introduction to Philosophy \ 1890, p. 363. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 17 

different method. It is an important confirmation 
of the claims and doctrines of the Bible. While 
Theists are not necessarily Christians, Christians 
must be Theists. Christian men are accordingly 
the most earnest supporters of theistic philosophy. 

Theism has a very practical relation to Ethics, or 
the science of conduct. There is no doubt that one 
may entertain moral convictions and lead a very 
good moral life without any very clearly defined 
ideas regarding God; in fact, without any belief at 
all in God. Very much of the current morality is 
due to education and environment, and may be en- 
tirely independent of any thought of God. It may 
be admitted, also, that a very good and useful theory 
of morals may ignore altogether the question of the 
existence of God. At the same time it does not re- 
quire argument to show that, if an infinite being, 
who is the embodiment, manifestation, and defense 
of righteousness, who is a moral governor as well 
as the guardian of physical law, be accepted, right 
and wrong will have a meaning which they never 
could have where there is no knowledge or thought 
of God. 

The result, then of a philosophical speculation in 
a convincing proof of the existence of God as a per- 
sonal being will have a direct bearing upon every 
system and conception of moral law and obligation. 
If an intelligent first cause, "working for right- 
eousness,' , can be shown to be the only rational 
interpretation of the world of matter and mind, this 



1 8 God Revealed; 

fact must concern, very directly and positively, the 
whole question of individual conduct. 

Whether there is a science of religion, as some 
affirm, will depend upon the definition given to re- 
ligion and the limitations set to science. A classi- 
fication of religious phenomena is undoubtedly 
possible, and so far certainly a science of religion is 
possible. Yet all religious phenomena must derive 
their significance from the supposition of the ex- 
istence of a God of intelligence and moral attributes. 
To whatever extent the scientific method may be 
applied, the complete treatment of it must depend 
upon philosophy. The doctrine of the being of God 
is the basis of all religion. 

It must be readily seen that the study of Theism is 
of great value to everyone. Indeed, can anything 
be of more practical utility to anyone, if there be a 
God, than a knowledge of who and what he is? 
Whatever may contribute in any way to give a 
clearer and more comprehensive conception of him, 
or show how necessary he is to explain the world 
and life, is surely worthy of the most eager study. 
Every present and future interest must take its sig- 
nificance from the existence of an infinite, intelligent 
and moral being. It would hardly seem possible 
that anyone could be insensible to the practical in- 
terests that center in the existence and nature of 
God. 

To the man who does not accept the teachings and 
requirements of Christianity, Theism is the only 



or, Nature's Best Word. 19 

source of knowledge that he has by which to ac- 
quaint himself with God, and learn what may be 
required of him. In a study of the disclosures 
which nature makes, under the scrutiny of reason, 
he must obtain information concerning the meaning 
of his own life and the purpose of the creation and 
preservation of the world. If he pretends to a re- 
ligion of any kind, its source must be the revelations 
of nature. 

With the Christian believer, Theism has a great, 
if not equally important, place. While he is de- 
pendent upon the Christian Scriptures for his 
religious faith and truths, it must necessarily be of 
the highest satisfaction to him to discover that 
nature, so far as he can penetrate its meaning and 
teachings, most emphatically and strongly supports 
the underlying principles of his faith. The Bible 
Christian will be a stronger Christian when he real- 
izes that, as far as Theism has anything to say, it is 
altogether on the side of Christianity. 

This study ought to be undertaken in a spirit of 
the most entire frankness and fairness. The secret 
of all knowledge is a loving discipleship to truth. 
Nowhere is this truer than in searching after God 
among the mysteries and wonders of the natural 
world. He who looks earnestly will see God. He 
who listens will hear his voice. 



20 God Revealed; 



STUDY II. 
The Essential Characteristics of Religion. 

Religion is a universal fact. There is no history, 
however ancient, of which it does not form a part. 
Scientists have affirmed that no tribe of men has 
ever been found in which there were not recognized 
the elements of a religious faith. These elements, 
persisting through all the generations of men, and 
centering in the thought of God, necessarily awaken 
an inquiry as to their reality and validity. The 
answer to the inquiry has taken the form of a the- 
istic philosophy. Religion has led to Theism. It 
has made Theism not only possible, but necessary 
as the explanation of the most distinct tendencies 
and stubborn facts that come within the knowledge 
of men. 

What is religion? It is either a name for a set 
of dogmas and ritual of observances which distin- 
guish different bodies of worshipers, or it represents 
fundamental and universal principles and disposi- 
tions which underlie all individual systems of relig- 
ious thought and feeling. It is this broader sense 
in which the word is here used. Dr. Caird thus 
defines it : "All religion involves a conscious relation 
to a being called God." 1 Dr. Pope states in this 
way : "Religion is the relation of the human creature 

1 The Evolution of Religion, 1893, vol. i, p. 61. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 21 

to the Supreme Creator." 1 Dr. Fisher declares that 
religion is communion with God." 2 Dr. Harris 
claims that * 'religion is a man's consciousness of a 
relation to a superhuman and supernatural power 
which we may call divinity; and manifests itself in 
spontaneous belief and feeling, and in voluntary 
action, to be a service acceptable to the divinity." 3 

It is necessary to inquire what the elements of 
religion are, in order to determine what may be the 
terms of the problem which an investigation of 
nature is to solve, and along what lines of investiga- 
tion the inquirer must proceed. They are the phe- 
nomena which must be explained. Mankind will 
be restless and unsatisfied until a satisfactory answer 
is given. What are these essential characteristics 
of religion ? 

1. The belief in a god, or the god idea, is uni- 
versal. This god idea has taken different forms, 
which vary from the most unworthy, if not ab- 
solutely repulsive, to the most noble and elevating. 

There are various names by which this progress 
of conception is indicated. Fetichism marks the 
crudest and lowest stage. ' This term was first ap- 
plied by the Portuguese to African savages, and 
includes anything to which a magical power is at- 
tributed; as, for instance, a charm. The worshiper 
adores it for its supposed power to protect him or 
secure for him the object of his desire. 

1 Pope's Compendium of Christain Theology, vol. i, p. 7. 

2 The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief p. 26. 

3 Self-revelation of God, 1887, p 15. 



22 God Revealed; 

Totemism is a step higher, and denotes the wor- 
ship of nature. In some countries, as in Alaska, dif- 
ferent tribes are named after some animal or tree, 
and this is the totem, or god, of that tribe. 

Shammanism embraces good and evil spirits, and 
the spirits of ancestors. It is the religion of the 
Tartars and some of the other Asiatic tribes. It 
believes in sorcery, and propitiates evil demons by 
sacrifices and frantic gesticulations. 

Idolatry is the worship of images which are sup- 
posed to represent the deity, and are accepted by him 
as his symbol. By long and thoughtless worship, 
the idolater comes to regard the image itself as his 
deity, and almost returns again to Fetichism. 

A philosophical arrangement of the conceptions 
of God which men have formed are included under 
Pantheism, or the doctrine that God is everything, 
and everything is God ; Polytheism, or the existence 
of many gods; Henotheism, or the belief that each 
tribe or nation has its own god, who, in a special 
manner, protects its interests, and watches over it; 
Monotheism, or one God for all the universe, the 
solitary creator and governor of all things. 

It is not necessary to say that these conceptions or 
misconceptions of deity have been, for the most part, 
low, and, in many instances, brutal. It does not, 
however, make against the proposition that some 
kind of deity has been recognized in all grades of hu- 
man life. Neither the diversity nor the low charac- 
ter of these conceptions can argue against the claim 



or, Nature's Best Word. 23 

that man's nature requires a god, and that some con- 
ception of the deity has always been in the posses- 
sion of the race. If any tribe of men should be found 
in which there was no conception of a supreme 
being, and no notion answering to it, the absence of 
the idea might be accounted for by the absence of the 
normal condition of human life. Brutal barbarity 
is no more normal than stupid idiocy. 

John Fiske says : "I argue that the all-pervading 
presence of God is the one prevailing fact of life 
from which there is no escape; that while, in the 
deepest sense, the nature of the deity is unknowable 
by finite man, nevertheless, the exigencies of our 
thinking oblige us to symbolize that nature in some 
form that has a real meaning for us; and that we 
cannot symbolize that nature in anywise physical, 
but are bound to symbolize it in some way psy- 
chical/' 1 

2. A relation to this world of 'creation, preserva- 
tion, and control has generally been ascribed to the 
deity. In some philosophical attempts to explain 
the origin of the world, however, it has been affirmed 
that matter is eternal, and therefore uncreated, and 
deity has either been rejected altogether, or made to 
occupy a very subordinate place in the scheme of 
creation. This doctrine has never exercised a very 
controlling influence upon human thought. Beliefs 
in a more or less vital relation of the deity to human 
affairs have flourished side by side with philosophical 

1 The Idea of God, preface, p. 16. 



24 God Revealed; 

denials of them, as in Greece and Rome. In the 
ethnic relations of other nations, the prevailing be- 
lief, although modified by philosophical systems and 
gross superstitions, has connected this world in its 
beginning and continuance with God. This is seen 
in ancient mythologies as well as in thoroughly be- 
veloped religious systems. This conviction has been 
a constant and pressing stimulus to find God and 
understand the nature and extent of his activities. 

3. The doctrine and exercise of prayer look in the 
same direction. Prayer is an appeal to God. It 
has been found to be common, in some form, among 
the lowest tribes of men. It has been thought that 
traces of its existence have been discovered among 
prehistoric races, whose only remains are their flint 
knives, their dolmens, and ancient sepulchers. It is 
certain that prayer has been all but universal among 
barbarous and savage tribes. 

It may have appeared in many cases only in the 
incantations of the medicine man, but it was of the 
nature of prayer in several important respects. It 
has assumed great definiteness in the ethnic types of 
religion. Its forms have been expressive of intelli- 
gent desire and purpose. More advanced and bet- 
ter developed religions are characterized particularly 
by a striving after a moral elevation, and a relation 
of love, peace, and communion with God. The 
assumption of a real being as the basis of prayer is 
certainly to be found in the continuousness and per- 
sistency of prayer from generation to generation. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 25 

Three points, at least, of interest are suggested in 
this connection : 1. The existence of God. 2. The 
possibility of an approach to him by man. 3. The 
free activity of the deity in relation to man and the 
world. 

4. The sense of dependence and need, emphasized 
by Schleiermacher, which has been represented so 
generally in the ceremonies and literature of different 
nations, is likewise significant. It may be said that 
dependence and need are the necessary results of the 
condition in which man finds himself. His ex- 
posure at every point, his weakness, his helplessness 
and frailty, his brief life, terminating in the dissolu- 
tion of the body, would necessarily enforce the idea. 
This sense of dependence causes uneasiness, and 
leads to a tireless search after a helper. The im- 
portant and quite universal fact to be observed is 
that man has sought that helper, not only beyond 
himself among his fellow-men, but beyond all ma- 
terial things, in an unseen world, and an unseen 
being. It is certainly one of those wonderful aspira- 
tions in human nature which transcend physical im- 
pulses and desires, and spontaneously reach after 
spiritual things. It would at least suggest that man 
is constituted to find rest outside the things with 
which he has every day to do, and possesses a dim 
sense of the source from which his rest and help 
must come. 

5. The moral idea, with its accompanying 
thought of sin, guilt, penalty, and accountability, 



26 God Revealed; 

which has been prominent in proportion as the 
thought of God has been clear, is entitled to consid- 
eration, in this connection, as one of the most 
remarkable characteristics of religion. The signifi- 
cance which it has now it could not have had in 
its earliest history. Increasing intelligence, if not 
revelation, has elevated the standard of moral con- 
duct. It is true, also, that there is no universal and 
unvarying standard of right and wrong. The con- 
ception of right and wrong, however, has existed, 
and with it the conviction that some kinds of con- 
duct were displeasing to the deity, and some pleas- 
ing. Accountability, obligation, a fear of penalty, 
desire to propitiate the deity and gain his good will, 
have been conspicuous in the literature of all time. 
Whether these feelings have been universal or not, 
they have been enough so to create a problem and 
furnish material for thought. 

6. Man has believed himself to be in some way 
the offspring of God, and an object of his regard. 
He has felt himself to be immortal, and destined at 
last to dwell with his God in the possession and en- 
joyment of a better life. 

The elements of religion with which we are here 
concerned may be thus summarized: I. A free, 
divine being, in essential relation to the world and 
man. 2. A personal human spirit. 3. The rela- 
tion, of accountability, dependence, confidence, and 
hope in God on the part of this human spirit. 



or, Nature's Best Word, 27 



STUDY III. 
The Origin of Religion. 

The consideration of the origin of religion occu- 
pies only a subordinate place in Theism, but should 
not be entirely omitted. Its chief value consists 
in the presumption which it furnishes, that back of 
these beliefs which men have always held regard- 
ing God, there is a God of intelligence, power, and 
goodness for whom these beliefs call. 

There are, it is true, methods of accounting for 
these cherished convictions of mankind which do not 
require the supposition of the existence of God. Of 
course, if these are entirely evident and satisfactory 
in their explanations, this is so far favorable to a re- 
jection of the idea of God and all religious customs 
and hopes. There will then be no place for Theism. 

If, however, they are unsatisfactory and do not 
account for this wonderful religious faith, while 
other explanations, assuming the existence of a lov- 
ing and intelligent God, meet all the conditions of the 
problem, or even meet them better than those which 
deny God, this is so far favorable to the existence of 
God and the reality of religious truth. There is still 
a demand for Theism. 

Some men explain the rise of religious ideas in a 
naturalistic way, and attribute them entirely to the 
accidental conditions of life. Evolution, with many 



28 God Revealed; 

of its most ardent advocates, favors this method, and 
accounts in a variety of ways for the general disposi- 
tion of mankind to religious sentiments and beliefs. 

The earliest manifestation of this disposition is 
found in fear, arising in man's helplessness and 
dependence, which leads him to placate in a variety 
of ways every mystery in nature, as though it were 
the hiding place of some superior being. 

Closely akin to this was the natural tendency of 
man to personify or to attribute life and thought to 
inanimate things because of his possession of life 
and thought, as the easiest explanation of the pres- 
ence and power and apparent design in the sur- 
rounding world. 

The imagination has also been supposed to have 
had a share in the formation of these religious con- 
ceptions. The activity and energy of the imagina- 
tion in childhood, and the vividness and apparent 
reality of the pictures which it gives are cited. It 
is believed that what is true of childhood in the in- 
dividual was especially true of the childhood of the 
race. The imagination created forms which became 
to the feelings and thoughts objects as real as any of 
the objects in nature. 

Dreams have had their place in this theory. Men 
dreamed, and, in their ignorance and superstition, 
supposed that real beings appeared to them. Sub- 
jective experiences became to them objective reali- 
ties. They believed that in some way the unseen 
world of spirits had been revealed to them. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 29 

Death has had something to do with religious be- 
liefs. Men saw their parents and friends and chief 
men die, and, unable to explain their departure in 
any other way, conceived of them as living after 
death in spiritual form. A world of spirits was 
thereby created, in which great personages became 
gods and goddesses. 

On its face, the naturalistic method carries with 
it its own improbabilities. It is difficult to believe 
that anything so powerful, and, to the best thought 
of the world, so real as religion, should have no basis 
whatever in truth. There is no doubt that the world 
has been more radically affected and influenced by 
its religious beliefs than in any other way. Aside 
from any arguments drawn from the nature of man 
against this naturalistic explanation, the improba- 
bilities lying against it, and the much more consist- 
ent explanations of religious beliefs which may be 
given, lead to its rejection. 

The vast majority of intelligent men have as- 
sumed the existence of God, and accounted for all 
the essential beliefs of religion, on the supposition 
that man has discovered proofs of all of them suffi- 
cient to satisfy him fully. Men have found God. 
They have differed only as to the way in which God 
has been apprehended; not at all as to the exist- 
ence of such a being as the author and preserver of 
the world. 

It has been strongly urged that religion has had 
its origin in an intuition of God, either in the form 



30 God Revealed; 

of a special faculty in addition to other faculties, or 
through an innate power of perception constitutional 
to the human mind. God has been thus manifested 
directly to the soul, not by any process of reasoning, 
or because of proofs supplied from any external 
source, but immediately and' without any other evi- 
dence than the individual consciousness. The truth 
of the existence of God and its proof are both given 
at the same time in the consciousness. No better 
proof is called for, or is possible. 

Professor Calderwood says: "I hold that there 
is in the mind a necessary belief in the existence of 
an infinite being. This faith in one infinite, all-per- 
fect being accordingly becomes the regulating prin- 
ciple in the whole current of our thought ; in other 
words, our thought concerning this great being, and 
the works of his hands, is determined by the faith 
which we find implanted in our nature." 1 

Dr. John Caird states the case quite as strongly: 
"In general, the theory of intuition, or the assertion 
of knowledge above reason, may be traced to the re- 
action of the religious nature from the seeming in- 
certitude, narrowness, and inadequacy of rational 
thought." 2 "The conclusion, then, to which these 
various objections seem to point is that, not reason, 
but intuition, or faith, is the legitimate organ of 
spiritual knowledge. The human mind, in seeking 
after a philosophy of God and things divine, is set- 

1 The Philosophy of the Infinite , Macmillan & Co., 1872, p. 24. 
a The Philosophy of Religion, p. 37. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 31 

ting out on a vain and impossible quest. Its true 
wisdom is to abandon the attempt, and to fall back 
on the primary, uncritical certitude and implicit full- 
ness of knowledge which, in our immediate spiritual 
experience, we already possess." 1 

This view was a reaction against the effort to 
know God by the reason alone. It was the peculiar 
merit of Kant that he demonstrated the inability of 
the intellectual powers in themselves to find out God. 
The result of cold, logical methods, as seen in the 
various philosophical systems, has proved altogether 
unsatisfactory as a means of disclosing the nature 
and attrbutes of God or of demonstrating his exist- 
ence. According to the intuitionalist's position, this 
lack is supplied by the power of immediate percep- 
tion, which is able to give the greatest certainty for 
uncertainty and absolute skepticism. 

This is so nearly correct, and is so generally be- 
lieved, that it may seem invidious to object to it even 
in the least degree. It represents a great truth, but 
is not exactly correct as a statement of that truth. 
It is not universally believed that an intuition or im- 
mediate perception, of just this character, independ- 
ent of all the reasoning processes, can be shown to 
exist. Otherwise there could be no atheists, except 
in such abnormal mental developments as would 
practically be counted out in any investigation of this 
claim; for, if there is such an intuition, every human 
being in a state of normal and healthful develop- 

1 The Philosophy of Religion, p. 40. 



32 God Revealed; 

ment ought to possess an irresistible knowledge of 
God. The views of God which men hold ought also 
to be more nearly alike. On the contrary, there are 
Atheists, and men's conceptions of God are widely 
different. 

There is a psychological objection to this theory of 
intuition, whether as a special faculty or as an imme- 
diate perception of God; but it does not affect the 
truth of the assertion that man knows God. Psy- 
chology knows of no such special faculty, and has no 
use for it, and affirms that there is, and can be, no 
such faculty. Its existence is contradicted by the 
first principles of the science. It is equally unable to 
justify an intuition which is independent of reason. 

It has also been affirmed that the knowledge of 
God and of religious truths has been the result of a 
primitive revelation, imparted under such circum- 
stances as to permit of no doubt as to its validity. 
This is supposed to have been given in an early 
period of the history of mankind, and to have been 
transmitted from generation to generation. This 
theory has no historical foundation, and now has 
few advocates. It is not at all probable, and may be 
dismissed without further remark. 

It would seem that the correct theory of the origin 
and progress of religious knowledge is a religious 
susceptibility, native in man, which, under the 
proper conditions, develops the convictions and 
truths of religion. This susceptibility is a capacity 
to recognize God, and the conditions are all those 



or, Nature's Best Word. 33 

circumstances of the natural world and man's nature 
which serve to bring out this thought of God. 

The reason has its part to perform in presenting 
the proofs and testing the results. The sense of de- 
pendence, the moral perceptions, the natural world, 
and intellectual activity lead to the conviction of 
God. Under the stimulus presented in these differ- 
ent ways, the soul develops religious sensibilities, 
longings, and hopes, and rises to a belief in the na- 
ture and existence of God. 

In the following words Dr. Bowne has expressed 
the position taken by others as well as by himself: 
"We must assume a germ of religious impulse in 
order to make religious development possible, but, 
on the other hand, this germ is not self-sufficient. It 
develops under the stimulus of outer and inner ex- 
perience, and unless under the criticism and restraint 
of intellect and conscience, it develops into grotesque 
or terrrible forms." 1 

This view accounts best for all the phenomena 
involved, and finds for religion a basis in the same 
intelligent judgment to which all truths must ap- 
peal. 

1 Philosophy of Theism, p. 5. 



34 God Revealed; 



STUDY IV. 
What is Man? 

In the study of the origin of religion it was seen 
how inadequate was the naturalistic explanation. It 
was also seen that the only explanation that would 
harmonize with all the facts was that which asserted 
the existence of God discoverable by man. The 
question then arises, "What is man?" Is his nature 
such as would justify confidence in his findings? 

The significance of the question will be apparent 
when we reflect that man is both the test and in- 
terpreter of the world. He is certainly the test, for 
no one would pretend to accept any theory of the 
universe, or its author, unless it were supported by 
reason. He is quite as much the interpreter, for the 
only interpretation of the phenomena of nature is 
man's intelligence. What, then, is man, upon 
whose judgment rest the burden and responsibility 
of giving a correct opinion upon this great subject? 

The reliance which every man puts upon his own 
opinions and explanations, or upon the opinions and 
explanations of superior intellectual powers, must 
carry with it the conclusion that there is something 
in man's nature that is a sufficient ground for the ac- 
ceptance or rejection of any doctrine regarding the 
author or origin of the world. Any other opinion 
than this renders the conclusions of the philosopher 



or, Nature's Best Word. 35 

or scientist as worthless as those of the rudest sav- 
age. In fact, it deprives all investigations of valid- 
ity and worth. 

Some teachers of modern science have undertaken 
to tell us what man is. Their views are entirely 
materialistic. They are entitled to consideration 
only because so many have become familiar with 
them, and they represent a respectable body of think- 
ers. They take the two forms of nervous mechan- 
ism and endowed atoms. 

The automatic or mechanical theory is the older 
of the two. It may be shown that, in the lower 
forms of life, very much of what is attributed to 
brute intelligence is only so much nerve mechanism. 
By various experiments, forms of activity which are 
exactly what would be characteristic of a normal 
mental state are found to be entirely due to reflex 
action in the lower nerve center; that is, the nerve 
centers of the spinal cord. The mechanical move- 
ments of the limbs of the frog after the brain has 
been removed, under different excitants, are illustra- 
tions of what is meant. Now, if the reflex activities 
may be aroused in the lower centers mechanically, 
why may not all activities usually called intelligent 
be the result of mechanical excitements in the brain 
or higher centers? In other words, as the lower 
centers are mechanisms for operating in the more 
simple reflex activities, why may not the brain cen- 
ters be the mechanical centers for the more complex 
reflexes ? 



36 God Revealed; 

Descartes first maintained the self-sufficiency of 
the nervous mechanism to account for all the activ- 
ities in animals inferior to man. In 1870 Dr. Hodg- 
son took the advance step needed, and boldly pro- 
claimed that what was true of other animals was 
true of man. He affirmed that the feelings had noth- 
ing whatever to do with the actions of men, and il- 
lustrated his thought by the colors of the mosaic, 
which have nothing whatever to do with the kinds 
or arrangements of the stones. He says : "There 
is no necessity, therefore, in cases similar to 
the above" — that is, in all cases of the repro- 
duction of past scenes or presentations to the mind 
of any kind — "to assume a reaction of states of 
consciousness on states of nerve or brain." 1 The 
consciousness is simply a cause of the recognition of 
the reproduction; the nerve motion is the cause of 
the reproduction. 

Professor Huxley has taken the same position: 
"The consciousness of brutes would seem to be re- 
lated to the mechanism of their bodies simply as a 
collateral product of its working, and to be as com- 
pletely without any power to modify that working as 
the steam whistle which accompanies an engine is 
without influence on its machinery. Their volition, 
if they have any, is an emotion indicative of physical 
changes, not a cause of such changes. The soul 
stands related to the body as the bell of a clock to 
the works, and consciousness answers to the sound 

1 Theory of Practice \ vol. i, p. 419. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 37 

which the bell gives when it is struck. Thus far, I 
have strictly confined myself to the automatism of 
brutes. It is quite true that, to the best of my judg- 
ment, the argumentation which applies to brutes 
holds equally good of men; and, therefore, that all 
states of consciousness in us, as in them, are imme- 
diately caused by molecular changes of the brain 
substance." 1 

Professor W. K. Clifford gives his opinion : "But 
I may very well say that among the physical facts 
that go along at the same time with mental facts, 
there are forces at work. That is perfectly true, 
but the two things are two utterly different plat- 
forms; the physical facts go along by themselves, 
and the mental facts go along by themselves. There 
is a parallelism between them, but there is no inter- 
ference of one with the other." 2 

To the same purpose is a statement by John 
Stuart Mill, in his discussion of Causation : "To 
my apprehension, a volition is not an efficient cause, 
but simply a physical cause. Our will causes our 
bodily actions in the same sense, and in no other, in 
which cold causes ice, or a spark causes an explosion 
of gunpowder." 3 

The force and meaning of these quotations are 
clear enough. Man is a mechanism, only of a most 
delicate construction. From the nervous jerk of 
the foot to the holy sentiment of love to God, all 

3 "Are Animals Automata." Fortnightly Review, Nov., 1874, P- 577- 
^Lectures and Essays , " Body and Mind." 
3 Logic, Harper Brothers, p. 256. 



38 God Revealed; 

activities are due to disturbances in the nervous or- 
ganism. All this seems plain and simple enough to 
commend it to the good opinions of those who desire 
truth. It has this merit at least, that, at the first 
glance, it presents no confusing contradictions such 
as are involved apparently in the theory of a soul 
and body, with their perplexing differences and in- 
teractions. There is the continuousness of one activ- 
ity from first to last. 

Some questions, however, will arise. They might 
properly cause some trouble, were it not for the im- 
portant fact that they, too, according to the theory, 
are only the effects of a stimulus directly or indi- 
rectly applied. That an artist desires to produce a 
beautiful piece of work, at length accomplishes his 
work, and is then pleased, only shows a remarkable 
coincidence between desire, action, and pleasure in 
this case, but indicates absolutely nothing as to their 
relation to each other. They are wholly separate 
mechanical activities. Intelligence plays no part 
whatever in the result. Each effect is due to some 
stimulus quite independent of the others, and is pro- 
longed through an indefinite period, which may in- 
volve years. 

The mechanical theory finds an insurmountable 
difficulty in the difference between a mechanical 
movement and a thought or feeling. As these are 
generally known and defined, it does not seem pos- 
sible to bring the two together in such a way as to 
save the theory. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 39 

For instance, it is impossible to conceive of the 
passage of physical energy into a thought, however 
simple it may be. The two are so entirely contra- 
dictory of each other that by no process of reason- 
ing can they be harmonized. Prof. Tyndall says : 
"The passage from the brain to the corresponding 
facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that 
a definite thought and a definite molecular action in 
the brain occur simultaneously; we do not possess 
the intellectual organ which would enable us to pass, 
by any process of reasoning, from one to the 
other." 1 

Mr. Herbert Spencer says: "Can the oscillations 
of a molecule be represented side by side with a 
nervous shock, and the two be recognized as one? 
No effort enables us to assimilate them. That a unit 
of feeling has nothing in common with a unit of mo- 
tion becomes more than ever manifest when we 
bring the two into juxtaposition." 2 

These opinions agree with all that we know of the 
nature of thought and motion. However closely 
they may be related in man, they are to all appear- 
ance entirely unlike. The gulf is a fixed gulf that 
separates them. How shall it be bridged in such a 
way that all the phenomena of consciousness may 
be assigned to the realm of the physical, and an un- 
broken chain of progress be provided for from star 
dust to the most profound thought in philosophy ? 

1 Fragments of Science, " Scientific Materialism," vol. ii, p. 86, D. Apple- 
ton & Co., 1892. 

2 The Principles of Psychology, 1890, \ ol. i, p. 158. 



40 God Revealed; 

Evolution claims that matter must be endowed, 
and there will then be no gulf of difference. 

Professor Tyndall says upon this point: "Aban- 
doning all disguises, the confession which I feel 
bound to make before you is, that I prolong the 
vision backwards across the boundary of the experi- 
mental evidence, and discover in that matter which 
we, in our ignorance, and notwithstanding our pro- 
fessed reverence for its creator, have hitherto cov- 
ered with opprobrium, the form and potency of 
every form and quality of life." 1 

This is sufficiently explicit. It requires the 
philosophical insight of Mr. Spencer to tell how this 
can possibly be true without contradicting a funda- 
mental principle of evolution that the original atoms 
must have been alike and simple, and yet contain 
everything that now is and ever shall be, thought 
included. 

In his Principles of Psychology, in the chapter on 
the subject of the mind, he undertakes an explana- 
tion. After having asserted of all motion that 
there is a unit of physical force that produces it, and 
of thought and feeling that there is a unit of feeling 
that produces them, he says : "If they — the units of 
force — are what they are supposed to be by those 
who identify them with their symbols, then the diffi- 
culty of translating units of feeling into them is in- 
surmountable ; if force, as it objectively exists, is 

1 " Belfast Address," Fragments of Science, vol. ii, p. 191 ; " Apology for the 
Belfast Address," ibid., vol. ii, p. 207. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 41 

absolutely alien in nature from that which exists 
subjectively, then the transformation of force into 
feeling is unthinkable. But if, on the other hand, 
units of force, as they exist objectively, are essential- 
ly the same in nature with those manifested objec- 
tively, then a conceivable hypothesis remains open." 

"Units of feeling and units of force," says Mr. 
Spencer, "are essentially the same." The only differ- 
ence, so far as it is possible to understand Mr. Spen- 
cer, is that some of them form combinations of such 
a character that consciousness appears as a result of 
the combination ; others fail to enter into such com- 
binations, and no consciousness appears. A possi- 
bility of consciousness thus belongs to each atom or 
unit which will appear or not according to the 
combination into which it happens to fall. The dif- 
ference between a stone and consciousness is that of 
combination. As consciousness could not possibly 
have slipped into life at any time in the process of 
development, without violating the first principles of 
evolution, it must have resided in some mode of the 
original atoms. In this way it exists in star dust 
as well as in brain cells. 

It must be acknowledged that these answers given 
by science do not throw much intelligible light upon 
the nature of man. Such a man, with such a nature, 
could account for nothing, and explain nothing. 
He would be a riddle to himself, and a standing con- 
tradiction of all that he thinks himself to be. He 
would be the standing lie of the universe. 



42 God Revealed; 



STUDY V. 
Consciousness in Man. 

Consciousness has already been referred to in 
the preceding Study. It is characteristic of all sen- 
tient beings, but in man it possesses a greater con- 
tent than in any other being. It is, therefore, neces- 
sary to study the human consciousness with great 
carefulness. 

What is consciousness ? A definition of it, except 
in the way of a description of the phenomena in- 
volved, would be impossible. Dr. Porter defines it 
"as the power by which the soul knows its own acts 
and states." 1 He also quotes from Sir William 
Hamilton : "It is a comprehensive term for the com- 
plement of our cognitive energies." 2 From differ- 
ent points of view both of these statements repre- 
sent the truth. In consciousness, we do know our 
own states and acts, and consciousness is compre- 
hended in the sum of our cognitive energies. This 
is not, however, the same as saying that conscious- 
ness is a faculty of knowing, or that it is made up of 
the sum of all the faculties. It is a concomitant of 
them and is essential to their existence and validity, 
but can hardly be said to be any one or all of them. 
It may be affirmed of consciousness that it is a neces- 

1 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1871, p. 61. 

2 Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton, p. 137 et seq. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 43 

sary characteristic of all mental acts, without which 
knowing, willing, and feeling would have no exist- 
ence. 

Dr. Bowne, in his Psychology, upon this point 
says : "Consciousness, then, is not a faculty in addi- 
tion to the other faculties, but an implication of the 
other faculties. It is not a light which reveals men- 
tal processes existing in themselves, but is rather an 
essential property of those processes. On this view, 
the field of consciousness is simply that of immedi- 
ate experience without admixture of inference. It 
does not extend beyond the mental states and activ- 
ities themselves, and the presentations they mediate. 
What all this may mean admits of no further defini- 
tion; it can only be experienced." 1 

Consciousness is itself characterized by the uni- 
versal and ever-present recognition of self. This is 
illustrated in such expressions as "I know," "I will," 
"I feel." Descartes's famous dictum expresses the 
same fact : "I think, therefore I am." To what ex- 
tent knowledge is possible without the recognition of 
self, and what may be the character and significance 
of such knowledge, is a question variously answered ; 
but there can be no question that knowledge in a hu- 
man being, sufficiently developed to think at all, 
must involve the consciousness of self. 

Dr. Harris has said this so well that it is desirable 
to quote him : "The reality of man's knowledge of 
himself and his environment is a primitive fact of 

1 Introduction to Psychological Theory, 1887, p. 237. 



44 God Revealed; 

consciousness. This is implied in the first law of 
thought; knowledge implies a subject knowing and 
an object known, and is the relation between them. 
When I say knowledge is real, I simply formulate in 
thought the primitive consciousness, 'I know.' But 
this primitive consciousness, 'I know,' declares 
alike, 'It is I who know,' and 'I know something.' 
In every act of knowledge, man's knowledge of him- 
self as knowing is an essential element, and without 
this there can be no knowledge. Thus, his whole 
conscious activity in experience is a continuous 
revelation of the man to himself." 1 

This self is very definitely characterized in con- 
sciousness. 

First, it is continuous. Sleep, temporary un- 
consciousness from accident or sickness, long inter- 
vals of time between two events or experiences, cause 
no interruption whatever in the consciousness of the 
self. It is the one self throughout all the changes 
and suspensions. 

Second, it is unitary in its nature. In the midst 
of greatest diversity of sensation, perception, repre- 
sentation and conception, self is central to them all. 
In relation to them, and for them, it is the source of 
all knowledge. The life in consciousness is never 
divided between different centers, as though there 
might be more than one self. 

Third, self is related to all intelligent acts as their 
author and controller. All volitions proceed from 

1 Philosophical Basis of Theism, 1883, p. 12. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 45 

it. There is a conscious exercise of energies on the 
part of the self in the direction of all selected ends. 

Fourth., the self is inseparable from the life of the 
individual. Whatever that life may be, it ceases to 
have any significance as soon as it ceases to have a 
recognition of self. This is so true that it is incon- 
ceivable that life and all the various phenomena of 
existence could have any rational meaning without 
it. It is impossible to think of such a thing. Uni- 
versal language, history, literature, and the develop- 
ment of social life clearly represent this one ever- 
present phenomenon of the self as an ever-present 
necessity. 

The place and significance of the consciousness 
may be still further seen in its relation to certain 
classes of mental facts. 

For instance, all thinking as a process centers in 
the self. "I think, I thought, I have thought," em- 
brace the central self as persisting throughout all the 
time of the thought process as the source and effi- 
cient cause. Each thought is related to the self in 
this way, and, only in self, to each other thought. 
There is no confusion at all regarding the proper re- 
lation of all thought to the self, except in abnormal 
cases, as in hypnotism or insanity. 

Thought is always changing, but the self abides in 
the midst of all the changes as the permanent ele- 
ment to which they are all related, and in which they 
find a consistent unity and harmony. This cannot be 
put too strongly. No past mental state is the same 
4 



46 God Revealed; 

when it is recalled what it was when it was pre- 
sented. The point of view is different; the condi- 
tions are changed; many of the details have been 
forgotten; the mind itself has changed. More or 
less is present in the production than in the presenta- 
tion. In all this change, however great or small, 
the consciousness of the self abides. It is the only 
element that does abide. 

There is a clear consciousness of a distinction be- 
tween the self and the not-self. To consciousness 
in a world of things, over many of which it has con- 
trol, and to all of which it is related, the self is some- 
thing different from them. 

Thus, it is seen to be the peculiar feature of con- 
sciousness that it distinguishes an abiding self in the 
midst of the most variable conditions. It is a case 
of absolute identity, and the only sameness of which 
we know that is never interrupted throughout the 
conscious life. Personal identity is the term by 
which it is known. 

The value of memory for intelligent life consists 
in this reference of all past perceptions to this per- 
manent and central self. The images that are 
represented to the mind are recognized as having 
been presented in some past time to the self to which 
they now recur. However often these images may 
be reproduced, and after however long a time, they 
are referred to the same self. They have this 
peculiarity and this merit, that they are the product 
of the same self-activities, and serve a common in- 



or, Nature's Best Word. 47 

terest whose only significance is in the self; but 
they could never serve a common interest, and it is 
inconceivable that they could ever be related at all 
but for the self whose interests are a continuous and 
more or less consistent current. Otherwise they 
would only be fragments, cut off from each other 
and hopelessly separated. There is no memory, for 
rational intellignece at least, that does not involve 
the consciousness of the self. 

A similar statement may be made regarding the 
relating activity of the mind by which it brings dif- 
ferent perceptions and truths into a consistent whole. 
The self discovers these relations, and arranges all 
the facts of consciousness into an organized whole. 
If it were not for this, there would be a mass of 
sensations, but no perceptions or ideas. 

Attention includes the same reference to the self 
as the source of that energy which is represented in 
an act of attention. "I attend" is the testimony of 
consciousness. 

Freedom, which is fundamental to all thinking, 
refers all activities to a free self. 

The self is the great fact of human consciousness. 
Consciousness and the self can never be separated 
without the destruction of intelligence. The self 
would seem to be something quite tangible and real. 
It certainly points to an entity which thinks, feels, 
and wills, and but for the demands of a preconceived 
scientific or philosophical opinion, no one would ever 
think otherwise. 



48 God Revealed; 

Neither the mechanical theory nor the theory of 
endowed atoms, so popular in evolutionary philos- 
ophy, can account for the consciousness or the self. 
Both of them are in the way, and are obstacles which 
it is impossible to remove. All effort to account for 
thought by either of these theories is worse than a 
failure. 

Man as a self-acting being, endowed with intelli- 
gence and freedom, and absolutely distinct from 
material conditions with which he is so closely asso- 
ciated, is the only view that commends itself to 
common sense. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 49 



STUDY VI. 
Matter and Mind. 

Common sense has shown no disposition to iden- 
tify matter with mind. There has always existed 
apparently a recognized distinction between the 
thought activity and the physical activity. This, 
among peoples that have arrived at some degree of 
thought development, has amounted to a division 
into mind and matter, soul and body. All ancient 
languages contain in particular words the distinction 
here referred to. It has well been said that this 
does not prove anything. It does, however, raise a 
question. It forces the possibility that common 
sense, through an ultimate and indefinable necessity, 
has been compelled to assert this difference. 

Our investigations so far harmonize with this 
supposition. The entire incapacity of matter, as it 
is known and defined by science, to produce the phe- 
nomena of mind, is apparent enough to anyone. 
When, for the sake of a theory, matter is made what 
it does not appear to be, and is endowed with po- 
tencies which it least seems to have, in order that it 
may not fail to do its part in making a world with 
neither God nor mind in it, the contradictions and 
antagonisms are, if anything, more gross and glar- 
ing. Common sense may be pardoned, if it first 



50 God Revealed; 

wonders, then doubts, and finally turns away in ut- 
ter despair and disgust. 

As far as it is possible to judge, unless the act of 
judgment is only a remarkable collusion of a multi- 
tude of atoms, endowed or not with infinitely small 
grains of mind dust, there is an absolute and im- 
passable difference between a physical effect and a 
thought or a change in consciousness of any kind. 
In every conceivable respect they are unlike each 
other, and it is impossible to imagine how the two 
can be identical in any sense whatever. According 
to the view of science from which the positions re- 
ferred to above are taken, man is only an aggrega- 
tion of units that, in an inexplicable manner, may 
combine to produce all the phenomena of conscious- 
ness, as well as the activities, in the physical world. 
According to man's opinion of himself, he is a unit 
capable of thought and feeling. 

According to the former, he is the victim of activ- 
ities over which he has no control. According to 
the latter, he is the author of his own activities. 

According to the first, he is in no sense free. Ac- 
cording to the second, freedom of will is his most 
characteristic possession. 

If the first be true, it makes no difference to him 
whether anything else be true or false. If the sec- 
ond be true, then the true and the false are essen- 
tially different, and it is of the greatest importance 
that it be known which is true and which is false. 

The following points, in confirmation of the above 



or, Nature's Best Word. 51 

distinction between mind and matter, soul and body, 
may be made with no probability of their refu- 
tation : 

1. There are multitudes of psychical phenomena 
which cannot conceivably be traced to any physical 
stimulus as their source. Refined speculations, for 
instance, into the nature of the deity, would seem 
to be of this kind. 

2. The second point seems to be almost a repeti- 
tion of the first; namely, there is no exact correlation 
between the expenditure of physical force and the 
corresponding psychical activities. At least, it has 
never been shown. It has been asserted, but never 
proved. 

3. There is not the slightest evidence that phys- 
ical force is transformed into thought, emotion or 
volition, or does more in itself than to arouse a phys- 
ical effect. Tyndall says : "The passage from the 
physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of 
consciousness is unthinkable." 

4. Every fact of consciousness, if it has any 
meaning at all, and is of any value as evidence, 
throws the weight of its testimony entirely in the in- 
terest of an absolute distinction between mind and 
matter. 

5. On the theory of the existence of the entity 
called a soul, the loss of energy in the physical or- 
ganism, in consequence of the physical activities in 
connection with psychical activities, may be due, and 
doubtless is due, to the use which the soul makes of 



52 God Revealed; 

the bodily organism under the present constitution 
of things. 

6. If thought is the result of physical energy, and 
has no influence upon the working of the body, or if, 
as Professor Huxley has said, "the soul stands re- 
lated to the body as the bell of the clock to the 
works," how is it that all that is fairest and best in 
the world's treasures has appeared to be the result 
of the exercise of intelligent contrivance and calcula- 
tion? In such a case deception would appear to be 
more the order of nature than truth. 

7. Again, if thought is no more than the bell to 
the works of a clock, arising from an inexplicable 
correlation with physical force, how is it that we 
only know physical phenomena through thought? 

It is impossible to see how any theory of the en- 
dowment of matter with potencies, whatever that 
may mean, can at all account for phenomena. 

1. Such endowment is wholly outside our concep- 
tion of matter and the definition that we are accus- 
tomed to give to it. It is certainly not recognized 
by science, except when science undertakes to con- 
struct the world. 

2. This explanation of the origin of the thought 
series is open to the objection that no combination of 
even two forces toward definite ends is conceivable 
without a unitary power to direct and control them ; 
but this is not, and cannot be, a part of the assump- 
tion, without introducing what would be equivalent 
to the spiritual entity, the soul. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 53 

3. It ignores entirely the fact that both thought 
series and force series are objective to a something 
of which we say "I" and "mine." 

4. According to Mr. Spencer, the ultimate atoms' 
or units of force or feeling represent a capacity for 
consciousness, or a nascent consciousness. The dif- 
ference between the unit of force and the unit of 
feeling lies in the development of this nascent con- 
sciousness by the combinations into which they fall. 
This nascent consciousness, however, must be ex- 
ceedingly primitive and dim. It is impossible to con- 
ceive how millions of these units could combine in 
a consciousness like that of even a child. They 
commit the absurdity of producing in combination 
what no one of them in the slightest degree produces 
in latent element or appearance, according to Mr. 
Spencer's own supposition. No one of them has 
consciousness to start with. How could conscious- 
ness be the product ? 

It would seem to be reasonably clear, then, that 
if one atom, or a thousand atoms by themselves, are 
devoid of consciousness, it is impossible to believe 
that a thousand, or a million, forming a more com- 
plex combination, could in any way produce a state 
of consciousness. To say that consciousness is a 
product or function of a mass of atoms uniting in a 
peculiar way is to use words to which we can attach 
no clear meaning. It is inconceivable that there can 
be in the whole what does not exist in the parts, even 
in its elements. Either all atoms are conscious, or 



54 God Revealed; 

consciousness is something quite distinct from them 
and its presence in any combination of atoms is 
proof of the existence of an intelligence outside, and 
independent, of what we call matter. 

Assuming, however, that a nascent consciousness 
means a fragment of consciousness, it is an impos- 
sible task for one to undertake to explain how any 
number of these units or fragments could combine in 
the purposive form of thought. For such an end, it 
would be necessary for them to have some power of 
agreement or arrangement, if any definite result is to 
follow. If they do not so agree, or cannot so agree 
— which is assumed, since it is only their combina- 
tion that can give a consciousness or intelligence nec- 
essary to such agreement — then it must be an infinite 
puzzle how they come together and accomplish any 
purpose whatever. Either there is such a purpose in 
the world back of these atoms, or these atoms do not 
combine to produce purpose. 

Du Bois-Reymond says : "The complete knowl- 
edge of the brain, the highest knowledge we can at- 
tain, reveals to us nothing but matter in motion. 
What conceivable connection exists between certain 
movements of certain atoms in my brain, on the one 
hand, and, on the other, the (to me) original, 
but not further definable, but undeniable facts, T 
feel/ T feel pain/ T feel pleasure/ T take something 
sweet, smell roses, hear organ sounds, see some- 
thing red/ and the just immediately resulting cer- 
tainty, Therefore, I am'? It is impossible to see 



or, Nature's Best Word. 55 

how the cooperation of the atoms in consciousness 
can result. Even if I were to attribute conscious- 
ness to the atoms, that would neither explain con- 
sciousness in general, nor would that in any way- 
help us to understand the unitary consciousness of 
the individual." 

Let it be supposed that we have a number of dif- 
ferent sensations, as those of sight, hearing, smell. 
As effects from a physical stimulus through the ap- 
propriate organ, there is not the slightest reason 
why, on the basis of a mechanical arrangement, there 
should be a continuous or unified consciousness. 
The different sensations might just as well be repre- 
sented as occurring, the one in the sea, another in 
the middle of a continent, the third in the heavens, 
as the one in one region of the brain, another in a 
different locality, and the third in still another sec- 
tion of the brain. It is not the contiguity of these 
sensations, physically considered, in the brain cavity 
that gives, for instance, the conception of gunpow- 
der. They might just as well have been a thousand 
miles apart for all the explanation afforded by their 
nearness is worth. In neither case would any one 
sensation have any connection with any other sensa- 
tion, or any control over it, for a definite end. Each, 
in both cases, is entirely distinct and separate from 
the others. Under such circumstances, without 
mind, no such state as that of consciousness is con- 
ceivable. The one condition of a unified conscious- 
ness is wanting. A fusion of elements into a mass 



56 God Revealed; 

would mean nothing in this case, since such fusion 
is a physical process, and has no counterpart in a 
state of consciousness. In physics, it would only be 
a closer relation of atoms or molecules. Analogy 
explains nothing. The only explanation is the con- 
scious self; that is, a soul. This only can give 
unity ; it alone can furnish a consciousness. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 57 



STUDY VII. 
Mind the Test of Reality. 

What is the nature of reality? How may it be 
ascertained? These are questions which come to 
everyone as the changeable and fluctuating character 
of his life and the world seem more evident. He 
believes that there is no way of answering these 
questions except through the reason. The laws of 
thought and the principles that underlie his nature 
must furnish the test. 

There is no other mode of answering these in- 
quiries, and, if these should fail, or be proved inade- 
quate, there would be no resource left. Faith could 
not meet the demand, for there is no faith which does 
not have its foundation in reason. Revelation could 
not do it, for revelation would necessarily, to some 
degree, appeal to reason. Instinct or feeling would 
have no value. The test of all reality, and of all 
truth, must be the reason. 

In all practical matters, that is, matters with 
which we have to do in the interest of everyday life, 
the most implicit reliance is put upon the faculties of 
the mind. All men do this. No sophistries can im- 
pair their confidence in reason. No suggestions or 
schemes, however flattering in their promise, ap- 
peal to men, unless they can be justified by good and 
sufficient reasons. Whatever speculations they may 



58 God Revealed; 

indulge in regard to the nature of mind and matter, 
well calculated to throw doubt on the reliability of 
all reasoning processes, they go right on doing what 
they would have done had they never heard of such 
speculations. All men are one in this most entire 
and practical confidence in themselves as the tests 
and interpreters of the world, in its relation to their 
daily interests. 

The trustworthiness of the rational principles 
must be admitted, if knowledge can be accepted as 
reliable in the realm of ultimate principles and 
truths. The three tests which are generally applied 
and have the appearance at least of value, self-evi- 
dence, necessity, and universality, imply this most 
certainly. Self-evidence is an appeal to a direct in- 
tuition. Necessity is not predicated of anything ac- 
cidental or arbitrary, or of long continuance, but to 
the demand which universal mind makes for it. It 
must be shown to be an essential demand of the con- 
stitution of things as understood by human intelli- 
gence. Universality does not merely include that 
which is common to the experiences of mankind, but 
has its ground in the perceived nature of things. So 
far as the rational principles are concerned, these 
tests are the strongest possible tests that can be ap- 
plied to truth. That certain ultimate principles of 
thought and intelligence are self-evident, necessary, 
and universal, must be accepted as sufficient proof 
that these principles are entirely reliable. 

Tfie sense perceptions must be trusted to give us 



or, Nature's Best Word. 59 

reality. Here, of course, the common facts con- 
nected with sense perception are familiar to all. 
The view, which seems to the unspeculative mind 
the perfection of simplicity, that objects are pre- 
sented to the thought from the beginning as wholes, 
and need no other explanation, is readily discarded. 
That the knowledge of the world, with its number- 
less objects, has been created from sensations by the 
organizing activity of the mind, is necessarily ac- 
cepted. It is also freely admitted that the real ob- 
jects in time and space are quite unlike what they 
appear to be in thought. The vibrations which re- 
sult in the harmonies of Haydn's "Creation" are 
not the harmonious sounds that fill the soul with 
triumphant joy. The same is true of all other per- 
ceptions. 

Reality, however, need not be rejected in the ex- 
ternal world, whatever theory may be held regard- 
ing the nature of those objects which give rise to 
sense perceptions. The external reality as to its 
form may not be known in sense-perception, but we 
know its attributes and their relations. It is not a 
question as to the nature of the reality, but whether 
there is something external to the perceiving self 
which is the occasion of the sensations and percep- 
tions. Matter may have a hard and fixed form, as 
it seems to have, or it may only be a mode of activ- 
ity. In either case, the demands of externality and 
reality are satisfied. 

It may be said that it is impossible to think that 



60 God Revealed; 

there is no external reality answering to these ob- 
jective conditions which appear to appeal to the 
senses. Practically, no one does question these con- 
ditions. Whatever his science or philosophy may 
be, he never fails to act in all things with reference 
to the real about him. To undertake to think the 
world of phenomena out of existence would be, for 
most men, a fruitless task, however easy it may be 
for the idealist philosopher to sweep them all away 
and offer in their place only phenomena of the 
mind. Common sense refuses to undertake any- 
thing of the kind, simply because it cannot do it; 
and it would be for it suicide, if it could. 

There is no course of reasoning that ever has, or 
ever can, shatter these conditions of reality in the 
phenomenal world. Men go on believing in them in 
the face of the arguments to the contrary which a 
few gifted philosophers present, and even those who 
make such arguments act as though they had never 
given utterance to them. Most men readily accept 
the claims of evolutionary philosophy that physical 
phenomena are real, although they would be unwill- 
ing to admit that it is the only reality. 

This is equivalent to saying that men believe im- 
plicitly in their own perceptions and rational power 
as the source of knowledge. They are confident 
that things are as they appear to be when every ra- 
tional test has been applied to them. They are not 
ready to believe that they are themselves a living 
falsehood, and the world about them an illusion. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 61 

Their only ground of confidence is the conclusion of 
a well-disciplined and thoroughly furnished judg- 
ment. 

Sciences are built upon the basis of the validity of 
the rational principles and perceptions; and, in the 
verification of scientific opinions, appeal is made at 
once to those very laws, or first principles of 
thought, which are implicitly accepted by all. 
Science is only the application of the laws of thought 
to material forms and facts. Read into the world 
these principles and this reality, and the world be- 
comes an orderly and intelligible thing. The 
calculations and verifications which men are carry- 
ing on in a thousand ways show how much a part of 
life itself is this conviction, and how destructive of 
every interest and truth would be the denial of the 
validity of the rational powers in understanding the 
natural world. 

Dr. Harris says upon this point: "If primitive 
knowledge" — that is, knowledge derived from first 
principles — "is found to be in harmony with experi- 
ence: if the first principles which regulate thought 
do not lead us in our reasonings to error and con- 
tradiction, but to conclusions which all our powers 
in concurrence acknowledge as truth; if what we 
in our philosophy hold to be primitive knowledge 
conditioning experience is in harmony with our 
actual experience, then we may properly say that it 
is continually verified by experience." 1 

- * Philosophical Basis of Theism, p. 31. 



62 God Revealed; 

It is hard to conceive what proof we can possibly 
have of reality, if it is not to be recognized and 
tested by the reasoning powers of man. His own 
thought must determine what is real for him, and 
his testimony upon this point, given by his reason 
under the tests of self-evidence, necessity, and uni- 
versality, must be accepted by him, or nothing can 
be known as real. 

If the rational principles are to be trusted, and 
their products are to be accepted, then it is quite 
proper and entirely consistent that one man, with 
one set of data, should hold one view, and another, 
with another set of data, a different view of truth, 
and each fall back upon his own line of reasoning for 
his proof. He has no other guide for thought or 
action. His knowledge may be defective, or his 
reasoning may be lame, but it is the best that either 
can do. Each believes that, with sufficient facts and 
correct reasoning, he would be led directly to the 
truth. 

Whatever throws doubt upon the entire reliability 
of man's rational powers, as the test of truth and 
reality, by so much puts all truths beyond the possi- 
bility of discovery or confirmation. To make a ma- 
chine of human reason, to constitute the mere for- 
tuitous outcome of irrationally combining units a 
source of knowledge, and then to set it to the task of 
forming sciences, solving great problems of phi- 
losophy and religion, organizing governments, and 
conducting the vast enterprises of the world, is a 



or, Nature's Best Word. 63 

most absurd performance. That that remarkable out- 
come of atoms, called St. Paul, gives us the Pauline 
view of the universe, and that other remarkable out- 
come of atoms, called Spencer, gives us an elaborate 
philosophy of evolution, has no significance what- 
ever, except that the units so combined with the 
result named. 

This seems supremely ridiculous, but there is no 
escape from the view if it is necessary to accept 
either the mechanical or automatic theory, or put 
confidence in Spencer's theory of endowed atoms. 
Consciousness and will become only effects which 
accompany movements of molecules or combinations 
of atoms. Man himself is only the highest ex- 
pression of these fortuitous activities. Whatever 
may be the outcome, more or less, it is of no con- 
sequence. Nothing, in fact, is of any consequence. 
Man is not what he seems to be, and what he may 
actually be under such conditions he can never find 
out, and would secure no good, if he could. 

If, then, the rational principles are to be ac- 
corded a place in discovering truth, they must be 
relied upon to vindicate themselves, and their prod- 
ucts must be acccepted as real and valid. Other- 
wise, mankind must sink into the worst kind of 
agnosticism, and thought must be surrendered as 
worthless. 

Dr. Bowne says, in his Studies of Theism: "1. 
Unless we admit the mind with an outfit of rational 
principles, and for which principles it needs no proof 



64 God Revealed; 

beyond its own power of insight, there is no rational 
science possible. 2. Unless we admit that these 
rational principles are the laws of reality, or that 
reason is lawgiving for objective fact, again no ra- 
tional science is possible. 3. Unless we allow that 
the basal fact of the universe is a free and rational 
creator, there is no rational science possible." 1 

1 Studies of Theism, p. 117. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 65 



STUDY VIII. 
The Categories of Thought. 

Assuming that reason is the test of truth, the 
question remains: What are the necessary condi- 
tions of thought? That is, what are those princi- 
ples or laws inhering in mind, according to which 
everyone must think, if he thinks correctly? The 
argument is that these necessities of reason, usually 
called first principles or categories of thought, re- 
quire actual conditions and relations in the world, 
which, in turn, imply the existence of an intelligent 
creator and ruler. 

The idea of substance or being, universal and un- 
limited, underlying and conditioning all phenomena, 
may first be mentioned. This is a necessity forced 
upon every thinking mind by the very nature of 
mind and things. 

Our perceptions do not give us the nature of sub- 
stance. Our intuitions, however, declare that, 
behind all this changing externality, there is a sus- 
taining substance of some kind. In this concep- 
tion are included existence, force, endurance, activ- 
ity. All these external things into connection 
with which our sense perceptions bring us, to 
our inmost conviction, have in themselves, or out of 
themselves, but certainly as the condition of their 



66 God Revealed; 

existence, a background in reality, a substance, but 
for which they could not exist. Our conviction of 
the reality of the changing phenomena must rest on 
the conviction of the reality of the substance. 
Causality is dependent, also, upon this truth, and is 
part of it. The existence of being, or substance, 
while we have not reasoned it out consciously, is 
firmly grounded in our intelligence, and conditions 
an intelligible explanation of phenomena. What 
this substance is, is another question, but of sub- 
stance itself there can be no doubt which does not 
doubt everything else. 

Cause and effect are fundamental to all knowl- 
edge. With every effect we believe there must be an 
adequate cause. This is something more than mere 
sequence, however much the perception of sequence 
may have to do with the idea of cause and effect. If 
there were sequence only, it would be difficult to see 
why we have any other idea than sequence. We 
never think of sequence, however close it may be, 
when we speak of cause and effect. We distinguish 
readily between mere sequence, as in day and night, 
for instance, and cause and effect, as in the relation 
of the spark to powder, causing an explosion. We 
say of cause, first, that it has reality; second, that 
it contains in itself power to produce a given result ; 
and, third, that the effect must be represented in the 
cause. Consciousness and observation affirm the 
correctness of our belief. The past, present, and 
future are explicable only on the supposition of the 



or, Nature's Best Word. 67 

absolute and unvarying relation of cause and effect. 
The mind intuitively believes in this relation, and it 
may be regarded as a necessary, universal and origi- 
nal belief. If sequence were all, and one cause 
might, for all that appears, be the cause of anything 
else, there would be an end to all order in thought 
and things. 

A knowledge of self is another fundamental 
truth. We believe in self. We believe that we are. 
Whether we come to this knowledge directly or in- 
directly, the conviction is undeniable. It is certain 
that among the earliest things we know, and among 
the things about which we never entertain a doubt, 
is self. We know self as existing, as possessing 
power, as exercising that power for definite pur- 
poses, as distinct from other selves, as having its own 
laws and characteristics. We have a necessary and 
absolute knowledge of self which will not permit us 
to deny it. No one can deny it. We know self 
through the consciousness without which there 
could be no intelligence. To deny such a self-con- 
sciousness is to deny self, and put an end forever to 
every truth and to all knowledge. This knowledge 
is implied in every expression of life. We neither 
speak nor act without bringing it into the fore- 
ground. In this self-consciousness and in a self- 
determination are found the conditions of person- 
ality. 

The reality of the not-self claims our attention. 
We know self, and with quite as much certainty we 



68 God Revealed; 

know the not-self. That is, we know a world that 
is external to us, and, in some form, real. We 
may not know what that world is, how it is con- 
stituted, and it may not correspond in all respects to 
the common view taken of it. Whether it is some- 
thing hard and fixed, as it seems to us to be, or a 
mode of energy, it is something real and external. 
The natural end of egoistic idealism is nihilism. If 
we do not know the external world, we are not what 
we think, and nothing is what we think it is; we are 
deceived. We live in the unvarying conviction that 
there is the objective as well as the subjective. 
While it is conceivable that beings may think and 
reason without the external world, it is inconceivable 
that we can know anything with certainty, or reason 
at all, if once it is admitted that there is nothing ob- 
jective to us, corresponding to our thought. Reason 
demands the objective and real for its satisfaction, 
and even existence, and the profoundest philosophy 
declares that reason is right. 

Freedom is another presupposition of intelli- 
gence. Intelligence in its nature is free. The op- 
posite of rational freedom is mechanical necessity. 
Activities which we call intellectual may be thought 
of in two ways : either as originated by causes out- 
side of self, physical or otherwise, or as originated in 
the soul. In the former case, one psychological con- 
dition follows another as effect its cause; in the 
latter, the soul puts forth energy for specific pur- 
poses. In the former case, it is an order of sequence, 



or, Nature's Best Word. 69 

whose direction is provided for in the antecedent 
cause of each action. In the latter, it is the end or 
purpose which determines the action. The differ- 
ence between the two is that between necessity and 
free choice. The one is something done upon the 
mind as the entire explanation of its action; the 
other is something done by the mind. In the case 
of necessitated action, reasoning, reflection, judg- 
ment, conclusion, choice, and purpose have no sig- 
nificance. If they may be conceived of as having 
an existence, they have no meaning for intelligence 
without freedom. They lead to nothing; they end 
in nothing. They are, if anything, only the effects 
produced by forces of some kind acting on the soul. 
This is certainly not rationality, the primary condi- 
tion of which is, that reflection, judgment, choice, 
purpose, representative of the inherent power of the 
soul to act, should be originated in the soul. As we 
have seen, this is a necessity of any rational 
explanation of what we call psychical phenomena. 
This, at the same time, is the condition of free- 
dom. 

Personal identity is another fundamental truth. 
We haye an intuitive conviction of our own identity, 
or the identity of self. The past and present self 
are one. If there were no such identity, there could 
be no knowledge. The current of thought must not 
only be continuous in the order of the sequence of its 
moments, but that continuousness itself must not be 
broken up into moments or events. It must be an 



70 God Revealed; 

unchangeable one. On any other condition the 
operations which we now attribute to the soul would 
be impossible. 

Order is presupposed in rationality. Thinking 
depends upon order of the most exact character. 
This is the foundation of logic. Logic simply 
points out the order of thought. The whole and 
the part, the genus and species, the universal and 
particular, are only so many indications and laws of 
order. Whatever is intelligently done is done with 
reference to an order, and that order, whether in 
reasoning, classification, or definition in their sim- 
plest forms, must conform strictly to the laws of 
order. In this respect the external world and the 
internal world are governed by the same laws. 
Mind and matter, when either is intelligible, exhibit 
the same laws of order. 

These conditions, cause and effect, self, objective 
reality, being, freedom, personal identity, and order, 
are certainly presupposed in intelligence. 

The denial of these supposed forms of intelligence 
is the denial of all intelligence. 

The denial of intelligence in man is a denial of a 
rational explanation of the universe and man. 

A denial of a rational explanation of the universe 
and man surrenders the universe and man to 
Atheism and necessity, the claims of materialistic 
philosophy. When this is done there is no ex- 
planation of the existence of the universe and man. 
We have gained nothing in the surrender of every- 



or, Nature's Best Word. 71 

thing. The light of materialism is really only a 
deeper darkness. 

Accepting these presuppositions of intelligence, 
while not everything is explained or known, we have 
advanced further in the direction of a satisfactory 
understanding of our own natures and the nature of 
the world in which we live than it would be possible 
to do in any other way. 



72 God Revealed; 



STUDY IX. 
Ontological Argument. 

The first argument usually presented in proof of 
the existence of God is called the Ontological Argu- 
ment. It is the oldest formal statement of theistic 
arguments. In a general way, it may be said that, 
according to it, the idea of God, which is so uni- 
versal among men, is itself a proof of the existence 
of God. The argument cannot be regarded as of 
any great value in the form in which it has been 
stated by most of those who have employed it. 
Some of its latest advocates have added to it in such 
a way as to change to a considerable extent its value 
but they have changed very largely its character at 
the same time. 

The history of this argument begins as far back 
as Plato. His theory of ideas was that ideas were 
the archetypal realities of which all things seen were 
but the fleeting phenomena. These realities belong 
to the mind, and are reflected in the phenomena of 
the world. They come to us. They must, there- 
fore, come from the supreme being. The idea of a 
supreme being is, then, the proof of the existence 
of that being. Among the earliest theologians, Au- 
gustine and others, who were under the influence of 
Platonism, this argument was of great value. 

Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, 1033-1109, 



or, Nature's Best Word. 73 

employed this argument. He gave it in its simplest 
form : "That which exists in fact is greater than 
that which exists in the mind. We have an idea of 
an infinitely perfect being; but actual existence is in- 
cluded in infinite perfection. Therefore, we have 
reason to believe in the existence." 1 

Descartes's argument is similar to this: "We 
have the idea of an infinitely perfect being. As we 
are finite, the idea could not have originated with 
us. It could not have originated in anything about 
us. It must, therefore, have come from God. 
Hence, the existence of God is assured." Anselm 
infers the existence of God to account for the idea. 
Descartes argues that actual existence is included in 
the idea. 2 

Dr. Samuel Clarke, 1675- 1729, varies slightly the 
argument. He says: "Nothing is necessarily ex- 
istent the nonexistence of which is conceivable. 
Nonexistence of duration and space is inconceiv- 
able. They are necessary and infinite. Space and 
duration are not substances, but attributes. There 
must, therefore, be a necessary and eternal existence, 
that is, God." 

Cousin, in his Elements of Psychology, presents 
the same general argument in his own form : "The 
idea of the infinite opposed to the finite is nothing 
less than the idea of perfection opposed to imperfec- 
tion. What, in fact, is consciousness for us, but the 

1 See Hodse's Theology, vol. i, p. 204. 

3 Meditations and Selections, translated from the Latin, 1872. 



74 God Revealed; 

sentiment of our imperfection and weakness. On 
every hand, the finite and imperfect appear in me; 
but I cannot have the idea of the finite and imperfect 
without having the idea of the infinite and perfect. 
These two ideas are logically correlatives, and, in 
order of their acquisition, that of finite and imper- 
fect precedes the other. Now, the infinite and per- 
fect is God himself." 1 

Bishop Butler, 1692- 1752, says: 2 "We find 
within ourselves the idea of infinity, that is, im- 
mensity and eternity, impossible, even in imagina- 
tion, to be removed out of being. We seem to 
discern intuitively, that there must and cannot but 
be somewhat external to ourselves, answering this 
idea, or the archetype of it. And hence we con- 
clude that there is, and cannot but be, an infinite and 
immense eternal Being existing prior to all 
design contributing to his existence, and exclusive 
of it." 

Lotze denies the logical value of this argument, 
but says: "But, although logically this attempt at 
proof is quite invalid, it is nevertheless of interest in 
other respects. This is obviously rather a case where 
an altogether immediate conviction breaks through 
into consciousness; to wit, that the totality of 
all that has value — all that is perfect, fair, and good 
— cannot possibly be homeless in the world, or in 
the realm of actuality, but has the very best claim to 

1 Elements of Psychology , p. 375. 

2 A nalogy^ part i, chap. vi. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 75 

be regarded by us as imperishable reality. This 
assurance, which properly has no need of proof, has 
sought to formulate itself, after a scholastic fashion, 
in the above-mentioned awkward argument." 1 

Dr. Samuel Harris, of Yale University, has 
brought this argument into prominence in his very 
able work on Theism. The condition which he puts 
upon the idea of God is, that it be a necessary idea. 
He claims that it is such an idea. It is necessary to 
reason that it may solve the problems that are forced 
upon it in the world of phenomena. He accepts the 
argument, with this modification of it, as one of 
great force and value. He says upon this point : 

"In order to the conclusiveness of this argument, 
it must be shown, both that the idea of the absolute 
being is a necessary idea of being, and that the ex- 
istence of the being is necessarily included in the 
idea. This is what has been shown. That the ab- 
solute being exists is a necessary idea of reason, self- 
evident to rational intuition ; it is the necessary pre- 
supposition in all knowledge of being as soon as 
being is known. And it is not merely the idea, but 
also the existence of God, which is necessary to rea- 
son in order that it may solve its necessary prob- 
lems, and attain a rational comprehension of the uni- 
verse in scientific knowledge." 2 

Again : "We find here, in a first principle of rea- 
son, the starting point for the whole course of evi- 

1 Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion, 1882, p. 9. 

2 Self-revelation of God, 1887, p. 164. 



76 God Revealed; 

dence of the existence of God as found by reflective 
thought. And because this principle asserts itself 
in consciousness on the occasion of our knowing 
that some being exists, and presents as self-evident 
the existence of absolute being, we see the signifi- 
cance of its name as the Ontological Argument." 1 

The argument stated in this way differs in form 
and value from that of Anselm and Descartes. Ac- 
cording to it, we have no idea of absolute being. Per- 
fection and existence are necessary elements of that 
being, but are not proofs of the existence of that be- 
ing. They are the result of the analysis of the idea 
of being. The idea of being is irresistibly forced 
upon the mind. We cannot prevent the idea. It is 
innate, and compelled by the laws of the reason. 
Substance and attributes, as we have seen, must be 
accepted as among the categories of thought. We 
must think of them, if we think at all. Back of all 
changing phenomena is universal being, upon 
which all phenomena must rest. Existence, causal- 
ity, activity, are presupposed in the very idea. The 
necessities of the thought may reach even further 
than this, and demand intelligence and perfection. 
As a starting point, therefore, in the theistic argu- 
ment, which will remit of research in the broadest 
fields of philosophic investigation, the idea of God in 
being is of fundamental and essential value. 

The value of the argument may be variously esti- 
mated, according to the point of view of him who 

1 Self-revelation of God, pp 164, 165. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 77 

makes it or judges it. Whatever logical value it 
may or may not have, it at least affords a strong pre- 
sumption in favor of the existence of a supreme be- 
ing, whom we call God. 

Dr. Valentine, in his Natural Theology, states his 
view of the argument in this way : "Contingent and 
dependent being does not fill out the idea of real be- 
ing, and we are compelled to think of ultimate being, 
involving the ideas of self-existence, independence 
and eternity. Thus, by a single analysis of our 
necessary idea and knowledge of real being, we find 
it to include an absolute and self-existent being. 
The ontological argument is simply an analysis of 
the first great fact of our consciousness, the con- 
sciousness of existence. If we believe in existence at 
all, as we must, we must believe in eternal existence, 
absolute existence. In so far as this absolute exist- 
ence is necessarily identical with God, the evidence is 
conclusive." 1 

Professor Flint says of this argument : "This, it 
may be objected, is not equivalent to a proof of the 
existence of an infinite and eternal being. It leads 
merely to the alternative, either that an infinite and 
eternal being exists, of that the consciousness and 
reason of man cannot be trusted. The absolute 
skeptic will rejoice to have this alternative offered to 
him; that the human mind is essentially untrust- 
worthy is precisely what he maintains. I answer 
that I admit the arguments in question do not 

1 Natural Theology , 1885, p. 52. 



7$ God Revealed; 

amount to a direct proof, but they constitute a 
re duct ic ad absurdum, which is just as good, and 
that, if they do not exclude absolute skepticism, it 
is merely because absolute skepticism is willing to 
accept what is absurd. If, though I am constrained 
to conclude that there is an infinite and eternal 
being, I may reject the conclusion on the supposition 
that reason is untrustworthy, I am clearly bound, in 
self-consistency, to set aside the testimony of my 
senses also by the assumption that they are habitu- 
ally delusive." 1 

1 Theism — Baird Lecture for 1876, Wm. Blackwood &. Sons, p. 286. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 79 



STUDY X. 

COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. 

The second argument employed to prove the ex- 
istence of the supreme being is called the Cosmolog- 
ical Argument. It proceeds upon the supposition of 
a sufficient cause for all things, and affirms that suffi- 
cient cause is the first cause, himself uncaused, God. 
It is a posteriori. In it, the reasoning is from effect 
to cause. Every effect must have an adequate 
cause. The universe is an effect. It must have an 
adequate cause. That adequate cause must be an 
all-powerful, intelligent being. 

We are to understand here, by cause, not mere 
sequence, with its antecedent and consequent, but 
that which has potentiality, and is fitted, and is suffi- 
cient, to produce the given results. It includes 
antecedent and consequent, but its meaning is not 
exhausted by the strict meaning of these terms. 

It is desirable to distinguish between efficient, ma- 
terial, and final cause. The efficient cause is the 
agent who employs the instrument or means to ef- 
fect a change or produce a result. The material 
cause is that by which a result is accomplished. It 
is the instrument or means, or material, by which 
a work is done. The final cause is the purpose or 
design involved. Cause is used here in the sense of 
agent. It is the efficient. 



8o God Revealed; 

An effect is that which does not have the elements 
or power of existence in itself. It is indebted for 
its existence to some agent outside of itself. It is 
conditioned and dependent. It has a beginning. It 
is temporary, and must also have an end. It pre- 
supposes, therefore, an efficient cause. It is claimed, 
as a part of the argument, that the universe is an ef- 
fect. If this be true, it must have the same 
characteristics as other effects. That is, it must be 
conditioned, dependent, temporary, and must have 
had a beginning at some time in the past. 

That the universe is a true effect in the sense sug- 
gested has been claimed on several grounds : First, 
it shows signs of progress from one stage to another 
in the process of its development. Second, what- 
ever may be the particular effect that we examine, it 
can be traced to a preceding effect, and this effect to 
another effect, and so on. Each single thing is both 
cause and effect, in turn. Third, there are indications 
of waste and decay. Fourth, it is impossible to find 
in the universe that which might be regarded as hav- 
ing potency, independently, in itself, and which, as 
an essential element of every particle of matter, 
would account for its existence. All these positions 
have been denied, and their opposites affirmed. 
Which is the correct position is the point to be de- 
cided. 

The validity of the principle of cause, which 
affirms that everything and every change are the re- 
sult of a potency which is not the thing or the 



or, Nature's Best Word. 8i 

change, is confirmed by the fact that it enters into 
all the interests of daily life, is at the basis of all the 
sciences, and is assumed in the conduct and thoughts 
of men. It has the three tests of all fundamental 
principles; namely, self-evidence, necessity, and uni- 
versality. Men maintain it, not because it is an at- 
tractive theory, but because it is a fact which cannot 
be denied in theory or neglected in practice. The 
conviction of mankind is that no event occurs with- 
out a cause, and, if an event occurs for which there 
is no assignable cause, there is a search at once for 
the cause, under the conviction, which cannot be 
overthrown, that there is such a cause somewhere. 
As everything is supported by something else, so it is 
believed that everything is caused by something else. 

The clearest exhibition of cause and its nature is 
found in man himself. It is a matter of personal 
experience with everyone that he is a cause, and is 
related, as a cause, to his surroundings and to all his 
movements. The idea of causation, therefore, must 
exist in every man's own consciousness, from the 
earliest moments of his life, in virtue of this fact 
that he is himself the efficient cause of various 
changes, conditions, and events. Man would be 
compelled to deny to himself one of the most impor- 
tant and one of the most common of all the func- 
tions which he thinks he possesses, if this were not so. 

Tn immediate connection with this fact of causa- 
tion, as one of the prerogatives of man, is also that 
ether fact, that every causation is attended with 



82 God Revealed; 

power. It is the prime fact in an event or change of 
any kind. It is the belief of everyone that, to bring 
anything to pass, however small and insignificant it 
may be, there must be the exercise of power. This 
experience, together with a constant observation of 
what seems to be the same fact in numberless other 
cases, leaves no question to the common mind — that 
is, the mind unbiased by a theory — of the existence 
of the principle of causation. 

There ought to be no doubt, then, that the prin- 
ciple of causation exists as one of the necessary be- 
liefs the denial of which is impossible. The real- 
ity and significance of the belief are the points to 
be tested. 

The easiest and simplest conclusion would be that 
there is a first cause that contains in itself the pos- 
sibility of all existences, laws, and changes that be- 
long to the physical world. The nature of the first 
cause would then be determined by an analysis of 
phenomena and a perfect understanding of the quali- 
ties inhering in, and presupposed by, matter. This 
has undoubtedly been the course pursued in primi- 
tive conditions of human life. 

If the principle and conclusion are not valid, have 
any theories been advanced as objections which 
carry authority with them ? 

The theory which goes along with the mechanical 
theory of the origin of mental phenomena proposes 
to explain causation by attributing to matter a po- 
tency whose exclusive right to be regarded as the 



or, Nature's Best Word. 83 

sufficient origin of all things no one has any right to 
call in question. Matter is no longer dead or inert. 
The smallest division of matter, the atom or 
molecule, contains all power. This is a theory 
which is sufficiently insisted upon by ultrascientists, 
or by men who find everything necessary for the con- 
struction of the world, men, and all things beside, in 
the world of matter. It is no wonder that they de- 
clare that matter is not the wretched stuff which men 
have always considered it to be. If it can do all 
this, it must be acknowledged by all that matter is 
something glorious — more glorious, in fact, than 
mind. The theory, however, stands or falls with 
the mechanical theory of the origin of consciousness 
and its contents. The theory is a mere assumption 
which has not been demonstrated, and cannot be 
demonstrated, it is thought; and, should it be 
answered that the principle and implications of 
causation have not been demonstrated, and cannot be 
demonstrated, it might be responded that, admitting 
that no demonstration has been given, the probabili- 
ties in favor of the principle of causation, with all 
that it implies, would be vastly greater. So far 
as demonstration is possible and is of any value, 
it has been demonstrated, it is claimed. 

Hume's theory, which forms at least the basis of 
some modern theories, denies the existence of the 
principle of cause, as it is understood. We are 
cognizant of nothing, he says, but the sequence of 
events. One event follows another in regular and 



84 God Revealed; 

invariable succession. One phenomenon occurs in 
immediate connection with another phenomenon. 
Sequence, in these cases, is all that we know, and all 
that it is possible to know. Mr. Mill modified Mr. 
Hume's position somewhat in making it his. He 
says : "It is necessary to our using of the word cause 
that we should believe, not only that the antecedent 
always has been followed by the consequent, but 
that, as long as the present order of things endures, 
it always will be so." 1 

In order to prove that there is nothing in cause, 
however conceived, which necessitates a first cause, 
Mr. Mill says: "The fact of experience, however, 
turns out to be that not everything which we know 
derives its existence from a cause, but only every 
event or change." 2 "There is in nature a permanent 
element, and also a changeable; the changes are al- 
ways the effects of previous changes ; the permanent 
existences, so far as we know, are not effects at all." 3 
As a fact of experience, then, causation cannot be 
legitimately extended to the material universe itself, 
but only to its changeable phenomena ; of these, in- 
deed, cause may be affirmed without any exception. 
It would seem, therefore, that our experience, in- 
stead of furnishing an argument for a first cause, is 
repugnant to it; and the very essence of causation, 
as it exists within the limits of our knowledge, is 
incompatible with a first cause. 

1 Logic. Harper & Brothers, 1870, p. 244. 

2 Three Essays on Religion — Theism^ p. 142. 

3 Tbid., p. 142. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 85 

Mr. Mill, as he himself acknowledges and as 
Professor Diman shows, in his Theism bases his 
permanent element upon force: "For all effects," 
he says, "can be traced up to it, while it cannot 
be traced up, by our experience, to anything 
beyond." 1 In this he is in harmony with the 
general position of Mr. Spencer regarding the re- 
sults of the last analysis of matter. Professor 
Diman affirms that, to this extent, Mr. Mill has 
conceded what is essential in the idea of cause. 
The theory of an original, persistent, indestruc- 
tible force is but a method of accounting for a 
change. He denies that the positions of Mr. Mill 
and others have ever been proved, or even made 
probable. 

The question is, whether the universal belief of 
men shall pass for nothing and thereby prove the 
unreality of all things, or be counted for something 
and lead to a confidence in an original cause, which 
is not matter, but possessed of power over matter as 
its creator and former. For spiritual and think- 
ing man, it is the choice between something and 
nothing. 

The cause ought to be adequate to all the effects. 
Therefore the cause ought to have intelligence as 
well as power. So far we are warranted in going, 
if we admit a first cause. Even more than this 
might be inferred. 

Professor Diman, after stating the value which he 

1 Three Essays on Religion — Theism, p. 145. 



86 God Revealed; 

gives to this argument, says: "From the universe., 
as an effect, we have simply argued a cause, and all 
that we have undertaken to show further is that a 
mere sequence of second causes does not furnish 
what the reason craves. I concede that, in the bare 
idea of a first cause, we do not have the idea of 
God." 1 

1 The Theistic Argument, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1881, p. 98. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 87 



STUDY XL 
Argument from Design. 

This is called the Teleological Argument, or the 
argument from design, or final causes. 

The form of the argument is this: Whatever 
shows marks of intelligence must have an intelligent 
author. The world shows marks of intelligence. 
The world must, therefore, have an intelligent 
author. 

This argument advances beyond the ontological 
and cosmological arguments in furnishing proofs 
and illustrations of the doctrines of Theism. While 
the conclusions to which the previous arguments 
led were being and cause, the design argument adds 
the attribute of intelligence. From the argument 
from design, if it is valid, we may infer many other 
attributes, as benevolence, truth, omniscience, and 
omnipresence. 

In denning design, we may say : First, it implies 
an end to be accomplished. It must be clearly 
shown that the particular thing is not the result of 
a fortuitous combination of elements in something 
which has the appearance of an end. The possibil- 
ity of the presence of mere chance must be excluded. 
It must also be proved that there is no possibility 
that law, conceived of, improperly, as an agent, 
could have accomplished, as a law, what we are ac- 



88 God Revealed; 

customed to attribute to intelligence. Second, it 
provides means suitable for the attainment of an 
end. The selection of the material, both in its kind 
and quantity, must be seen to be appropriate to the 
end, and such as might have been due to a careful 
and skillful choice. Third, it must show an intelli- 
gent application of the means to secure the end. As 
an illustration of these conditions we may select the 
eye. The design is evidently sight. For the ac- 
complishment of this purpose, muscles, lenses, fluid, 
with a supporting and protecting structure, present 
us with material wrought into forms, every one of 
which illustrates all that the whole eye represents. 
The arrangement of these parts in the very best 
manner possible for the accomplishment of the end 
shows an intelligent application of means to end. 
The eye, completed, and performing its wonderful 
part in furnishing us with the elements of knowl- 
edge, is a most beautiful illustration of the design 
argument. 

In all works of art, these conditions are invariably 
and necessarily present. We recognize them, and 
acknowledge their necessity. The watchmaker makes 
a watch. His purpose is to make something that 
shall enable men to keep an accurate account of the 
passage of time. He selects his material with ref- 
erence to this particular purpose. To do this he 
must understand the laws of mechanics, the nature 
of different kinds of material, the best means for 
guarding against the extremes of heat and cold, and 



or, Nature's Best Word. 89 

of producing uniformity of movement from day to 
day and week to week. The slightest carelessness, 
or ignorance, or want of skill, will vitiate the work. 
The skillful application of the means to the end will 
be seen and acknowledged, and the watchmaker will 
be praised as an intelligent man. What is true of 
the watch and the watchmaker will be true of every 
piece of mechanism and every designer. 

There is no limit in nature to apparent illustra- 
* tions of just such instances of design as these. 
Adaptation of part to part for a particular end, won- 
derful contrivances which, in delicacy, far surpass 
anything in art, beautiful combinations which fit 
with precision into large and comprehensive ar- 
rangements, are found everywhere. Books on 
science are full of them. Upon these numerous in- 
stances of design, or supposed design, the greatest 
confidence has been placed in this argument. It 
has been thought to be irrefutable. 

On the face of it, it must be confessed, the argu- 
ment seems to be very strong. It certainly is 
strong, and has been employed with great force. 
There is no limit to the confidence which we 
put in the appearance of contrivance in any object 
that may be supposed to have been made by man. 
Flint flakes, of the rudest form, stand for the exist- 
ence of man in far-off periods, although there may 
be no other evidences of his presence in that age and 
locality. A stick whittled into any shape, in the 
most remote part of the globe, in the most obscure 



90 God Revealed; 

and isolated place, where man would have been least 
likely ever to have found his way, is the surest kind 
of proof that man has been there, for the simple 
reason that only his intelligence could account for 
the whittled stick found there. Men have reasoned 
in the same way regarding the nature of the first 
cause, and some of the ablest men have held that 
the argument was unimpeachable. 

The strength of the Teleological Argument has 
consisted in the analogy which has been supposed to 
exist between the manifestations of intelligence in 
the works of man and the works of nature. It is 
objected that there is no such analogy. We see the 
workman perform his work, and he accomplishes his 
work only by shaping matter provided for him. 
There is nothing like this in the world of natural ob- 
jects. An inscrutable mystery marks the appear- 
ance of everything, and the process is that of 
growth. The validity of this objection is questioned 
from the fact that it is the existence of design, and 
not the way in which it is effected, that is the point 
of inquiry. The distinction is justly made. Is 
there intelligence, as we understand the term? As 
a matter of fact, we do not see intelligence at work 
in man any more than in growth. We do not see 
man at all. It would be an unreasonable limitation 
to affirm that intelligence could only manifest itself 
in one way, and in that way in which man is accus- 
tomed to accomplish his purposes. It would be 
equally as unreasonable to discriminate between 



or, Nature's Best Word. 91 

phenomena involving essentially the same condi- 
tions, and attribute to the one set of phenomena in- 
telligence and deny it to another because of some ac- 
cidental circumstances. We infer the intelligence 
of man from his works, and his method of working 
is no more easily comprehended, when all the ele- 
ments of his activity are taken into the account, than 
is the growth of a tree, or growth in anything else. 

Evolution is supposed to be opposed to the Teleo- 
logical Argument, and strong advocates of evolution 
have affirmed that the theory would necessarily in- 
volve the overthrow of this argument. Such a state- 
ment, however, must be understood as applying to 
the mechanical theory of evolution, which makes no 
provision for either divine origination, preservation, 
or control of the universe, and confuses mind with 
matter. With such assumptions, the argument 
would be impossible. Such an evolution must, of 
necessity, destroy Teleology. 

Something has been made of the statement that 
no one purpose can be discovered to which all other 
purposes are subordinate; and it has been affirmed 
that much that seems to be of the nature of design 
must be attributed to accidental conditions. Many 
failures, too, are apparent in the arrangements of 
this world. A divine and omniscient intelligence 
would have ordered quite differently, it is thought. 
Tt is acknowledged, however, that wonderful adap- 
tations to special ends are frequent. Even the fail- 
ures are also acknowledged to be according to law. 



92 God Revealed; 

It is true that physical nature does not disclose a 
great purpose for which all things were made and are 
controlled. Whether the glory of God, the perfection 
of man, or some other great end, it must be admitted 
that it cannot be learned from nature. The absence 
from physical nature of any such clearly defined pur- 
pose would not necessarily disprove the existence of 
a purpose, or depreciate the value of single instances 
of apparent contrivance as evidence of a creating 
and controlling intelligence according to which the 
universe has come into existence. The fact that the 
first cause has manifested itself as though it had 
plans, whatever that first cause may have been, is 
the very best evidence that there is a plan, whether 
we can understand it fully or not. 

In the discovery of a purpose, no part of nature 
ought to be excluded or included in such a way as 
to prejudge the case. The phenomena represented 
in man's nature, the moral as well as the intellectual, 
must be accorded a place and meaning. 

Dr. Bowne says of this argument: "If, then, 
watches point to an unseen workman who knows 
what he is doing, nature also points to an unseen 
workman who knows what he is doing. Any doubt 
of the one must extend to the other. But, if we 
may be practically sure of our neighbor's intelli- 
gence, and that because he acts so intelligently, we 
may be sure that the world-ground is intelligent for 
the same reason." 1 

1 Philosophy of Theism^ p. 107. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 93 

The design argument has been held to teach a 
construction of the world by one who was, and is, 
external to it. Such a view is inconceivable, and not 
sustained by the facts in the case. The strongest 
arguments may be made against such a position. It 
is answered, however, and with good grounds for 
the statement, that it is not necessary to suppose 
anything of the kind. The immanence of the first 
cause is quite as consistent with the planning of the 
world as would be his transcendence. It is more 
consistent, and not at all contradictory of such 
planning. Our idea of intelligence at work is de- 
rived from our own contrivances, in which man is 
external to material, and that material is provided 
for him. It need not, and cannot, be so in the case 
of the first cause. 

It has been affirmed that there is no need of an in- 
telligence to account for the world — that laws ac- 
count for it; but laws demand a law-giver, and, as 
a matter of fact, law cannot explain anything. It 
can only exhibit modes of operation. 

I quote Dr. Bowne again: "As a result of all 
these considerations," referring to some positions 
taken, "we hold that the design argument, when the 
unity of the world-ground is given, proves far more 
conclusively the existence of mind in nature than it 
does the existence of mind in man. The two stand 
or fall together." 1 

1 Philosophy of Theism^ p. in. 



94 God Revealed; 



STUDY XII. 
Intelligence in the World. 

The design argument may be greatly strengthened 
by a consideration of the ways in which the laws of 
intelligence and thought are illustrated in the world. 

That intelligence is an attribute of the first cause 
is affirmed because of the rational character of the 
world. The world is intelligible; it is knowable. 
As we study it we learn something of it and from 
it. If the world were a collection of unrelated and 
disjointed things, without order, method, or end, the 
intellect would simply be baffled. The mind would 
be weary, dissatisfied, and oppressed, without one 
thought on which to rest. 

If, on the contrary, the mind discovered relation, 
order, end, whole, parts, harmony, it would be 
pleased, satisfied, and instructed, and would thereby 
come to a knowledge of the world. The world 
would express some idea to the mind. Mind would 
be at home in the realm of matter. It would be 
fitted to the world and in accord with it. In short, 
there would be a perfect correlation between mind 
and the world. 

This is the way, in fact, in which the world is pre- 
sented to the mind. Law, order, system, are every- 
where manifested in it. Each element is correlated 



or, Nature's Best Word. 95 

to some other element, and all are combined into a 
whole. All things are explained in terms of other 
things to which they are uniformly and definitely 
related. 

One of the most clearly attested facts in science is 
the universal presence of law. So prevalent is law 
that some scientists have attributed to it a potency, 
as though it would account for all things that exist. 
Law expresses one truth, namely, the existence of 
order or sequence. It is simply an expression of the 
constituted channel which force, of whatever kind, 
uniformly follows in realizing different forms. It 
only declares the fact that things occur according to 
a definite order. It has no power. It only indi- 
cates the way in which power manifests itself. 

The term law is employed in another connection, 
which is admitted by all to be entirely correct and 
essential as the basis of all scientific classification. 
Without uniform and absolute laws the sciences 
would be impossible. In constituted channels, force 
is working constantly in the direction of forms at 
once the most delicate and wonderful. This order, 
working out definite purposes, leading into sys- 
tems, and marking the limits and possibilities of 
force in different directions, is an expression of in- 
telligence which appeals to the mind. Without it 
this world would be an empty place for intelligent 
beings. "God geometrizes," said Plato, and man 
understands his geometry, and interprets it. 

The doctrine of evolution is one of the grandest 



96 God Revealed; 

illustrations of this orderly and systematic arrange- 
ment in its march from one kingdom to another, 
from the lowest to the highest, from the incomplete to 
the complete — to man, whose intelligent and know- 
ing mind is the only thing that can complete such 
a world as this, and without which this world would 
have no use or meaning. 

In the study of mind, we recognized certain uni- 
versal and necessary laws of thought, according to 
which all must think, and without which thought is 
inconceivable. They are known as categories of 
thought. We have cause and effect, being and at- 
tributes, whole and part, proportion, harmony, 
regularity or order. All of these are illustrated in 
myriad forms, and are absolutely necessary to any 
classification or understanding of phenomena. 

The material world shows a most perfect logical 
arrangement. That is, the relation of every par- 
ticular thing to every other thing, in making com- 
plete wholes or classes, follows the laws of thought 
laid down in books of logic. For instance, geom- 
etry, or the science of magnitude, with its lines, 
angles, and surfaces, is pure logic. The organiza- 
tion of phenomena into classes and subclasses con- 
stitutes the sciences, as astromony, chemistry; and 
the union of all of these sciences into a more compre- 
hensive whole is a strictly logical process. There 
would be no sciences but for this logical arrange- 
ment. 

Even more than this might be said. By what 



or, Nature's Best Word. 97 

means is man's intelligence developed and strength- 
ened? This grand result has been accomplished in 
his study of the physical world. The sciences are 
recommended to the student, not simply for their 
practical utility in enabling him to obtain a liveli- 
hood, but because of their value as a study which 
will discipline the mind. The physical world has 
been the teacher of man. He grows wiser and 
stronger from his intercourse with it. The multi- 
tude of facts and the disclosure of principles enrich 
the mind, and render it greater and nobler. These 
are simple truths, but they possess the greatest sig- 
nificance. 

The conclusion apparently forced upon us is that, 
whatever intelligence is, it must have been con- 
cerned in the formation of the world. The great 
source of the world, whatever that source might have 
been, had both the capacity and disposition to ar- 
range all things according to the order which we 
call intelligence. Man, as an illustration of intelli- 
gence, a conscious cause, working and thinking 
always according to the laws which are presented 
in the world, is a type of the first cause. That first 
cause must possess the attribute of intelligence. 

The only apparent escape from this conclusion is 
to deny intelligence any existence or significance 
apart from matter. Such a denial on the part of 
man is a denial of that which distinguishes and sep- 
arates him from the material world in nature, and 
gives him preeminence. One material thing is as 



98 God Revealed; 

good as another, and in itself no better. That ma- 
terial thing whose characteristic is mind is no better 
than that material thing whose characteristic is 
brightness, as in the diamond. Both are manifesta- 
tions of matter. At the same time it robs man of 
the only justification which he has in passing judg- 
ment on this subject, or on any other. In any case 
his judgments are mechanical and the necessary 
sequence of material changes. 

Such an attempt to meet the argument from in- 
telligence not only annihilates intelligence in man, 
but leaves the impressive and essential truths in 
nature without any explanation whatever. The 
world is inexplicable. Man himself is inexplicable. 
Neither the whence nor the whither of things admits 
of any explanation. There is no one to explain, and 
no one to whom an explanation could be given. At 
the best, it would only be a mechanical contrivance 
acting upon a mechanical contrivance. Even the 
word contrivance is out of place, for that implies a 
contriver. 

Intelligence in the world, in its very structure and 
processes of development, gives a meaning to it. 
For darkness there is light; for chance or fatality 
there is purpose; for despair, hope; for simple being, 
an intelligent creator. 

There are two ways in which it is possible to treat 
truth. We may doubt everything and demand over- 
whelming proof; or, on the other hand, we may 
accept that which seems most probable and har- 



or, Nature's Best Word. 99 

monious with the facts until we have reason to doubt 
the conclusion reached. 

This latter course ought to be followed in the 
study of the teachings of nature. Why should men 
assume that nature is a stupendous deception, and 
demand proof that it is not ? It is far more reason- 
able, and certainly more in accordance with the 
dictates of common sense, to accept the appearance 
of nature as real and truthful than to doubt reality 
and truthfulness, and challenge proof. There is 
very little that can be said of one who rejects in- 
telligence in the world and reduces his own activities 
to a nervous mechanism, all for the sake of a scien- 
tific theory. 

The world is the product either of intelligence 
or of nonintelligence. There is nothing else. If 
we attribute the existence and forms of things to 
nonintelligence, we must account for the fact that 
r everywhere, as a universal and necessary element, 
intelligence is manifested. If the nonintelligent is 
the source of all things also, we must also acknowl- 
edge that there is more in the effect than in the cause, 
which is absurd and inconceivable. To ascribe in- 
telligence to mechanical forces, or to a transcen- 
dental something which is neither intelligence nor 
nonintelligence, but a combination of both, is simply 
to play with words, and to put the answer to the 
question still further off. 

The mechanical theory of nature can in no way 
explain the wonderful fact of an intelligent pervad- 



ioo God Revealed; 

ing all things. It has no way of showing why the 
world should be a world of organized phenomena 
rather than a world of unrelated atoms, if such a 
thing were conceivable. 

We usually adopt hypotheses by showing which 
explains the largest number of phenomena. It is 
absurd to reject an hypothesis simply because it did 
not answer all the conditions of the problem, and ac- 
cept its opposite when it answers none of them. 
Which of the hypotheses answers best the demands 
of the problem involved in the existence and 
organization of the world, intelligence or nonin- 
telligence? Admit nonintelligence, and it does not 
answer any of the questions that arise. It involves 
us in constant contradictions. Admit intelligence 
in the world, and an intelligent author of the world, 
and, while questions may remain to be answered, the 
most important will already have been answered. 



or, Nature's Best Word. ioi 



STUDY XIIL 
The Moral Argument. 

Arguments for the existence of God are not to 
be found alone in the demands of the intellect, al- 
though the logical necessity for a God to meet the 
intellectual requirements of man is very great, and 
ought to satisfy the earnest seeker after truth. The 
Moral Argument supplement the arguments from 
design and intelligence in the world, and furnishes 
another strong proof of the existence of God. 

To appreciate the force of this argument, it is 
necessary to observe the difference between the 
sensibilities and the intellect. While they are opera- 
tions of the same indivisible self, and neither can be 
active without involving the other to some extent, in 
the sphere of their operations they are quite distinct. 
The intellect is that form of psychical activity which 
relates objects, both in and out of the mind, and 
organizes them into a logical order, in the form of 
precepts, concepts, judgments, and reasoning. The 
intellect, therefore, represents an objective order. 
The sensibilities, on the contrary, represent a sub- 
jective experience. It is to this subjective experi- 
ence that moral law appeals for its validity. 

It is necessary to avoid a misunderstanding. No 
moral quality is recognized without perception and 
judgment. The same intellect that is active in other 



102 God Revealed; 

matters is necessary in all moral perceptions. At 
the same time, it is equally true that there can be 
no recognition of a moral quality without an activity 
of the sensibilities of a most marked character. An 
intellectual statement of a moral truth alone means 
no more to a person than a description of color to a 
blind man. No definition of purity will give to 
anyone the slightest idea of the meaning of purity. 
Everyone must feel what it is to be pure. The force 
of the word justice is wanting in the most elaborate 
description of its meaning to him who has never 
been just. It must be felt. Conscience is not only 
an intellectual perception of right and wrong re- 
garding self-conduct, but it is a feeling of ought or 
ought not with reference to a given act. 

The two essential elements of a moral act, con- 
scious self-determination and conscious capacity of 
purpose, harmonize with this view. By self-deter- 
mination man is able to initiate and carry forward 
any undertaking. By his capacity for purpose, he 
calculates the result of actions, and plans for a 
definite end. These two conditions inhere in man 
as a self. He does not, in helpless passivity, repre- 
sent so many states of consciousness moving on 
under the law of association to a particular end, as 
a current in a river bed. If this were all there is 
in man's moral activity, it would be idle to talk of 
the moral quality of his acts, unless moral is made 
equivalent to mechanical. He is a center of con- 
scious activities, whose outcome he sees and fully 



or, Nature's Best Word. 103 

provides for. The moral nature of man is, there- 
fore, much more an essential part of the self than 
the intellectual, and the moral argument for the ex- 
istence of God finds a deeper response in man's 
moral consciousness. 

A necessary result of these two conditions of a 
moral act is a feeling of responsibility. It is incon- 
ceivable that it could be otherwise with a being 
whose action in one of many directions is selected 
and performed by himself. This feeling is often 
heightened to such a degree that the consciousness 
of it is a burden and distress. Sin, guilt, and re- 
morse are the frequent forms in which it is ex- 
pressed. The victim is unable to escape in any way 
from the wretchedness that preys upon his life. 
This is a common experience which is to be 
accounted for. 

Whatever presumptive force there may be in the 
argument that, because men have these feelings of 
accountability and responsibility to some being, 
there must be a being to whom they are responsible, 
there is a real argument in the fact that such is the 
nature and such the position in which every day man 
is placed, that he cannot escape the sense of re- 
sponsibility. That he feels responsible is only the 
echo of the fact in his own nature. It is the recog- 
nition of a free and intelligent self which is of 
necessity related to, and dependent upon, a being 
who is free and independent as well as intelligent. 
Man himself is not alone and independent. Society 



104 God Revealed; 

forms no such independent unity as to force upon 
him a responsibility to it. It answers in no fitting 
way to the self which he is. It has no inherent inde- 
pendence, no essential unity. It is an aggregation 
of responsible units, each one of which and all to- 
gether declare their dependence and responsibility 
to a higher power. 

In close relation to this sense of responsibility, 
and as the expression of his moral life, is another 
feeling, best expressed as the ought of the moral 
consciousness. That this feeling is generally ad- 
mitted cannot be denied, but the ground of it lies 
deeper in the nature of man than feeling. As a feel- 
ing, many attempts have been made to explain it. 
As a fact, its explanation must be sought in the na- 
ture of the self. 

There are two explanations of this ought, only 
one of which is consistent with a free and intelligent 
self. The first is that it has been transmitted from 
animals to man in the evolution of living beings, and 
was originally the controlling power of environ- 
ment. In man, education, social surroundings, 
religious teachings and customs, in part hereditary, 
in part personally experienced, create the ought, or 
a sense of obligation to an order already existing, 
Any departure from an habitual course of action 
produces regret, guilt, and, perhaps, remorse. If 
the time should ever come when all impulses to de- 
part from the environment should cease, the feeling 
of the ought, or duty, would also then cease. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 105 

The activities of the self which are provided for 
in this way are, however, entirely mechanical. It is 
the explanation which is made by scientific evolution 
for all activities in the world. Everything is what it 
is because it is compelled to be so by a force pushing 
from behind. The stone falls to the ground because 
gravitation forces it to the ground. Two chemical 
elements combine because of a force which brings- 
them together. In animals and man alike, each 
movement is determined by impulses awakened from 
without. All things act from a power which impels 
them. 

This is not a rational explanation of what seem to 
be rational actions. Such an ought only sinks to the 
level of mechanical action, which every man re- 
pudiates. Each one affirms that he acts because he 
desires so to act, and that the reason of his action is 
an end to be gained which meets most fully all the 
conscious conditions of his being. He creates the 
end, which is only another way of saying that he 
creates his own motive. All men readily assent to 
such an explanation of their conduct, and denounce, 
as unworthy of them, the idea that they act without 
any reference to a desirable end to be reached. 

This is only another way of saying that man acts 
according to an ideal, and this is the essential char- 
acteristic of his action. He Is so constituted that he 
is capable of conceiving of an indefinitely higher and 
better condition which he ought to realize. If he 
goes to one place rather than another, he says that he 



106 God Revealed; 

ought to go, and that for the reason that, all things 
considered, it will be best for him. It is impossible 
for him to stand between unequal advantages with- 
out a feeling of obligation to himself, at least, to se- 
cure the one that has the best promise of good for 
him. He may, overborne by passion, seek the other, 
but the obligation of his ideal remains with him to 
enforce the obligation to do what, on the whole, 
satisfies the largest number of conditions, and is a 
pressing imperative whose violation is followed by 
more or less pungent regrets. 

Very frequently these obligations are only pru- 
dential in their character, and include problems of 
temporal well-being. They may be remedied by 
wiser choices in the future. There is, however, an 
ought which is an imperative that offers no alterna- 
tive and allows no further time, whose coercive 
demands are heard in the inmost being, and the 
measure of whose significance and continuousness is 
eternal. They create the feeling that nothing can 
atone for a violation, purposely, of the ideal of con- 
duct dominant in the life. To obey the ideal is bet- 
ter than life; to disobey it is worse than death. 
After it man ever pursues, drawn by its promise of 
goodness and beauty. He makes and follows his 
ideal under the compulsion of the perfection to be 
attained. 

How this ideal is formed and what it includes 
are steps Godward. Out of the possibilities of his 
own personality, seen in the light of careful scrutiny 



or, Nature's Best Word. 107 

and experience, man discovers the promises of some- 
thing better and nobler. In relation to family and 
society, as spheres for personal moral activities and 
development, the ideal grows still larger and more 
attractive. In the yet wider sphere of humanity, 
extending throughout the world and through all 
time, offering to present activity a boundless field of 
noble endeavor, the self finds ample room for the 
development of the style which it seeks to imitate. 
Guided and inspired by the pressing necessity of per- 
fection, the ideal becomes a possibility that is forever 
moving onward toward something even more ex- 
pressive of what it really is. Like all ideals, as in 
art, for instance, it grows by thought, study, com- 
parison, and personal activity. 

The ideal of infinitely perfect moral goodness is 
the only conceivable limit to the personal ideal. 
Beyond the individual possibilities, beyond the 
moral law of society and humanity, the ideally per- 
fect moral order stretches away into infinity. 

What does all this mean? Is this ideal, which 
lays such endless obligations upon the self, an unreal 
fancy, a fiction of the imagination? Such a fact, if 
it could once take possession of mankind, would ut- 
terly destroy the power of the moral ideal to control 
the life. And why should not this truth of the fic- 
titious character of this ideal be discovered, if it be 
a truth? What is to hinder man penetrating this 
great deception, and hurling it from him as a 
horrible farce? The only hindrance is the deeper 



io8 God Revealed; 

conviction that beyond this ideal is the Absolute 
Moral Real; that right, truth, perfection, are not 
terms whose meaning is exhausted in the picturing 
power of the mind, but are not known in infinite 
realm. Hence, too, springs the assurance that this 
Absolute Moral Real is in nowise to be conceived as 
an impersonal moral order, but as a divine, free, in- 
telligent existence, in whom moral law finds an in- 
finitely perfect expression. Such a conception, in 
turn, gives power to the ideal, and makes more sig- 
nificant the ought of moral conduct. Moral percep- 
tion is anchored to the throne of a moral Ruler who 
stands for perfect uprightness, justice, and benevo- 
lence. Any other explanation empties the ideal of 
all meaning and degrades human living to inex- 
plicable contradictions. Morality vanishes, and 
good and evil become worthless distinctions. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 109 

STUDY XIV. 
Moral Argument Continued. 

With the conclusions reached in the previous 
Study in regard to personal responsibility and the 
ideal of man Theism is in the most entire agreement, 
although these conclusions are not admitted by 
scientific evolutionists. There are, however, the very 
best reasons for believing that they are correct. 
Evolution, as a theory of progressive development 
from the simple and unanalyzable atom through the 
different kingdoms to man, is a movement upward 
to completion and perfection. Just what that com- 
pleteness and perfection may be is, with the evolu- 
tionist, an unsolved problem. With the Theist and 
the Christian it is a moral completeness and perfec- 
tion. The Theist claims that this is the one all-em- 
bracing purpose, running through all the variations 
of nature, which furnishes the key to the explanation 
of existence. If this is not correct, the key has not 
yet been found, and the riddle of this sphinx has not 
been solved. 

There is no doubt that scientific evolution, so far 

as physical forms are concerned, has reached its 

highest expression in man. In the nature of the 

case, this development cannot go any further. 

While it is conceivable that the form of man might 

be improved, and his capacities enlarged, it is quite 

certain that such will never be the case. The 
8 



no God Revealed; 

development of the physical strength in man is 
already a secondary matter. Brute force, once so 
carefully cultivated, is not now in demand. The 
cultivation of physical strength is scientifically con- 
ducted for the simple purpose of giving opportunity 
for mental development. With his knowledge of 
mechanical laws, man can easily command more 
power and manipulate it in a more wonderful man- 
ner than would be possible with any increase what- 
ever of bodily strength or faculties. What need is 
there of a better eye, with microscope and telescope? 
What demand is there for more fingers, with the 
lingers of steel which he can employ a thousand 
times more rapidly and accurately for the utilities of 
life? The one force of scientific evolution, always 
working toward the enlargement of capacities, 
namely, that of need and use, has no longer any 
place in physical development. 

Supposing, however, that evolution may still con- 
tinue its work in the perfection of the brain cells, and 
in the increase thereby of intellectual activity and 
power, it comes to a dead stop when it reaches moral 
conduct. This can readily be seen to be true, in 
spite of a multitude of socialistic writers who find 
their social ethics in evolution. 

It is necessary to recall the fundamental principle 
of evolution. It is a struggle for existence, with a 
survival of the fittest. What jugglery of words can 
deduce an altruistic spirit or universal charity from 
such a conception ? The most reprehensible egoism, 



or, Nature's Best Word. i i i 

which thinks of nothing but self and works for 
nothing but self, and in its frantic efforts treads 
down all other struggling wretches, is the correct 
picture of evolution. When the reader has entered 
the realm of Mr. Spencer's Data of Ethics, in which 
he explains ethics on the basis of evolution, he 
will meet with tacitly and unconsciously admitted 
principles which are utterly at war with scientific 
evolution. "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thy- 
self," and "Do unto others as ye would that they 
should do unto you," are not evolutional in their 
character. They do represent what the age de- 
mands in its system of ethics. 

The utter antagonism between ethics and evolu- 
tion, and, as for that matter, between any material- 
istic account of the universe and moral principles, is 
shown by Mr. Huxley, in his Romanes Lecture 
on Evolution and Ethics. He affirms that, while 
man, in the earlier stages of his development, was a 
perfect illustration of the principles of evolution, "in 
the unscrupulous seizing upon all that could be 
grasped, the tenacious holding of all that could be 
kept," in his present condition of civilization he has 
passed beyond that as the ideal of his conduct. 
"Civilized man brands all these ape and tiger 
promptings as sin; he punishes many of the acts 
that grow from them as crimes." "I have said that 
civilized man has reached this point: the assertion 
is, perhaps, too broad and general ; I had better put 
it that ethical man has attained thereto." 



ii2 God Revealed; 

"Social progress means a checking of the cosmic 
process at every stop, and the substitution for it of 
another, which may be called the ethical process, 
the end of which is not the survival of those who 
may happen to be fittest in respect to the whole of 
the conditions which obtain, but of those which are 
ethically the best. In place of ruthless self-asser- 
tion it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting 
aside or treading down all competitors it requires 
that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall 
help, his fellows." "Law and moral precepts are 
directed to the end of curbing the cosmic process." 
"Yet, if what I have insisted upon is true; if the 
cosmic process has no sort of relation to moral ends ; 
if the imitation of it by man is inconsistent with the 
first principles of ethics, what becomes of the sur- 
prising theory?" 

Yes. "What becomes of the surprising theory?" 
It is clear that the largest part of human life is un- 
explained, and inexplicable, on the basis of evolu- 
tion, if this dualism of nature and ethics be correct. 
The ethical man is not a product of nature. He does 
not find a home in any kingdom of the cosmos. 
There is no fitness or utility in his struggles after a 
better life or nobler destiny. He is a contradiction 
of all the cosmic processes. In nature, life is a 
struggle of the individual to maintain, at any cost, 
his own integrity, while it is the great struggle of the 
rest of the world to despoil him of all his posses- 
sions. No wonder that Mr. Huxley grows pessi- 



or, Nature's Best Word. 113 

mistic, and exclaims : ''The theory of evolution 
encourages no material anticipations. If, for mil- 
lions of years, our globe has taken the upward road, 
yet some time the summit will be reached, and the 
downward route will be taken." 

On the assertion, thus, of one of the greatest ex- 
ponents of evolution, as well as in harmony with the 
principles of the theory, we are bound to acknowl- 
edge that moral man is neither the offspring nor 
citizen of nature, For in what realm does he be- 
long? To whom does he owe his allegiance? What 
is the explanation, or what will be the end, of his 
existence? To these questions evolution returns no 
answer that is not a denial of all significance to what 
is usually regarded as morality in man. Morality is 
a seeming. It can never be a reality. 

As we have seen, morality cannot be thus dissi- 
pated with a breath. It claims as its basis the 
nature of man, and denies that nature can be less 
than a free intelligence, whose prerogative it is to 
order his own destiny; who lives and acts, drawn 
onward by an ideal which forever beckons him for- 
ward to better things. The "ought" of moral con- 
viction takes the place of the "is" of physical 
sequence, between which there is a difference which 
can never be removed. 

The only other explanation that is worthy of con- 
sideration, for the reasonableness which it manifests, 
is that of Theism. Here we have an intelligent first 
cause, a divine creator, to whom man is responsible, 



114 God Revealed; 

and who is the Absolute Real to which his ideal is 
ever drawing him. His existence provides a way 
in which the ethical man may be able to realize him- 
self in a life which is the ''checking of the cosmic 
process." It furnishes an escape for him in a world 
which does not know him and has no place for him. 
It finds a parent for a waif of time and sense, whose 
birth and destiny nature repudiates. Surely, this 
is something gained for man, who otherwise would 
lose all. 

This is the assertion of a moral order in the world 
upon which Kant insisted. It is a government of 
moral beings of which there is an infinite and perfect 
moral governor. That this is a new conception is 
not urged, but that it is a truth which no teachings 
of science or philosophy can successfully contradict 
is earnestly maintained. Birth and death, eating and 
drinking, physical comfort and temporal prosperity, 
mechanical forces and cosmic development, are 
subordinate to the ever-present question of conduct. 
The world of the physical, for the highest purposes 
of man's life, is secondary to the world of ethical 
principles and truths. Here God reigns, and man 
owns his sovereign kingship, and bows in obedience 
to his laws, in which he finds his completeness and 
hope. 

In such an ethical sphere as the end of human 
strivings and progress is found the explanation of 
the antagonism which Professor Huxley so strongly 
sets forth as existing between nature and man. The 



or, Nature's Best Word. i i 5 

heartlessness of nature has been the enigma of the 
ages. From man has been forced the confession that 
the cosmos is too much for him. He has lamented, 
in the literature of every generation, the fearful odds 
against him. What does it mean that nature seems 
ever to be pitted against man — that her forces re- 
morselessly sweep away his most cherished hopes? 

Without an intelligent creator, it is an inex- 
plicable divergence and contradiction where we 
should expect a rigid uniformity. With a God, it 
is an inconsistency in his methods which confuses 
the thought. It is only when, out of the world of 
physical forces, arises a moral life to which the 
physical furnishes a sphere of discipline and develop- 
ment, the end of which shall be a more perfect moral 
character and a higher moral type, that any relief 
is offered to the bitter experiences and persistent op- 
positions of the material conditions of existence. 
In a personal creator, and an essentially noble and 
worthy end for man, finding its perfection in the In- 
finite Moral Ideal, is the hope that saves from utter 
pessimism and despair. 

The words of St. Paul echo the great truth of this 
conception of the Moral Ideal: "Our light afflic- 
tion, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far 
more exceeding and eternal weight of glory; while 
we look not at the things which are seen, but at the 
things which are not seen : for the things which are 
seen are temporal ; but the things which are not seen 
are eternal." 



1 1 6 God Revealed ; 



STUDY XV. 
The Unity of the First Cause. 

We have already had reason to accept a first cause 
as the origin of the world. The question now arises 
whether this first cause is one or many. 

Materialism, which insists that matter has existed 
from eternity, does not claim any unity of origin. 
The world presents only the unity of a mass which 
has as many separate units as there are atoms. 

According to Mr. Spencer's evolutionary philoso- 
phy, this is all the unity that is needed. Fortuitous 
combinations of atoms will, according to his state- 
ments, account for everything, from the simplest 
form to the magnificently organized brain of a 
Spencer. 

The contention is that such a theory of atoms can- 
not possibly account for the world. Atoms so con- 
stituted could not produce the simplest organism, 
much less a world. 

Two suppositions are possible regarding these 
atoms. Either they may be independent of each 
other to such an extent that they cannot be com- 
pared — as, for instance, a color, yellow ; and a taste, 
bitter — or they may be independent and comparable. 
In the first case, it is evident that nothing whatever 
could result from any chance relation into which 
they might be thrown. From any number of in- 



or, Nature's Best Word. i i 7 

comparable and unrelated atoms it is not conceiv- 
able that even the simplest result could follow. 

In the second case, it is necessary not only that the 
atoms should be comparable in order that they 
should combine for some result, but also that, with 
this likeness, or comparability, there should be a defi- 
nite difference. Otherwise, there would be no reason 
why one thing would occur more than another. In 
order that a and b should produce x, and a and c 
should not produce x, it is necessary that they 
should be, not only comparable, but that they should 
also be different. For instance, that oxygen and 
hydrogen should combine in water, and oxygen and 
nitrogen should not combine in water, it is not only 
absolutely required that they should be of such a 
nature as to be compared with each other, but that 
they should be so different that the combination of 
two of them should never produce the same result as 
the combination of the other two. 

The atoms in the Spencerian philosophy are "es- 
sentially the same/' This is the term used, and the 
discussion shows plainly that essential sameness 
means absolute sameness. This is a necessity of the 
philosophy of scientific evolution. Such atoms 
could never combine with any definite result. The 
result, in any case, would be a mere chance, the 
throw of dice, or any purely accidental occurrence. 
A universe so constituted, if it were possible to con- 
ceive of such a thing, would present no basis for cal- 
culation, 



1 1 8 God Revealed ; 

In the world, as we know it, all the elements act 
in a definite way, according to a definite law, each 
upon the other, in the direction of a definite re- 
sult. 

There is nothing upon which the different sciences 
and all the enterprises and affairs of life depend so 
entirely and implicitly as on the varying relation of 
these ultimate particles. The bond of relationship 
has been scientifically stated, and we are informed 
that force is the uniting property, manifesting itself 
under such circumstances and with such affinities as 
to produce the orderly conditions and relations that 
we see everywhere. This, however, is only a state- 
ment of a fact, and not an explanation of the fact 
itself. It is a description of observed phenomena. 
What things are, and how they come to be what 
they are, are different questions. As for the proper- 
ties recognized, they also are to be accounted for and 
their significance is to be determined. 

Materialistic thought, in science or philosophy, 
insists upon the relation and comparability of the 
atoms. As they are original atoms, and the first 
cause of all things, they are independent units. If 
they were dependent, it would imply a different first 
cause. Their potentiality is a point constantly 
urged as a sufficient explanation of the existence of 
this world in its immense variety of forms and 
modes. All elements are related to other elements 
by either attraction or repulsion, and there is noth- 
ing so small, obscure, or unimportant that it is 



or, Nature's Best Word. 119 

not definitely related to something else, and thereby 
to all. 

Admitting that these ultimate atoms are compa- 
rable and related, and that they possess a potency of 
their own, how could they ever combine for definite 
results? Under what supposable conditions could 
all the millions of millions of ultimate particles work 
with absolute and intelligent precision throughout 
the universe, so far as we know it, from a grain of 
sand to whole systems of planets and stars, from 
protoplasm through all the vast kingdoms of vege- 
table and animal life, even to the complexities of the 
most cultured brain, and the various phenomena of 
social, civil, and religious associations and rela- 
tions ? 

We are familiar with affinities of various kinds, 
and we speak of the activities of the world in the 
language of affinities. Chemical affinity, mag- 
netism, gravitation, and other terms make up the 
vocabulary which we are constantly and convenient- 
ly using. What are these affinities and attractions ? 
We call them properties of matter; but what is mat- 
ter, and how do these properties inhere in it? It 
is certain that we cannot tell what matter is. All 
we know of it is its properties in their various modes 
of manifestation. We speak of it as a certain some- 
thing, in itself inert, to which these properties be- 
long, or we say that matter is these properties. In 
either case there are difficulties. We do not know 
of anything that we may call pure matter as a 



120 God Revealed; 

something which holds these properties. It is 
equally difficult to conceive of the properties as exist- 
ing in their present stable combinations without the 
unifying substance back of them. It is impossible to 
understand how particles, possessed of any amount 
of potentiality, can reach out of themselves and 
touch other particles and produce definite results. 
Potentiality may be in the element, we may admit, 
but how does it pass to another element ? It cannot 
be both in itself and in the other element at the same 
time. In passing, then,' there must be an instant 
when it is not in itself or in the other element. It 
is suspended on nothing between the two. If it 
were conceivable that a property of an element could 
exist in another element, it is not conceivable that 
that which belongs to matter could disengage itself 
from matter, and subsist, for even the briefest 
instant, alone. We do not know how influence 
could pass from one element to another. The fact 
is familiar, but the explanation, on a physical basis, 
is wanting. 

What is needed is a free, intelligent, all-embra- 
cing activity, of whose power the atoms are the ex- 
pression or instrument. Without this, it is incon- 
ceivable that any two, three, or a million atoms 
could work for a definite result, even specially fitted 
for each other, which is contrary to the supposition. 

For instance, let the various parts of a watch be 
distributed on a table. Each wheel, spring, lever, 
is fitted for its place with perfect precision. How 



or, Nature's Best Word. 121 

long will it be necessary to wait for the watch to ap- 
pear? Until one mind, comprehending the whole 
arrangement, selects, adjusts, and fastens each part 
in its appropriate place. 

This is true of every arrangement of individuals, 
either things or persons. Even though atoms were 
supplied with a ''nascent consciousness," or an 
atomic proportion of mind, it would avail nothing. 
Every orderly arrangement for a definite end is 
under the direction of one mind, or such an inter- 
mingling of several minds as leads to a mental unity. 
The suppositions of several minds, or millions of 
parts of minds, according to the theory of atoms, in 
the creation, preservation, and government of the 
world, would have no support in reason. 

Lotze says : "In the unity of our thinking Ego 
the two thoughts a and b cannot appear as states of 
the Ego without c being attached to them, and this 
just on account of the nature of this one subject. 
If, on the other hand, the thought a were conceived 
by one person, and the thought b by another, then 
the thought c would not originate as a consequent 
in either one of the two, although c, and c alone, 
would be the necessary result of a and b together, 
provided they came together at all. The case is ex- 
actly so with things." 1 

"Finally we derive the conviction that the incon- 
ceivableness of a passage of some one thing to an- 
other thing can be removed only by the negation of 

1 Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion, Ginn & Co., p. 30. 



122 God Revealed; 

the independence of individual things. A and B 
cannot be absolutely different beings, but only modi- 
fications of one and the same being, M, which is in 
them all, a, b, c, d, the truly existent; and which has 
assumed, indeed, different forms in all these differ- 
ent things, but still remains indivisible, one and the 
same individual, M." 1 

Dr. Bowne says: "Allowing the dynamic theory 
of matter, we can do nothing with the atoms with- 
out assuming a unitary and spontaneous ground 
which embraces them all. And now the various 
teleological arguments come back with increased 
force. The teleological view is the only one which 
satisfies the human mind, and the mechanical objec- 
tions turn out to be quite irrelevant." 2 

It may be justly concluded that our first cause is 
a unity — the intelligent power which uphold all 
things, and directs all things to the realization of his 
divine purposes. 

1 Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion, Ginn & Co., p. 31. 
8 Studies in Theism, p. 257. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 123 



STUDY XVI. 
A Personal First Cause. 

Theism claims that the firsa cause is personal. 
This it does in the face of the protests of Pantheism, 
Materialism, and Agnosticism. 

Aside from the demands of reason, it may be af- 
firmed that the moral and spiritual nature of man 
requires such a personal being. It is impossible to 
conceive of any relation to him except through per- 
sonality. Love, reverence, accountability, and, 
many other feelings necessitate a personal character 
in the deity, if an outward object corresponding to 
these affections is required for their satisfaction. 
If he is not personal, it is inconceivable, from the 
point of view of man's own personal character and 
activities, that he could ever become an object of 
love or a source of comfort. 

This is the natural and common requirement on 
the part of man. For this reason, in all religions 
we observe the most earnest endeavors to put the 
idea of personal being into the idea of deity. Man- 
kind have personified things. In doing this, they 
only attributed to things, and through them to their 
deity, the qualities and conditions of being which, 
to their conception, were essentially characteristic of 
man. That they ever thought or spoke of God as a 



124 God Revealed; 

person, giving a strict definition to the word, is not 
asserted, but simply that God possessed that which 
was peculiar to man, and which formed the only 
conceivable link of intelligent communion between 
man and man. The personality of deity, then, 
arises out of the personality of man. It is necessary 
to inquire in what personality in man consists. 

Sometimes language may be relied upon to fur- 
nish a definition of a word. In such a case, how- 
ever, it does so only because it represents a gener- 
alization which has been made, or supplies many 
different forms and uses of a word from which we 
may generalize. The root word "persona" and the 
verb "persono" fail to throw any light upon the 
word "personality." 

Some definitions may be presented. Dr. Fisher 
says : "The essential characteristics of personality 
are self-consciousness and self-determination; that 
is to say, these are the elements common to all spir- 
itual beings." 1 Dr. Harris : "A person is a being 
conscious of self, subsisting in individuality and 
identity, and endowed with intuitive reason, rational 
sensibility, and free will. All beings constitution- 
ally devoid of these characteristics are impersonal." 2 
Dr. McCosh says : "It is an essential characteristic 
of the man's individuality, and is one of the main 
elements in his sense of independence, in his sense of 
freedom, in his sense of responsibility." 3 He holds 

1 The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Beliefs p. 2. 

2 Philosophical Basis of Theism, p. 40S. 
8 Intuitions 0/ the Mind, p. 156. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 125 

that it is a simple perception in consciousness, and 
cannot be denned. Professor Baldwin, after dis- 
cussing attention as an expression of the energy of 
the soul, closes with these words : "And in the con- 
sciousness of this abiding energy we find the 
ground of mental unity and personality." 1 

From these brief definitions and descriptions we 
learn in what way leaders of philosophical thought 
have conceived of the nature of personality; but they 
can only serve the purpose of directing our investi- 
gations. We need to inquire what those essential 
elements in man's nature are which constitute the 
man, and exalt him above every being about hiirL 
These, as a unit, we may call his personality, relative 
to which everything else is impersonal. 

Self-knowledge, or knowledge of self, may be 
mentioned as one of the essential elements of person- 
ality. It is necessary to distinguish between the ex- 
perience of self and the knowledge of self. Regard- 
ing self, we are justified in saying: First, that we 
know self as existing. Second, we know it as a 
permanent and unchangeable entity. Third, we 
know it as possessing power. Fourth, we clearly 
distinguish it from things and beings, as external 
to self and separated from self, as the "not-self.' ' 
Fifth, these cognitions of self, for which conscious- 
ness is responsible, lead to the inference that the sub- 
stance of self is entirely different from that of ma^ 
terial things. As the best designation of it, we call 

1 Handbook of Psychology s 1890, vol. i, p. 70. 



126 God Revealed; 

it a spirit. In affirming that these elements belong 
to self, we deny that they are possessed by any other 
terrestrial being. 

Self-determination may be given as another ele- 
ment of personality. This self-determination will 
include: First, power to act. Second, intelligent 
activity with reference to even remote ends. Third, 
capability of choice and action in the presence of 
many and various incentives to action. Fourth, 
recognition of choice and volition as the product of 
self. Consciousness bears testimony to the presence 
of these elements in every normally constituted 
human being, and, while there has been a denial of 
all of them, as in any way significant of a nature in 
man at all peculiar to him, or remarkable to any de- 
gree, the denial has been based upon materialistic 
and other grounds which would be fatal to person- 
ality in any being. Self-determination, as above 
described, must be maintained, or personality must 
be abandoned. That personality, as thus defined, is 
peculiar to man alone, is the position taken. 

Dr. Harris says : "The will is a person's power 
of self-determination. It is his power of determin- 
ing the exercise of his own causal efficiency or en- 
ergy. He can determine the object or end to which 
he will direct it; he can exert it or call it into action 
when he will; he can refrain from exerting it when 
he will. He has power of self-exertion, self-direc- 
tion, and self-restraint. This power is the will. 
Its function is to determine the exercise of power. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 127 

Its acts are determinations. We call it the power of 
self-determination." 1 

It is necessary to all the higher forms of intelli- 
gence, at least. Dr. Bowne says upon this point, 
in connection with the mechanical theory : "In every 
mechanical doctrine of mind there are no mental 
acts, but only psychological occurrences. Even the 
drawing of a conclusion is not an act of the mind, 
but an occurrence in the mind. The conclusion is 
not justified by its antecedent reasons, but is coerced 
by its psychological antecedents. If we deny the 
substantiality of mind, the conclusion is only the 
mental symbol of a certain state of the physical 
mechanism." 2 

Moral consciousness, with the sense of accounta- 
bility and responsibility, is claimed to be an essential 
element of personality. Only persons are moral 
agents, but every person is responsible. Self-knowl- 
edge, also, which supposes a complete knowledge of 
the nature and purpose of acts, and self-determina- 
tion, which was adequate to a change of the pur- 
poses and acts, are the grounds of moral responsi- 
bility. The strength of consciousness in this direc- 
tion is seen in the fact that man is the only being 
that can be held guilty of any wrongdoing. 

Personality is preeminently characterized by these, 
three elements. In the possession of these, which, 
in the nature of the case, comprehend other condi- 
tions, man stands alone in the world. 

1 Philosophical Basis of Theism, p. 349. 2 Philosophy of Theism, p. 112. 



128 God Revealed; 

Is there over him one who corresponds to him in 
these respects, and may be called a person ? 

Theism maintains that there is a personal being, 
who is the first cause, corresponding to man as a 
personal being, and that this personal being is a 
necessity of a rational interpretation of the world. 
It assumes to find in the first cause the three condi- 
tions of personality, self-consciousness, self-deter- 
mination, and moral conduct. That the personality 
of the first cause may differ in many respects from 
the personality in man is admitted, but it is emphati- 
cally maintained that all that may be essential to 
personality belongs to the first cause. 

Self-consciousness, or the knowledge of self, has 
been denied. The ground of denial is psychologi- 
cal. It is affirmed that man knows the self only be- 
cause, being finite, and but a small part of the 
world, he knows also the not-self. It is undoubt- 
edly true, so far as man is concerned, that change in 
sensations in a world that is changeable is the condi- 
tion of the consciousness of self. It is asserted of 
the first cause that he is both absolute and infinite. 
Being absolute, he is unchangeable; and being in- 
finite, he must include everything in himself. There 
can, then, be no not-self. All things are in the in- 
finite. It is equally true that there can be no self- 
consciousness. 

To this it may be responded that that which is 
objective to man is his own mental activities or 
states; that these may be self-awakened or awak- 



or, Nature's Best Word. 129 

ened by external conditions. The self-activities of 
the first cause, which must be conceded to him, 
would furnish the occasion of self-consciousness, 
even supposing that the infinite being is limited in 
his knowledge as man is limited. The infinite be- 
ing, however, need not be limited in his knowledge 
as the finite being is limited, and the perfection of 
personality is conceivably reached in an infinite be- 
ing whose power of self-knowledge is in himself. 

Dr. Bowne says: "It is, indeed, true that our 
consciousness begins, and that it is conditioned, by 
the activity of something not ourselves; but it does 
not lie in the notion of consciousness that it must 
begin, or that it must be aroused, from without." 1 

As regards self-determination, it is necessary to 
remember that intelligence in its nature is free; for 
to purpose, which is an essential movement of in- 
telligence, necessitates freedom. If, then, what has 
been said regarding the intelligence of the first cause 
is true, it follows that the first cause is free. 

The moral character of the first cause is the con- 
clusion from his intelligence and freedom. 

Materialism, which holds to the eternity and po- 
tency of matter, affirms that there is no need of free- 
dom and no room for it. Things are what they are 
because they are necessitated to be what they are by 
the laws which are eternal. The entire previous 
discussion is a sufficient answer to this objection. 

It is maintained that there is a power in the world, 

1 Philosophy of Theism, p. 131. 



130 God Revealed; 

ever upholding and directing it, which may be desig- 
nated by such terms as pure will, impersonal intelli- 
gence, impersonal spirit, impersonal reason, uni- 
versal spirit, and others of a similar character. 
This summoning of a living and directive force 
from the deep unknown is supposed to remove the 
necessity of a personal God. 

Aside from the absolutely contradictory character 
of the terms themselves, it may be affirmed that rea- 
son knows of nothing of the kind. Pure will, im- 
personal reason, are unintelligible terms. All the 
difficulties that are raised in the supposition of a 
world without an intelligent author lie against these 
terms, if the terms do not create more difficulties by 
far than exist in a purely material conception of the 
origin and preservation of the world. 

The most satisfactory view of the first cause is 
that he is a personal being of infinite power and in- 
telligence. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 131 



STUDY XVII. 
Agnosticism. 

Agnosticism, or the doctrine that the human 
mind is capable of arriving at the knowledge of God, 
rests, on the one hand, on the doctrine of the Infinite 
and Absolute, and, on the other, on the Relativity of 
Knowledge. 

The former is defined by Mansel, in his Limits of 
Religious Thought: "There are three terms, that are 
as familiar as household words, in the vocabulary of 
philosophy, which must be taken into account in 
every system of metaphysical theology. To con- 
ceive the deity as he is, we must conceive him as first 
cause, as absolute, and as infinite. By the first cause 
is meant that which produces all things, and is pro- 
duced by nothing itself. By the absolute is meant 
that which exists in and by itself, having no neces- 
sary relation to any other being. By the infinite is 
meant that which is free from all possible limita- 
tion, that than which a greater is inconceivable, 
and which, consequently, can receive no additional 
attribute, or mode of existence, which it had not 
from all eternity." 1 

Again: "The metaphysical representation of the 
deity, as absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as 

1 Bampton Lectures, 1859, p. 75. 



132 God Revealed; 

the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, 
amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality. 
What kind of an absolute being is that, says Hegel, 
which does not contain in itself all that is actual, sin 
included? We may repudiate the conclusion with 
indignation, but the reasoning is unassailable." 1 

The passage to Agnosticism is easy by the limita- 
tions of human thought. To think is to limit, for 
all thinking includes comparison, analysis, judg- 
ment, and generalization. These terms can only 
be applied to that which is conditioned and limited. 
All thinking, therefore, must be done upon finite 
objects, and all knowledge must be at best limited to 
the finite. Accordingly, to know the infinite or the 
absolute is impossible. God must, therefore, be un- 
knowable to the intellect. 

By the relativity of thought the same result is 
reached. The definition of this doctrine has been 
variously given. It may be best understood by the 
familiar fact that the sensations, as of sight, sound, 
smell, are the results of the reaction of the mind 
upon certain physical stimuli, and are wholly men- 
tal. The mental image thus given has no similar 
image in the external world. In the physical world 
sound is vibration merely. What the nature of the 
cause of these sensations, and what their external 
appearance may be, the mind cannot know. Knowl- 
edge is relative to man's faculties, and these are 
limited to the testimony of consciousness. Nothing 

* Bampton Lectures, 1859, p. 76, 



or, Nature's Best Word. 133 

is accordingly known beyond the sensation. All 
else is unknowable. 

Mansel was a disciple of Sir William Hamilton, 
and elaborated his views on the Limits of Human 
Thought, and the consequent unknowableness of 
deity. Neither, however, rejected Theism. Hamil- 
ton says : "When I deny that by us the infinite can 
be known, I am far from denying that by us it can, 
and is, and ought to be believed." 1 Mansel ex- 
presses Hamilton's thought: "We are thus com- 
pelled, by the consciousness of moral obligation, to 
assume the existence of the moral deity, and to re- 
gard the absolute standard of right and wrong as 
constituted by the nature of deity." 2 

Mr, Spencer takes the same position regarding 
the absolute and infinite, and affirms that they are 
a necessary datum of consciousness. Accordingly, 
reality, though not capable of being made a thought, 
properly so called, because not capable of being 
brought within the limits, nevertheless remains as 
a consciousness that is positive, and is not rendered 
negative by the negation of limits. 

So far as Hamilton and Mansel are concerned, the 
utterly destructive character of the doctrine of the 
relativity of thought, as an objection to Theism, has 
been prevented by the doctrine of the "inner con- 
sciousness" as the source of a belief in deity. Some 
knowledge, however, must be presupposed in the 

1 Letter to Prof. Calderwood. Lectures on Metaphysics, Blackwood & Sons, 
1859, vol. i, p. 530. 
8 The Limits of Religious Thought, Gould & Lincoln^ Boston, 1859, p. 122. 



134 God Revealed; 

contents of the inner consciousness, if any reliance 
is to be placed upon this source of information. 

Spencer, likewise, has been compelled to make im- 
portant concessions. While he maintains the doc- 
trine of the infinite and absolute, but at the same 
time speaks of them as unknowable, he says that the 
mind must, "in some dim mode of consciousness, 
posit a non-relative, and, in some similar dim mode 
of consciousness, a relation between it and the rela- 
tive." His use of terms, as, for instance, that of 
cause applied to the unknowable, is a tacit and inci- 
dental recognition of some knowledge, at least, of 
the unknowable. The legitimate effect of such an 
admission is obviated by the resolution of the un- 
knowable into absolute force. So far as Spen- 
cer's positivism does not negative his doctrine of the 
unknowable, his position may be designated as pan- 
theistic. 

One objection to the doctrine of the infinite and 
absolute, as the negation of all theistic beliefs, is 
that, if the infinite is absolute, that is, unrelated, it is 
inconceivable that human thought could ever have 
arrived at such a conception as that of the infinite, or 
unknowable, absolute; for, if related, there can be 
no connection between the world of phenomena and 
this unknowable. Man must be shut up to a knowl- 
edge of phenomena alone. There cannot be any- 
thing in phenomena that would lead the mind out to 
an unknowable, for there is no relation between 
phenomena and the unknowable that the human 



or, Nature's Best Word. 135 

mind could cognize. The world as known would 
entirely satisfy the conditions of existence and 
knowledge. It would not be necessary to assume 
the presence of any intimations of any kind, in- 
hering in phenomena, which would lead the mind 
out to something beyond phenomena. This would 
be contrary to the supposition embraced in the doc- 
trine of the absolute, and unrelated. If the un- 
knowable were only the great infinite and absolute 
abyss that is implied in the world, there is no reason 
why human thought should embrace even this. The 
categories of thought, through which alone we pass 
beyond phenomena, would have no significance or 
value, if they could be supposed to exist even. 

Another objection lies directly against the doc- 
trine of the absolute and unknowable. It has 
been stated as follows by Professor Caird : "The 
principle on which the unknowableness of the 
absolute rests is, when closely examined, noth- 
ing more than a false abstraction. It first creates 
or conjures up a fictitious logical entity, and 
then charges consciousness with imbecility be- 
cause of its inability to think that fiction. The 
theorist begins by conceiving of an absolute 
reality, unconditioned, unqualified, existing in and 
of itself independently of any mind to know it; 
and then he proceeds to conceive of that object, 
thus presumed to be outside of thought, as caus- 
ing or awakening certain impressions or ideas in 
the knowing object." "Is not the notion which 



136 God Revealed; 

constitutes the starting point of this demonstration a 
purely illusory one, and does not the demonstration 
consist in first creating a fictitious and impossible 
object, and then pronouncing the mind's incapacity 
to think it an inherent disability?" 1 

Is there such a logical entity? If there is such a 
logical entity, then the unknowable is known to hu- 
man thought to that extent. If there is no such 
logical entity, that is, if logic grasps nothing, then 
the absolute, as conceived, is pure fiction, as Pro- 
fessor Caird claims, and, whether there is such an 
object as the absolute or not, that object has nothing 
to do with the intelligence of man. 

Another objection is found in the conclusions, 
destructive of all thought and freedom in man, to 
which the doctrine of the absolute leads. Accord- 
ing to supposition, the infinite or absolute must in- 
clude everything. How can it be otherwise, if they 
are used in the sense proposed by those who use 
them? There is no such thing as cause, for cause 
must condition effect, and must itself be conditioned 
by the effect, and can no longer be either absolute or 
infinite. 

Neither can the absolute think; for, if thought 
necessitates limitation, then the very conception of 
the absolute excludes all thought and all intelligence 
from the universe. The intelligence in the world 
and in man goes for nothing. It is only ap- 
parent. Man cannot be a personality, for the abso- 

1 Philosophy 0/ Religion, p. ig. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 137 

lute will, of necessity, absorb his individuality into 
absoluteness. 

"To know" is not employed in the sense of "to 
comprehend. Otherwise the expression would be 
contradictory of the ordinary use of language. We 
speak of knowing infinite space, for instance, or in- 
finite duration. There is nothing absurd in such 
use of language. While we do not comprehend 
infinite space or duration, we do know them and are 
able to describe their manifestations. The infini- 
tude of deity would not be incompatible with the 
existence of self, and some apprehension of itself, 
except as it is thought of as possessing physical 
dimensions. 

Mansel, in his Limits of Religious Thought, says : 
"The conception of the infinite and absolute, from 
whatever side we view it, appears encompassed with 
contradictions. There is a contradiction in sup- 
posing such an object to exist; and there is a contra- 
diction in supposing it not to exist. There is a con- 
tradiction in conceiving it as one, and there is a 
contradiction in conceiving it as many. There is a 
contradiction in conceiving it as personal, and there 
is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal. 
It cannot, without contradiction, be represented as 
active; nor, without equal contradiction, can it be 
represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived as 
the sum of existence; nor can it be conceived as a 
part only of that sum." 1 

1 Philosophy 0/ Religion, p. 85. 



138 God Revealed; 



STUDY XVIII. 
Pantheism and Theism. 

Among the doctrines antagonistic to Theism 
which have secured recognition in human thought 
may be mentioned Deism and Pantheism. Deism, 
however, claims little consideration, partly because 
it has had comparatively little influence, and partly 
because an extended discussion of its positions 
would include doctrines involved in the discussion 
of other subjects. Deism, as a theory, separates 
God from the world, and represents him as indiffer- 
ent to it. This, science utterly rejects. Whatever 
may be the background of the changing phenomena 
of the world, whether force or spirit, it is intimately 
related to phenomena. Deism is not a solution of 
anything, and contradicts the best scientific thought, 
so far as it may be quoted at all upon the subject. 

Pantheism, much more than Deism, meets the re- 
quirements of much of the thinking of the times. 
Indeed, it has been claimed that the Spencerian 
philosophy is pantheistic, so far as it is anything 
more than materialistic. Pantheism, under a vari- 
ety of differences of meaning, includes the necessary 
and eternal coexistence of the finite and infinite, and 
of matter and mind. It claims a substantial oneness 
of the two. It believes in a god, as the name im- 



or, Nature's Best Word. 139 

plies, but that god is not transcendent. He is 
immanent only. All things exist in him. Some- 
times he is the one substance; or he is the soul of 
the universe ; or, as with Fichte, he is the universal 
moral order. The truth remains that, whatsoever 
he is, he is the all of the universe. Popularly, it is 
said that God is the universe, and the universe is 
God. This form of statement is denied, however, 
as being too gross. The doctrine has assumed three 
principal forms : First, God is the eternal something 
whose attributes are matter and mind, or, according 
to Spinoza, extension and thought. Second, he is 
the something recognized in the attributes of 
matter. Third, or he is the something recognized 
in the attributes of thought. 

Pantheism begins with the assumption that there 
is a divine being, as a truth which cannot be denied, 
but identifies him with nature. As a doctrine, it has 
prevailed very widely in both ancient and modern 
times. It is of interest to us in its relation to 
philosophical systems of thought which explain phe- 
nomena in relation to being. 

A brief review of pantheistic thought will show 
the tendency of the philosophical thought, with 
which it has been connected in modern times. Spi- 
noza stands at the head of modern Pantheists. He 
was an admirer of Descartes, and in the early years 
of his life of study was a disciple of Descartes. He 
accepted the two modes or forms of existence taught 
by Descartes, extension and thought. He very 



140 God Revealed; 

soon, however, diverged from the teachings of 
Descartes, and affirmed the existence of one sub- 
stance, which included all phenomena. This sub- 
stance was the divine being accepted by Spinoza. 
This divine being, however, absorbed into himself 
everything else. God is all, and all is God. He 
says : "There cannot be, and we cannot conceive, 
any other substance than God." "Whatever is, is in 
God; and nothing can be, nor can be conceived, 
without God." 1 Descartes taught a dualism and 
believed in a personal God. Spinoza affirmed unity, 
which was God, but his unity was the universe, and 
therefore, of necessity, impersonal. 

The current of thought was somewhat changed 
and modified by Leibnitz and Kant, but Pantheism 
still found support in the philosophy of Fichte, who 
was a subjective idealist. He maintained that be- 
tween the ego in itself and the object in itself it was 
necessary to make a choice. One alone could be 
retained. He favored the ego, and declared that all 
the limitations and hindrances that are met with are 
only parts of the ego. This ego, according to 
philosophy, was God. He only knew the ego, how- 
ever, in and through self, and self was only the ego, 
God, coming to consciousness. Schelling followed 
Fichte, being at first a subjective idealist with 
Fichte, but becoming afterward an objective ideal- 
ist, rejecting both positions in turn, and at last an- 
nouncing that reason was the absolute. Hegel was 

1 McClintock and Strong's Cyclopcedia, article "Spinoza." 



or, Nature's Best Word. 141 

an idealist, who declared the existence of the abso- 
lute, but his absolute embraced everything. "The 
absolute is, with him, not the infinite substance, as 
with Spinoza; not the infinite subject, as with 
Fichte; nor the infinite mind or reason, as with 
Schelling. It is a perpetual process, an eternal 
thinking, without beginning, and without end." 
"This is God, the unity of all things, finite and infi- 
nite, temporal and eternal, natural and supernatural." 
The necessary characteristics of that system of 
thought which ends in Pantheism are very evident. 
Any doctrine which makes God the sum of all things, 
immanent in all things, and coming to view and ex- 
istence in them only, is pantheistic. The test of 
Pantheism as a system of thought explanatory of 
existing phenomena, and satisfying to the spiritual, 
nature of man, must be found in its harmony with 
those principles of life and thought, the reality and 
manifest significance of which cannot be denied, if 
anything whatever is to be affirmed with confidence. 
In other words, those conditions and principles upon 
which we constantly rely, which present to us the 
only reality we know, must be accepted as valid and 
real, and their contradictions as false, or we must 
despair of knowing anything as it actually is, 
Until, then, we have good reason for doing other- 
wise, we are compelled to receive as real and reliable 
that without which nothing would be intelligibly real 
and reliable. 

Take, then, the self and not- self, which so clearly 
10 



14 2 God Revealed; 

underlie all psychological study. Self certainly is the 
peculiar expression of consciousness. If it is nothing, 
consciousness is nothing; but, if consciousness is 
nothing, in what an abyss of negation are we hurled ! 
If the self may be confidently affirmed, its affirma- 
tion is fundamentally and directly antagonistic 
to the doctrine of Pantheism and the principles on 
which it rests. We have already seen that, what- 
ever may be the form the philosophical thought may 
take that leads to Pantheism, unity is its foundation 
stone. There is no such distinction as a subject and 
object. At most, they are two phases or sides of the 
same common substance. Nothing can be clearer as 
an illustration of this position than the declarations 
of the Pantheists whom I have quoted. 

Self-consciousness, then, must be surrendered if 
Pantheism is true. With self-consciousness, per- 
sonal identity, which conditions all intelligence and 
provides for that stream of continuous consciousness 
without which memory, imagination and reasoning, 
together with moral responsibility, would be im- 
possible, must also be denied. At most, the soul 
would be broken into fragments, and would present 
to an observer, but never to the self, a series of dis- 
connected activities. John Stuart Mill has said : 
"If we speak of the mind as a series of feelings 
which is aware of itself as past and future, we are re- 
duced to the alternative of believing that the mind is 
different from any series of feelings, or of accepting 
the paradox that something which is, ex-hypothesi, 



or, Nature's Best Word. 143 

but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a 
series." 

Freedom, also, must be denied by the very condi- 
tions of pantheistic thought, or of any system of 
thought which does not discriminate clearly between 
the self and the not-self. There cannot be any free- 
dom unless one phenomenon rises superior to other 
phenomena and its surroundings, and asserts inde- 
pendent individuality, which, in Pantheism, is in- 
conceivable, and contrary to the supposition. Free- 
dom cannot exist either in the absolute or in any 
part or element of the absolute. Such a conception 
as that of a free being, acting freely, could never be 
realized, if, indeed, it could itself have an existence. 
If, then, Pantheism is accepted, freedom must be 
denied. Spinoza says upon this point: "There is 
nothing contingent in the nature of things; all 
things, on the contrary, are determined by the 
necessity of the divine nature, to exist and to act, 
after a certain fashion." "Nature produced is deter- 
mined by nature producing. The soul of man is a 
spiritual automaton. There can be nothing arbi- 
trary in the necessary developments of the divine 
essence." 

As has already been said incidentally, accountabil- 
ity cannot exist under such conditions. Conscience 
and moral consciousness, as guides to conduct, have 
neither place nor meaning. How can there be 
moral responsibility without freedom? Of what 
advantage can guides be for moral purposes, unless 



144 God Revealed; 

freedom of action is an attribute of the subject of 
such guidance ? 

Personality is also impossible. All its elements 
are wanting. Man is only part of the all, and, how- 
ever much he may seem to himself to be acting as a 
free and intelligent personality, it is only a part of 
the universal delusion and deception. 

It may readily be seen that the laws of thought 
under which intelligent beings must act have no 
place in a system of pantheistic thought. There can 
be no proper cause or effect, no substance and at- 
tribute. The very terms of Pantheism make them 
impossible. 

Pantheism contradicts all that we seem to be, and 
all that the world of phenomena seems to be. It can 
have no place in our thinking, unless we absurdly 
deny all validity and truth to our thinking and feel- 
ing. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 145 



STUDY XIX. 
The First Cause and the World. 

Theories of a self-developed world, as in every 
materialistic conception of creation and preserva- 
tion, do not require a source or control outside the 
world, and the problem of God and the world does 
not exist. The mythologies of antiquity, represent- 
ing the crude thought of the ancients, either in 
Pantheism, Polytheism or the doctrines of the 
emanation of the world from a deity, have presup- 
posed a close relation of the world to the deity. 
Theism, maintaining a first cause of intelligence and 
unity, raises the question of the relation of the first 
cause to the world. 

As we have seen, the supposition that the first 
cause is infinite and absolute presents the problem of 
the possibility of the existence of such a being in 
coexistence and conjunction with something beside 
itself. If the world is an effect, it limits the cause, 
and the infinite is reduced to the finite. There is a 
contradiction at once. Either the first cause ab- 
sorbs the effect, and thereby ceases to be a cause in 
any proper sense, or the term infinite cannot be used 
in this connection in the same sense in which it is 
used by those who advocate the relativity of knowl- 
edge. The position is that it is used in a different 
sense. 



146 God Revealed; 

One of the objections, as we have seen, made to 
the terms infinite and absolute, as they are employed 
in the exposition of the doctrine of the relativity of 
knowledge, is that they are logical abstractions en- 
dowed with form. As so conceived, the infinite and 
absolute must fill all space and time, and are condi- 
tioned by everything beside themselves in the world. 
Space and time are thought of as vast forms filled 
with an unbounded bulk, which is the deity. This 
view is sensuous, and reduces deity to the conditions 
of the material forms in the world. Such a view 
is inconsistent with the unity of the first cause, for 
the different parts of whatever may be extended in 
space are distinguishable. 

If we conceive of God as a spirit, he certainly will 
not be limited or bounded by any of the conditions 
which limit or bound material forms. Only in the 
way of thought or self-conscious mind is it possible 
to conceive of God as infinite. In the finite thought, 
or self-consciousness, do we have the only illustra- 
tion or suggestion of what an infinite thought or 
self-consciousness would require, but from this ex- 
perience we know of one expression of life which is 
not limited by forms and conditions of matter. 
Such a conception of the first cause cannot negative 
the possibility of the existence of finite things and 
beings, if, indeed, it does not necessitate them. 
Omniscience and omnipresence, both of which must 
of necessity be attrbutes of the first cause, are per- 
fectly consistent with a relation to the world which 



or, Nature's Best Word. 147 

does not imply the existence of an infinite substance 
that fills the universe. Immediate action and im- 
mediate knowledge are not inconsistent with the ab- 
sence of such universal substance. The first cause 
may be thought of as present and filling all space and 
time with his activity, and this woud be consistent 
with the existence of anything that he might choose 
to create. 

Dr. Caird, in his Philosophy of Religion, says : 
"Now, this idea of the infinite, if we apprehend its 
true import, is simply the idea of God as absolute 
spirit. Under no other category than that of 
thought or self-conscious mind can we conceive of 
God as an infinite who manifests himsef in the dif- 
ferences of the infinite word, and * * * returns upon, 
or realizes himself. It is in thought or self-con- 
sciousness alone that we have a subject which is 
limited by nothing outside of itself, for here the only 
limit is a determination that is capable of being 
wholly retracted into that which it limits or deter- 
mines." 1 

The theistic conception of the world, from the 
point of view of the first cause, requires, first, that 
it shall have an objective reality; secondly, that it 
shall be recognized as the product of the intelligence 
and power of God; thirdly, that the working out of 
all its parts shall be in accordance with the plan and 
purposes of God; fourthly, that it shall be pre- 
served at every moment of its existence by the sup- 

0/ Religion, p. 242, 



148 God Revealed; 

porting and restoring power of God. Theism 
affirms that nothing less than this would be at all 
compatible with the demands of thought. We do 
not know how the world could be self-sustained any 
more than we know how it could be self-created, and 
neither supposition receives any explanation in the 
nature of mind or matter. Thought does not give 
it, as we have seen in all our study of the nature and 
laws of thought, and matter, known only to us 
through the medium of thought, does not give it. 
It is impossible to explain how creation and 
preservation may be distinguished. Either one re- 
quires the other, and both must be admitted. 

The immanence of the first cause, therefore, is a 
necessity of the positions that have been taken. If 
this immanence is carefully distinguished from 
identity with the world, no contradiction will follow. 
Each single condition or event need not be regarded 
as an act of God, although the power, knowledge, 
and laws of the first cause may condition and limit 
it. Secondary laws, therefore, need not be abro- 
gated. There is nothing necessarily inconsistent be- 
tween the immanence of the first cause and what we 
call secondary laws. The nearest approach to an in- 
dependence of them is found in man, and in him only 
in his higher spiritual activities. There is room, 
however, in this case for providential interfer- 
ences and such a relation of the first cause to the in- 
dividual personality as shall secure the consumma- 
tion of the purposes entertained by the first cause. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 149 

The immanence of the first cause may be justified, 
for the most part, on the same grounds on which the 
doctrine of the preservation of the world is main- 
tained. His separation from the world, as some- 
thing entirely external to it and wholly independ- 
ent of its development, involves contradictions and 
impossibilities in respect to both man and the 
world. 

At the same time, the transcendence of the first 
cause is a necessity both of his own personality and 
that of man. It is a necessity of the doctrine of 
cause and effect. The rejection of this doctrine 
would invalidate the positions contained in the cos- 
mological, ontological, and teleological argu- 
ments, and prove equally destructive of those funda- 
mental principles which antagonize the doctrines of 
Pantheism. To think of the universe as both cause 
and effect is to contradict the laws of thought and 
put an end to all reasoning. If there is any doctrine 
which is fundamental, and underlies all our activ- 
ities in thought or action, it is the law of cause and 
effect. The universe is not the first cause, and the 
first cause is not the universe, although his power 
who created the world must always be exercised for 
the continuance of that which he has created. 

The first cause is free. There is nothing in the 
fact of law that would lead necessarily to an oppo- 
site conclusion. The intelligence which has been 
ascribed to him would necessitate his freedom. The 
existence of a world of the most exacting laws is 



150 God Revealed; 

perfectly consistant with his freedom, and, in fact, 
requires it. A system of necessity would overthrow 
reason, reduce the world to mechanism, and destroy 
the unity of the first cause. 

The question of the mode of creation is not, in its 
relation to this point at least, a matter of im- 
portance. How the first cause creates is a matter 
which does not seem likely to be quickly settled. So 
far, the most that men have been able to do has been 
to trace and describe sequences. It is possible that 
along the line of these sequences the originating 
power of the first cause has had more to do with the 
world and its form than some, at least, are willing to 
attribute to him. 

From what source the first cause brought the uni- 
verse into existence can have significance only on 
the supposition that he should have made something 
out of something. Here the first cause is con- 
founded with man in his method and power of creat- 
ing. Man must have something out of which to 
make something. In the realization of any form in 
connection with secondary laws this is clearly recog- 
nized. Tt is a necessity of thought. As regards the 
first cause, what may be said is this, that God caused 
the world to exist. His own power gave it being, 
but in such a way that he was neither limited nor 
lessened by this expression of his activity. There is 
no explanation beyond this of the process of crea- 
tion, but it alone satisfied the requirements of 
thought. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 151 

As to the preservation of the world, three views 
may be mentioned ; first, that of Deism, which holds 
that God created the world, and left it to itself and 
the laws imposed upon it; second, that of contin- 
uous creation; third, the presence of the divine 
energy in the maintenance and direction of the 
forces in the world according to the laws under 
which they received their form. 

As far as the first is concerned, it is inconceivable 
that the world can get along by itself any more in 
preservation than in creation. The difficulty of 
understanding how any number of atoms, however 
endowed, can come together to form a world with- 
out an all-embracing mind in whose consciousness 
and purpose they have a place, is quite as great in 
creation as in preservation. It is an insurmountable 
difficulty in either case. 

As regards the second view, while a continuous 
creation, in which everything is what the divine will 
purposes it should be in each moment of its exist- 
ence, might agree with the conditions of the physical 
world as a mere machine whose only end is mechan- 
ical action, it could not be applied to human life 
without the destruction of all that is essential to man 
as an intelligent and responsible person. The deity 
would then be the author of sin as well as holiness, 
and man would be the machine. 

The third view is the only one that satisfies all the 
conditions involved. It provides for the supporting 
and preserving energy of the first cause in accord- 



152 God Revealed; 

ance with the demands of thought. It leaves man 
with the dignity of a free and intelligent personality, 
and the object of the constant care of God. Forces 
operate according to the laws which the creator has 
ordained, and with the power and in the direction 
with which he created the world. Nothing abides 
alone. Underneath both man and things are the 
everlasting arms. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 153 

STUDY XX. 
Theism and Evolution. 

Theism does not antagonize Evolution, when it is 
simply presented as a mode of the divine activity in 
the origination and preservation of the world. It 
only objects to certain forms of the theory of Evolu- 
tion which claim a monopoly of the doctrine, and 
affirm that it can never be reconciled with the posi- 
tions of Theism. While, therefore, Evolution as 
thus represented persistently maintains its claims, 
Theism must assert, with equal determination, its 
claims. Theism and theology are, therefore, fre- 
quently and unjustly represented as being ignorantly 
and bitterly opposed to Evolution. While Theism 
holds that Evolution is as yet only an hypothesis, as 
do some of the strongest and most pronounced 
Evolutionists, it is perfectly willing that, under the 
proper forms, it should become an accepted scien- 
tific theory. 

The different forms under which Evolution is pre- 
sented may be included in three subdivisions. 

W r e may state, first, the mechanical form. It 
denies a creator, or any cause independent of the 
world, and ascribes the universe, with all its adjust- 
ments, differences and correlations, to a blind force 
which is identical with the world. Matter, motion, 
and space are eternal, and represent all the potencies 
from which the various forms and expressions of life 



154 God Revealed; 

have come. The world is what it is through a sim- 
ple process of evolution from the simple to the com- 
plex, extending through an inconceivably long 
period of time. It is developed in several different 
stages — the nebular hypothesis, persistence of force, 
spontaneous generation, and natural selection. 
Among its prominent supporters may be mentioned 
Haeckel, Spencer, and Huxley. From star dust to 
thought, the process is a purely mechanical one. It 
is thoroughly materialistic and atheistic. 

A second position has been termed by some 
writers Philosophic. Evolution. It recognizes the 
existence of an intelligent and independent first 
cause, who at least gave a beginning to the world,, 
and at some time in the past originated one or more 
life cells. These he endowed with the power of 
appropriating to themselves other forces, and of 
evolving out of themselves other life cells, with 
various differences and powers of attraction. The 
main strength of this phase of the hypothesis of Evo- 
lution is devoted to the development of the organic 
world. It inherits life at the start, and is, therefore, 
relieved of the responsibility of undertaking to find 
life or make it; but beyond this everything goes on 
without any further reference to the being who first 
gave life. It evolves all forms of life in the past or 
present from this original life principle according to 
a few laws. Variation and natural selection are the 
laws proposed. Under the accidental conditions of 
life, the struggle for existence, the sexual instinct, 



or, Nature's Best Word. 155 

and limited spheres of existence, the laws of variation 
and selection produce all forms of life. The world 
of life has no need of a god in realizing all its ends. 
With the laws and potencies assumed to belong to 
the world by the first act of the creator, any further 
interference of the creator is entirely superfluous. It 
need not be regarded as a part of his purpose that he 
should have anything further to do with the world. 
The discovered laws and conditions of life fully, and 
in a very satisfactory manner, account for all the 
wonders of the physical world. Darwin's name be- 
longs here. 

By whatever name we may call the third position 
taken by Evolutionists, it aims, before everything 
else, to be scientific, and concerns itself with the ef- 
fort to ascertain how the world has been developed 
and how it goes on, without affirming or denying 
a personal first cause, or attempting to determine 
how the world originated or by what power it is 
sustained. By a discovery of the laws of nature, 
and a more complete classification of all individual 
things, in tracing the order or sequence of forms as 
far as possible, it seeks, by empirical methods, to 
learn the history of the physical universe. It carries 
the same method into the study of man as an in- 
dividual and in social relations. The question of 
the origin and support of nature is secondary, and is 
not regarded as essential to the best results in scien- 
tific study. The realm of philosophy is thereby 
avoided, while the ligitimate work of science is 



156 God Revealed; 

advanced. Some of the strongest supporters of Evo- 
lution, understood from the point of view of the 
study and classification of phenomena, are Theists. 
They are no less ardent and enthusiastic scientists, 
and the results of their labors have been no less valu- 
able than those of their fellow Evolutionists who are 
antitheistic in their opinions and efforts. The 
names of such men as John Fiske, Le Conte, Dana, 
Gray, and many others might be mentioned. 

A failure to distinguish between these different 
phases of Evolution not only leads to confusion, but 
confounds the objectionable and the unobjectionable 
in one sweeping condemnation. They have not been 
clearly separated. In fact, a certain class of Evolu- 
tionists have persistently asserted that there could be 
no such thing as theistic Evolution. Such men are 
largely responsible for the antagonism with which 
the doctrines of Evolution have been met. The 
number is undoubtedly small of those who would on 
any other ground oppose the teachings of Evolution. 

It is necessary to call attention to the differences 
and resemblances of the first two positions. They 
differ in the supposition of an independent origin of 
life and its potencies in the direction of variation and 
selection. They are alike in this, that, living cells 
having been thus provided, the process of evolution 
goes on without any direction of mind or any addi- 
tion to the potencies first given. It is not Deism, and 
it is not Theism. Everything, aside from the first 
supply, is mechanical. In any discussion of Evolu- 



or, Nature's Best Word. 157 

tion and Theism, the second may be classified with 
the first, since it embraces very largely the features 
of the mechanical theory, or may be neglected, since 
its principal assumption is agreeable to Theism. 

What, then, are the objections that Theism may 
offer against materialistic Evolution? 

First : It gives no satisfactory explanation of the 
existence of life. From an experimental point of 
view, abiogenesis is a failure, and while Haeckel and 
others still maintain that there must have been such 
a thing, and that it may some time be found, it re- 
mains true that the spontaneous generation has never 
occurred under the eye of man ; and there is no good 
reason, except the demands of the hypothesis of Evo- 
lution that it ought to have been so, to believe that 
it ever will or ever did occur. To hold that life was 
evolved from potentialities inhering in the original 
atoms out of which worlds were formed, is to main- 
tain that which can never be demonstrated or made 
reasonably probable. On the other hand, it con- 
tradicts every conception of matter that we have a 
right to entertain, and violates the axiom that "out 
of nothing, nothing can come." 

The assumption that life was provided, when the 
time came for its development, through the inter- 
ference of a self-existent being, is no very great help 
in the interest of an intelligible explanation of the 
origin of life and the evolution of living forms. I 
quote from Dr. Bascom upon this point : "We shall 
not collect the divine presence out of the universe, 
11. 



158 God Revealed; 

and confine it to a brief moment, without soon losing 
it altogether. What we have saved is not worth a 
struggle. If God has but one instant of action, it 
is not easy to believe he has any ; and, as that instant 
has so long since passed, its reality is purely a 
theoretical point. But the omnipresence of God 
cannot be dealt with in this way. We shall lose our 
Theism equally, whether we identify nature with 
God, or allow nature to exclude God as a pervasive 
presence/' 1 

So far, then, as the origin of life is concerned, 
while we may say that an intelligent first cause, who 
originated life and whose potency sustains it, is 
agreeable to our reason, the opposite doctrine is in 
agreement with nothing, and raises far more difficul- 
ties than it explains. 

Second : A similar objection lies against the evo- 
lution of all the forms of life in one period from 
lower forms in an earlier period. It is easy enough 
to say that they were evolved, but in itself such a 
simple statement is altogether inadequate. All such 
forms, not only because they are higher in their 
orders, but also because they are so vastly multi- 
plied, imply an increase in energy above what was in 
the world before, or an astonishing potentiality in 
previous forms. If the potentiality existed, a 
fundamental principle of Evolution is violated, 
namely, that evolution proceeds from the simple and 
homogeneous to the complex and heterogeneous. 

1 Natural Theology, pp. 126, 127. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 159 

The earlier conditions of life must have been just as 
heterogeneous as the later conditions, or why and 
whence this remarkable heterogeneity? If it was 
not in the individual and elementary cells, how was 
it evolved from them? If it was not in them, 
how was it involved into them? We are thrown 
back upon the previous questions : Whence came 
matter? Whence came life? Of one thing we are 
quite certain, that nothing can be evolved that was 
not previously involved. If we fall back upon the 
position that the potency only became real in the 
combinations of the elementary atoms or cells, we 
have simply raised another question how these ele- 
ments ever came together in such a way to realize 
these forms. 

I may quote from Le Conte in confirmation of 
this argument: "Evidently, therefore, in the uni- 
verse, taken as a whole, evolution of one part must 
be at the expense of some other part. The evolu- 
tion or development of the whole cosmos — of the 
whole universe of matter — as a unit, by forces 
within itself, according to the doctrine of conserva- 
tion of force, is inconceivable. If there be any such 
evolution, at all comparable with any known form 
of evolution, it can only take place by a constant in- 
crease of the sum of the whole energy — that is, by a 
constant influx of divine energy — for the same 
quantity of matter in a higher condition must em- 
body a greater amount of energy." 1 

1 Appendix to Professor Balfour Stewart's Conservation of Energy, pp. 199, 200. 



160 God Revealed; 

Third: If we refer this producing potency to a 
combination of elements, whatever they may be, we 
are met with the two metaphysical difficulties 
already referred to, that of the interaction of these 
elements among themselves, and that of their unified 
combinations in definite directions, either one of 
which would be sufficient to put an end to the activ- 
ities of these elements, unless the higher reaches of 
thought are a delusion. 

Fourth : Mechanical Evolution fails to explain a 
large number of facts which it treats as very simple 
illustrations of its laws, or covers with a multitude 
of words, or explains very inadequately. 

a. We may mention the origin and growth of 
different organs, as the eye, the ear, and many oth- 
ers. Tyndall's description of the origin of the eye 
may serve as an example. 

b. It does not explain the correlation of parts, the 
advantage of which, in most cases, is utility of the 
highest and most refined character. The whole 
nervous organism may be cited as an example. 

c. The law of minute variation is exceedingly 
simple, apparently. More naturally, however, like- 
ness of the most rigid character would appear in the 
sequence. Why are there variations of such a kind 
that intelligible forms, rather than monstrosities, 
should follow? 

d. Selection is also very simple, but why is there 
any selection, and what selects ? 

e. Utility is one of the recognized principles in 



or, Nature's Best Word. 161 

development, but that useful ends may effect evolu- 
tion those ends must be in sight. According to the 
supposition they cannot be in sight. In most cases 
the utility does not appear or exist until the parts are 
formed. 

/. The origin of the sexes, whether in plants or 
animals, is a perplexing question, simple though it 
seems. Why did both sexes appear at the same 
time and in the same localities? Neither variation, 
nor selection, nor useful ends, would require it. 
Yet anything short of it would have proved fatal to 
an evolution dependent upon it. Mere chance, with 
all the subordinate chances, is too inadequate to 
merit thought. 

g. If variation and natural selection be accepted, 
why do they act in the direction of species and 
genera in such a way that all nature may be classified 
with the utmost precision? 

h. It cannot explain any of the phenomena of 
thought, and makes no place for personality with 
self-consciousness and self-determination. 

These points are a few of those which may be 
made against atheistic Evolution, each one of which 
covers a multitude of instances. It is not objected 
that these laws exist, but simply that they exist by 
themselves, and accomplish their own work in virtue 
of their own power. A description is not always an 
explanation, and in this case it is far from being so. 

The demands of Theism have already been quite 
fully stated. Personality, independent and infinite 



1 62 God Revealed; 

power, intelligent direction of all the forces of the 
world, sustaining and upholding energy, are as- 
sumed in the deity, while the world is dependent, 
created and directed toward some end agreeable to 
the purposes of the creator. 

Le Conte says : ''The forces of nature I regard 
as an effluence from the divine person — an ever- 
present and all-pervading divine energy; universal, 
because he is omnipresent; invariable, because he is 
unchanging." 1 

The origin of man, then, through whatever forms 
he may have been developed to his full nature as a 
man, is divine. God gave him his being. His 
divergence from the rest of the animal creation was 
a part of the divine purpose and through the divine 
power. His intellect was also the bestowment of 
God. His moral nature was given him by God, and 
served in him a purpose which it could never have 
served in any other animal. Both the intellect of 
man and his moral nature, if bestowed upon the 
brutes, would have contradicted the doctrine of util- 
ity, according to which the process of evolution is 
supposed to proceed. 

Human life and human history thus come under 
the control and direction of God. He is in the 
world working out definite purposes. 

1 Princeton Review^ Nov., 1878, article " Man's Place in Nature." 



or, Nature's Best Word. 163 



STUDY XXL 
Is the First Cause Ethical? 

Every investigation into the ground and nature of 
a belief in God leads inevitably to the question of the 
ethical value of that belief. It must be clear that a 
metaphysical conception of God merely would be 
barren of vital interest to men. They are never 
satisfied to know simply that there is a God, who is 
the cause of all things, as an intelligent explanation 
of existing phenomena. If this were all, one hy- 
pothesis would be as good as another, provided that 
it gave a satisfactory account of all things. Panthe- 
ism would then be as good as Theism, and there 
would be no difference in the practical results. It 
would simply be the solution of a problem. As the 
solution of the problem would not change the condi- 
tions of life, and would only satisfy a natural curi- 
osity, it would be of no consequence what the solu- 
tion might be. Only keen intellects would find 
enjoyment or profit in working out the problem, and 
their enjoyment and profit would only be intellectual. 

With the inquiry into the nature and existence of 
the first cause, to the majority of minds, there is 
always an ulterior purpose. This purpose finds its 
fulfillment in the discovery of the ethical relation of 
the first cause to men. This has been the greatest 
motive to an inquiry into the nature of the deity. It 



164 God Revealed; 

is very doubtful if even philosophic minds would 
have troubled themselves very much to inquire after 
God, had they not been impelled by their own needs 
or the needs of others. The demands of the ethical 
nature have undoubtedly been at the basis of the ear- 
nest and continuous endeavor to find out the nature 
of the first cause. Accordingly, we find that mankind 
have been best satisfied when they have discovered, 
as they have supposed, ethical qualities in the first 
cause. There has been an improvement in civiliza- 
tion and individual life just in proportion as the 
ethical element has prevailed in the conception of the 
nature of deity. 

There are two ways of approaching this subject: 
First, as an inference from the assumption of perfec- 
tion in the first cause. It cannot be claimed that it 
is a direct conclusion of any metaphysical course of 
reasoning, unless the perfection of the deity is the 
major premise. Moral feeling is not intellectual, 
and cannot be derived from the intellectual perfec- 
tions, although moral action may be judged by the 
intellect; but as man is constituted, a perfect first 
cause could hardly be assumed without his possession 
of the elements of the true, the beautiful, and the 
good. Perfection must be claimed for the deity. 
Less than this the mind would not endure, but per- 
fection without these qualities is inconceivable, as 
the world of thought is now constituted. 

Generally the subject is approached from another 
point of view. From conditions of an ethical char- 



or, Nature's Best Word. 165 

acter, discernible in various ways, we draw the con- 
clusion that the first cause, the author of all things 
and of all men, must possess an ethical nature, and 
must be related to man in an ethical way. This is 
a satisfactory form of the argument, and is the one 
probably, on which mankind have acted. It is per- 
fectly harmonious with the conclusions of philosoph- 
ical thought in its determinations in other directions, 
and responds to conditions which are fundamental to 
human life. It usually takes the threefold form: 
First, the moral nature of man ; second, the nature 
and structure of human society; and, third, the 
course of history. 

As regards the first point, it is necessary to ac- 
count for the moral nature of man, and determine 
the significance for the deity of such an element in 
human nature. We need to remember the conflict 
between the empirical and intuitional schools of 
ethics, and the denial of any original moral sense in 
man by the former; but, while this rejection of the 
original moral sense is maintained as a part of the 
accepted theory of mechanical evolution, the con- 
science, the moral judgments, and the conduct of 
men protest against such an explanation. It is as 
certain as anything is certain that there is a con- 
stitutional instinct in man which recognizes the 
principle of right and wrong as original and inde- 
structible, even though there may be no absolute 
agreement in regard to many individual acts. The 
problem is to account for the existence of this power 



1 66 God Revealed; 

and disposition of moral judgment. If the reason- 
ing regarding the relation of the first cause to the 
world and its development and preservation be cor- 
rect, then the explanation of mechanical evolution 
must be rejected. Any other phase or theory of evo- 
lution must be rejected, also, that limits the activity 
and interposition of the first cause in the interest of 
the establishment of the moral element in the consti- 
tution of man. There is no other explanation than 
to say that the cause must account for the effect. If 
we were correct in saying that intelligence in the 
effect affords a presumption that it is in the cause, 
then there is reason in saying that ethical quality in 
the effect proves that the cause is ethical. The 
author of man and this world must have been a 
moral being. 

The moral nature of man implies also, in another 
way, the existence of a moral first cause. However 
the conscience is explained, it is certain that there is 
a sense of moral obligation and responsibility, and 
even an accountability, which underlies all the acts 
and judgments of men, so far as they express a 
judgment or their acts are of any value for ethical 
purposes. This obligation is ideal, and finds ex- 
pression in an appeal to a personified personality 
representing the appropriate qualities of justice, 
love, truth, and others, with the idea that there is a 
personality that responds to the moral obligation 
presented in the moral consciousness. There is no 
doubt that the hatred of wrong, oppression, and in- 



or, Nature's Best Word. 167 

justice, and the conviction that they will be avenged, 
and that, too, by a personal governor and judge who 
will always do right, spring from the decided ten- 
dency of the moral nature to assume a personal 
ground of this obligation. This is not a logical con- 
clusion, it must be admitted, but it has the force of 
the greatest probability. 

Dr. Mansel has put this argument very strongly : 
"The conception of this standard, in the human 
mind, may, indeed, be faint and fluctuating, and 
must be imperfect; it may vary with the intellectual 
or moral culture of the nation, or the individual; 
and, in its highest human representation, it must fall 
far short of the reality. But it is present to all man- 
kind as a basis of moral obligation and an induce- 
ment to moral progress ; it is present in the universal 
consciousness of sin; in the conviction that we are 
offenders against God; in the expiatory rites by 
which, whether inspired by sin or natural instinct, 
or inherited from some primeval tradition, divers 
nations have, in their various modes, striven to 
atone for their various transgressions, and to satisfy 
the wrath of their anxious judge. However er- 
roneously the particular acts of religious service 
may have been understood by men, yet in the uni- 
versal consciousness of innocence and guilt, of 
duty and disobedience, of an appeased or offended 
God, there is exhibited the instinctive confession of 
all mankind, that the moral nature of man, as sub- 
ject to a law of obligation, reflects and represents, 



1 68 God Revealed; 

in some degree, the moral nature of a deity by whom 
that obligation is imposed." 1 

Another proof of the moral character of the first 
cause is seen in the organization and structure of 
society. The principles on which the progress and 
stability of society rest are moral. Industry, pru- 
dence, temperance, in fact, all the economic virtues 
which at the same time, in a very essential manner, 
include an ethical quality, present important condi- 
tions of the progress of society. On the other hand, 
justice, truth, purity, honesty, brotherly kindness, 
are absolutely necessary to a nation's life, if that life 
represents anything more than the lowest kind of 
social existence. It is true, beyond any question, 
that no people can long endure in a condition of im- 
morality and vice. There is no condition of knowl- 
edge, refinement, wealth, and power that can long 
survive the prevalence of unrighteousness. If there 
is, then, a first cause of that which is manifestly so 
essentially a part of the very constitution of human 
nature recognized in individuals and society, the 
first cause, as the author and preserver of man and 
society, must also be a power which makes for 
righteousness. 

History shows the ethical nature of the author of 
the world, not only in the fact that all progress is 
dependent essentially upon moral conditions, but 
also in the fact that, whatever may be the final and 
all-embracing purpose of the first cause, the purpose 

1 Limits of Religious Thought, p. 122. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 169 

presented in this phase of the world's existence is a 
better moral condition. The end of historical de- 
velopment looks certainly to a better time and a bet- 
ter condition of things, when righteousness shall be 
the prevailing type of human life. The existence of 
great and widely spreading evils seems, on its face, 
to impeach the justice and goodness of the creator, 
and the question is often asked, suggested by terrible 
facts, if the author of this world can possess in per- 
fection all the ethical virtues which man is expected 
to illustrate? The considerations which are often 
presented — that most of the evils that men suffer are 
self-inflicted; that many more serve the purposes of 
good; that, for some reason not yet disclosed, man 
was created with his destiny in his own hands, and 
under his circumstances many of the ills of life are 
necessary for his better deveopment — to be sure, in 
themselves only partially relieve the case; but, when 
they are studied in connection with the general 
demands of righteousness, it would seem that, 
although it may not be possible to explain fully 
every difficulty, the moral nature of the first cause 
and the moral purposes of creation might be vindi- 
cated. 

The presence of God in history, working toward a 
moral end, lies in the philosophy of history. Ac- 
cordingly, Professor Morris, commenting upon 
Hegel's Philosophy of History, says: "God, not 
apart from history, decreeing its results from afar, 
but in history, working hitherto, and still working, 



170 God Revealed; 

revealing and showing himself in his work, this is 
the one essential side of the case. And the other is, 
man a coworker with God, sometimes unconscious 
of this divine partnership, sometimes blindly, and 
even willfully, rebelling against it, yet on the whole 
growingly obedient to the guidance of his Father's 
hand, and finding in the present knowledge of him, 
and in vital, willing, and active union with him, the 
perfection of his true or spiritual nature, and of his 
essential freedom." 

"Meanwhile, on the way toward this goal, man 
appears as a creature having within him the instinct 
of his true and spiritual self, as it were the seed of 
God, and the present power of God within his own 
breast, an instinct in varying degrees helped or 
hindered by the changing state of his knowledge. 
It is a generic and universal instinct, the results of 
which appear consciously in the organic construc- 
tion of an ethical world, and in religious conceptions 
and activities." 1 

1 Philosophy of History, Grigg's Philosophical Classics, p. 117. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 171 



STUDY XXII. 
Miracles. 

If the course of reasoning which has been pur- 
sued is correct, we have found that the only satisfac- 
tory explanation of the origin of the world and man 
is an intelligent, personal first cause, who is in the 
world, and yet is not the world; by whose free 
activities all beings and things exist; who is also the 
source and perfection of all ethical truth, the un- 
caused and the eternal one. On this line of rea- 
soning Theism depends for the vindication of its 
claims, and these are the positions which it thinks it 
has a right to maintain. 

There are some subordinate questions which pre- 
sent themselves for consideration. They might 
naturally be inferred from a statement of the claims 
of Theism. They acquire importance from their 
vital relations to some of the most cherished beliefs 
and hopes of men. No conviction has been more 
common or has been manifested in a greater variety 
of ways than that of the superintendence of the deity 
over the affairs of men, even to the extent of an in- 
terference to help or hinder by supernatural means. 
This conviction has been characteristic of pagan as 
well as Christian conceptions of God. 

The idea of a revelation of the divine will also, 
although shown among pagan nations in a frag- 



172 God Revealed; 

mentary and oftentimes childish way, has been very 
persistent. Among the Hebrews, and especially 
through the teachings of Christianity, a revelation 
from God to man is accepted as a perfectly reason- 
able and consistent manifestation of the love and 
care of God. 

The immortality of man is another expression of 
man's feeling which makes its appeal to Theism, and 
waits for an answer that shall fully satisfy his 
aspirations and hopes. 

A brief consideration of the question of miracles 
will occupy this Study. 

The nature of law, and the possibility that it may 
be suspended or changed from its ordinary and ob- 
served course, are involved in the discussion of 
miracles. In view of the prevalence of law, and the 
rigidity with which it is maintained, are miracles 
conceivable? According to the hard and fixed 
character of materialism, only one answer is pos- 
sible. Of course, miracles must be denied. No 
scheme which is necessitarian or mechanical has any 
place for them. If the view attributed to those who 
hold materialistic opinions is correct, miracles are 
excluded from the world. 

From the theistic definition of the first cause, as a 
personal, and, therefore, self-conscious and self-de- 
termining being, the only question would be, if it is 
maintained that law reigns universally, and cannot 
be violated by man, whether the deity has restricted 
himself by ordaining inviolable law with which 



or, Nature's Best Word. 173 

even he could not consistently interfere ? It is clear 
that there is only one way of determining it. Evi- 
dence alone of divine interference with constituted 
law could answer the question. 

It is possible that, while uniformity of law, as 
maintained by science, is the order of the universe, 
except for special reasons, it might please the deity, 
for purposes best appreciated by himself, to change 
the ordinary action of law for an order suited to 
promote his purposes. It would, at least, seem to be 
perfectly absurd for the supreme being to tie his own 
hands in such a way that, having created and given 
laws to a world, he forever after remains impotent 
to change them for any reason whatever. It is 
quite reasonable that, while for man law is in- 
violable, God reserves to himself the right to inter- 
fere according to his own good pleasure with all that 
his own hands have made. 

If the position of the mechanical evolutionists is 
correct, and the world has evolved, without divine 
help or direction, from primitive atoms, there would 
seem to be no occasion for a change in law, and no 
significance in such a change, even if it were pos- 
sible. On the other hand, let the world contain 
something besides mechanical laws and physical 
substances and forms ; let there be moral beings and 
moral law, with an ideal of moral perfection whose 
promotion is of the greatest importance and interest 
to the creator, and it will not be at all strange that 

he shall change or suspend anv law to advance this 
12 



174 God Revealed; 

great end. If man is something besides a machine, 
and if there is a higher law and order than the 
physical, it is entirely supposable that the physical 
will be subordinate to the moral, even though some 
scientists may assert the inviolableness of physical 
law. 

Dr. Bowne has thus stated the demand for 
miracles on the basis of philosophy : "If we suppose 
the world of things to contain the reason of its ex- 
istence within itself, there is no reason why the fixed 
order of antecedence and consequence should ever be 
departed from. In such a world, any state would 
be as good as any other, and new departures would 
have no significance. But a world of things, which 
is to administer to a world of persons, must not be 
thus rigid. It must be capable of taking up new 
factors, or of receiving new influences from with- 
out. Only on this condition can it become the serv- 
ant of finite intelligence." 1 

Three different views, held by those who admit 
the possibility of miracles, may be mentioned. They 
represent so many attempts to explain all the facts 
involved in such a way as to harmonize with both re- 
ligion and science. 

The first is the doctrine that miracles are a sus- 
pension of law, as it is seen and known by everyone, 
for the vindication or authentication, by supernat- 
ural power, of a divine message. It is not something 
merely out of the usual course of things, which may 

1 Philosophy of Theism, p. 205. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 175 

be wonderful, but in no sense miraculous, but some- 
thing so contrary to a well-established law of nature 
that there can be no doubt as to the character of the 
change or suspension of the law. 

Most of the miracles of Christ were of this char- 
acter. The calming of the waves of the Sea of 
Galilee was so entirely outside the usual and estab- 
lished course of things that the only inference that 
was possible was the exercise of supernatural power. 
The restoration of sight to one born blind, by a com- 
mand, or the application of spittle to the eye, left no 
room for natural causes. The resurrection of a 
dead man to life was a most marked instance of the 
introduction of new forces to produce life after the 
natural laws of decay had brought about their 
proper consequences. 

Analogies are often cited in the actions of men. 
By the exercise of the mysterious power of the will, 
which is not directed by natural law, the legiti- 
mate action of law is suspended. The ball, which 
would fall to the ground under the force of gravita- 
tion, is caught and held in the outstretched hand. 
The new force introduced is man's will, to which 
law is subordinated. 

The claim is made that, with a free and intelligent 
personality, even in a world where law is the rule, 
the infinite creator can change or suspend its action 
for the accomplishment of his plans. 

A second explanation of miracles, in order to 
avoid the objectionable idea that law is ever changed 



176 God Revealed; 

or suspended, in a world absolutely controlled by 
law, supposes that, back of ordinary laws, unknown 
to the masses of mankind, are subtle laws which pro- 
duce inexplicable effects. One who is divinely en- 
dowed may recognize these hidden channels of 
power, and apply them to the production of the re- 
sults desired. In this way the blind may be made to 
see, the sick healed, the dead raised to life. 

Aside from the numberless difficulties that are in- 
volved in this explanation, it is impossible to under- 
stand what gain has been made over the previous 
view. If it is necessary to save the reputation of 
the divine being for suspending his own laws for the 
higher purposes of the moral improvement of the 
race, it seems, at the best, a very dubious method of 
doing it. Why it is necessary to do this, except to 
spare the feelings and opinions of those who fancy 
that they have come to a complete understanding of 
creating and operating a world, does not appear. 
The great effort to keep the supernatural out of the 
world, in this case, is a failure; for the supernatural 
must be assumed in a person who discovers and 
manipulates these hidden forces and it becomes a 
miracle of knowledge, or it must be recognized in 
the miraculous coincidence of the activity of these 
laws at the required time and place. 

According to a third view, two factors are pres- 
ent in the world : elementary forms of activity, and 
laws in accordance with which these forms are com- 
bined. The forms of activity are atoms and mole- 



or, Nature's Best Word. 177 

cules, or an equivalent manifestation of primitive 
force capable of taking any form. The laws are 
fixed. The forms of activity are what the divine 
mind, under any particular circumstances, for any 
purpose, may require. 

The carpenter has about him a large quantity of 
lumber of all shapes and sizes. There are possibili- 
ties of many different things in this unworked ma- 
terial. He may make what he pleases. He may 
form boxes, chairs, tables, houses, or many other 
things, according to his purpose. While he is free 
in this respect, he is not free in another respect. 
Whatever he may make he must make according to 
mechanical laws which have been the same from the 
beginning of the world, and will continue to be the 
same as long as the world endures. 

The merit of this view is that it saves the uni- 
formities of nature from ruthless violation and at 
the same time provides for miracles. As a practical 
solution of the possibility of miracles, it adds very 
little light. It points out one way in which God can 
work miracles, if he desires to do so. As a theory, 
it is open to objections which, however, it is not 
necessary to discuss here. 

It is manifest from the -views given that, with the 
God of Theism, there is no inherent impossibility in 
the doctrine of miracles. To prove a miracle in any 
particular case may not always be easy, but with a 
God of freedom, power and intelligence, miracles 
are possible and consistent. 



178 God Revealed; 

STUDY XXIII. 
Revelation. 

The question of the revelation of the will of God 
to man is embraced in the study of Theism. Will 
the principles and teachings of Theism permit a 
revelation ? 

Like miracles, a revelation necessitates the inter- 
vention of God in the affairs of men. Involving as 
it does the impartation of truth to the understand- 
ings of men, both the source of the truth and the 
method of imparting it must, in the nature of the 
case, be supernatural. 

In the particular revelation represented in the 
Christian Scriptures, the source is the divine mind, 
and the methods, whether through angels, personal 
utterance by God, by inspired men, in prophecy, 
dreams, miracles, or articulated language, the 
agency of a supernatural being is insisted upon. As 
these, or similar conditions, would characterize any 
revelation, place must be found for them in Theism. 

It is evident that revelation is not impossible be- 
cause of the absence of power, intelligence, or free- 
dom in the deity. These are fundamental principles 
in Theism. So far as they are concerned, a revela- 
tion is clearly possible. The manifestation of his 
nature, and the conveyance of truths to man, would 
turn upon his plans and disposition. No one could 
possibly say that he would not reveal himself unless 



or, Nature's Best Word. 179 

it could be proved from his nature and evident dis- 
position. Nor could anyone affirm that he would 
do so unless there were reasons for such a statement 
in the nature and spirit of the deity. 

There is nothing in the first cause, as seen in the 
light of nature, to preclude a revelation. He does 
not hold himself aloof from the world, as though the 
outcome of it were a matter of the most entire in- 
difference to him. It has been shown that the first 
cause is immanent in the world. While he is above 
it, and independent of it, he is present with it, and 
its preservation and development must come from 
his constant relation to it. Then, also, the whole 
force of the argument of Theism develops an ethical 
nature in the first cause, and an ethical purpose in 
his government of the world. 

So far, then, there is no presumption against a 
revelation arising from the nature of the deity or 
the discovered purposes which characterize the 
world and condition its progress. As it must be ad- 
mitted that such a deity as is affirmed by Theism 
can reveal his nature and truth, if he will to do so 
(and no good reason appears in the nature of the laws 
which are known why he may not constantly do so), 
there would seem to be no good reason for denying 
a divine revelation, if it should be shown that it is 
necessary for carrying out the moral purposes of 
God. It would still be a question whether there has 
actually been a revelation, and what form it has 
taken. 



180 God Revealed; 

It may be most positively affirmed that a strong ar- 
gument for a revelation is provided for in the ethical 
nature of the first cause, and the ethical purposes 
which appear in the world, and in the structure and 
development of human society. That the constitu- 
tion of the world is moral is a first principle in 
Theism, and carries with it, of necessity, the moral 
character of God. 

With such a ground of inference, it is impossible 
not to believe that the deity would do all possible to 
guard the moral rectitude of his own character and 
secure the perfection of his moral creatures. It 
is entirely conceivable that, if this could be accom- 
plished more fully by a revelation than without one, 
he would be under moral obligations to furnish one. 
Justice to himself and the beings called into ex- 
istence by his will could not be served without one, 
unless he has already made the world morally per- 
fect, and provided means for preserving it in this 
condition. 

Nothing is clearer than this, that there is no such 
thing among moral intelligences on the earth as 
moral perfection. There is certainly the contradic- 
tion of all moral principles and requirements as the 
rule of conduct of the great masses of men. Gov- 
ernments are scarcely less open to condemnation 
than individuals, and society, as an aggregation of 
individuals, is the manifestation of every iniquity 
and crime. It cannot be said that the world, as 
moral, without some such effort to improve the con- 



or, Nature's Best Word. 181 

dition of his moral creatures, would reflect favor- 
ably upon the divine character and goodness. That 
which relieves the picture of human sin, misery, and 
shame to sensitive minds is the doctrine of Redemp- 
tion through an incarnated and divine Saviour, with 
its large and glorious revelation of truth. It helps 
our moral convictions to believe that God is working 
in the world to bring individuals and society to a 
better and still better moral condition. The King- 
dom of Heaven, as the ideal of moral perfection and 
the end toward which the efforts of the divine being 
are constantly directed, is a beautiful solution of the 
problem presented in an ethical God and a moral 
universe in which moral evil has seemed to reign all 
but supreme. 

No one can doubt that a revelation, setting forth 
in words and inspired characters and formulated 
doctrines the nature and purpose of God, explaining 
fully and minutely every element of right living, 
would suit and strengthen the moral nature of 
man in a most wonderful manner. It cannot be less 
doubtful that such a manifestation of truth meets 
all the requirements of such a race of beings as is 
found in mankind. It would not only give infor- 
mation on important subjects and point out the best 
way to live, but would prove a powerful stimulus to 
support man against the hurtful moral tendency of 
his own nature and his surroundings. 

This is the only escape from the abyss of philo- 
sophic pessimism, A world without some revelation 



1 82 God Revealed; 

and some effort of the divine being to save men 
from wretchedness and moral misery would be as 
bad and hopeless as it would be possible to conceive. 
No vindication of the justice and goodness of God 
in his relation to natural and moral evil, as it exists 
in his world and under his government, would be 
possible. The very evidences of a moral order in 
the universe would prove an inexhaustible source of 
righteous complaint and pitiable lamentation on the 
part of his moral creatures. 

When the nature and history of man are studied, 
the case seems more strongly in favor of a revela- 
tion. 

Man is morally weak and helpless, and needs the 
direction and help which can alone come from a 
clear and forcible statement to him by God of the 
divine attitude. The condition of man in these re- 
spects does not require much emphasis. Aside from 
the demand upon the Creator which his sinful ten- 
dencies make, there is the whole emotional life, 
which is a continuous pleading for divine sympathy 
and comfort. It would seem as though a moral 
deity would do something in behalf of such weak- 
ness and sorrow. 

Man's inability to discover by his own reason the 
great truths which his nature needs has been proved 
through ages of struggles. Ancient religions and 
philosophies have shown how little man has been 
able to learn, with any degree of certainty, by his 
own unaided powers. Even now, those who de- 



or, Nature's Best Word. 183 

pend most upon their own sufficiency, like Herbert 
Spencer in his philosophy, terminate their investi- 
gations in the darkness of Agnosticism, or the worse 
condition of Atheism. These are our great philoso- 
phers whose magnificent researches in nature are 
supposed to yield the essence of truth. Of what 
value to a sinning, guilty, and wretched being are 
such utterances as these ? Such philosophies are the 
pride of human learning and genius, but what do 
they contribute to the solution of the problem which 
every man finds pressing night and day upon his 
deepest life? If this is the best that man's efforts 
can do to furnish moral help for the morally help- 
less, it is poor indeed. 

The whole history of natural religion shows how 
inadequate it is to meet the moral and religious 
needs of men. Even Theism never has been, and 
never will be, a pioneer in ethical thought and effort. 
It is true that it cannot be accepted without giving 
strength to moral convictions, but, in the nature of 
the case, its teachings must be experimental. No 
truth can be known until it has been tried, perhaps 
by bitter experience. The light of Theism is not 
great. Left to it, the world would not advance very 
rapidly to a high condition of moral development. 

This might be said with still greater force in re- 
lation to religious living. Theism furnishes, with 
considerable clearness, some fundamental principles 
of religion. They may be briefly stated : 

1. The existence of a personal deity is implied. 



184 God Revealed; 

2. He is the creator and preserver of all things 
and beings. 

3. He is ever present with his creation. 

4. He is a being of kind dispositions toward his 
creatures. 

5. All these circumstances encourage prayer. 

6. He ought to be worshiped and feared. 

7. He is favorable to right moral conduct. 

Giving thus all possible credit to nature, no pro- 
vision whatever is made in it for sin and guilt, for 
forgiveness and divine grace, for rest, holiness and 
eternal life. It cannot, in the nature of the case, 
make any provision for them. It has no articulate 
language, no sympathy that touches the heart, no 
word of forgiving love to offer. Direct intercourse 
of the Personal God with man alone can furnish 
these. 

Theism has its place and work. No one can pur- 
sue its study in the right spirit without being wiser 
and better, but it can never take the place of a clear 
revelation of the will of God. 



or, Nature's Best Word. 185 



STUDY XXIV. 
Immortality. 

Is man immortal? Is there anything about him 
that will survive the shock of death? Will death 
end all? These are not new questions. They are 
as old, certainly, as human history. Philosophy, 
literature, biography, and the silent monuments of 
the dead bear witness to the persistent nature of this 
inquiry. 

To us such a question is exceedingly important 
from many points of view. It is vitally related to 
conduct, for what might be done with no incon- 
gruity in the limited period of a few years would 
be essentially wrong if life is to be prolonged 
eternally. Employments, gratifications, ambitions, 
which would be appropriate enough for a limited 
existence in a world so largely made up of material 
values, would be puerile and reckless in the presence 
of the probability of an unlimited existence in a 
world whose values would be spiritual. St. Paul 
has put it in this way: "What advantageth it me, 
if the dead rise not? let us eat and drink; for to- 
morrow we die." 

The question of immortality forms a necessary 
part of the Subjects discussed in these Studies. All 



1 86 God Revealed; 

that might be gained by a proof of the existence of a 
personal, intelligent, moral creator and governor of 
the world would be greatly reduced in value, if not 
entirely destroyed for us, if there were no reliable 
probabilities that man is, by nature and the purposes 
of God, destined for immortality. For this reason 
the earlier inquiries into the existence of God and 
his relation to the world and man have included the 
discussion of immortality, and no presentation of 
the subject of the Philosophy of Religion can be re- 
garded as complete that does not comprehend im- 
mortality. 

The arguments for the existence and nature of the 
deity presented in the preceding Studies are all 
grounded in the rational nature of man. From the 
reality that we have, for good reasons, assumed to 
belong to the rational nature of man, the contrary of 
which would precipitate us in destructive negations, 
we have inferred certain necessary attributes of the 
deity. The essential attributes of man have found 
their correspondence in the essential attributes of 
God. Intelligence, self-determination, ethical and 
spiritual qualities, existing in man, have been found 
to be the necessary characteristics of the God who 
would meet the requirements of man's nature. If 
the deity is thus closely and essentially related to 
man, and, in the nature of things, must be eternal, 
there would be a strong presumption, at least, that 
man was made to share with him in the eternity of 
his existence. It would seem somewhat inconsis- 



or, Nature's Best Word. 187 

tent to infer the nature of the deity from the nature 
of man, and identify it thus closely with man's 
nature in the qualities which are chiefly character- 
istic of him, and deny the immortality of man. 

The difference between psychical and physical 
phenomena, illustrated in the spirit and body of 
man, may serve as another strong presumption. As 
we have learned, and know, the self is permanent. 
Length of periods and multiplications of changes in 
a normal condition of human life do not obscure the 
consciousness of self. It is not so with the body. 
It is a well-known physiological fact that the body 
is constantly changing. The matter which com- 
poses it suffers several changes in the period of a 
human life. Then, too, various parts of the body 
may be injured or removed without affecting at all 
the activities of the self. It would seem as though 
the self were quite distinct from the body, and to a 
degree independent of it, and might be entirely in- 
dependent of it. The persistence, then, of the self, 
unimpaired by the succession of changes taking 
place in the body, frequently to the injury and per- 
manent impairment of the body, would justify the 
negative conclusion, at least, that death would not 
destroy the self. Physical nature can offer no valid 
objections against immortality, unless it can be 
shown that the change in death is so radically differ- 
ent from other physical changes that it must involve 
the destruction of the self as well as the body. The 
negative argument remains valid that death will not 



1 88 God Revealed; 

necessarily carry with it the destruction of the soul. 
Bishop Butler, in his Analogy of Religion, has 
elaborated this argument, and made a very strong 
case. 

The incompleteness of human life without immor- 
tality may also be mentioned as a strong and valid 
natural argument for man's continued existence 
after death. It is clearly true of all other existences 
that they reach a satisfactory development and end 
in the time allotted them. The tree passes from the 
seed through all its different stages, bears its fruit, 
grows old, and in course of time decays and perishes. 
All its powers and possibilities have been exhausted. 
There is no reason why it should live longer. Had 
it been broken down and destroyed in the very be- 
ginning of its fruit-bearing period some disappoint- 
ment might have been felt, but a relief to the 
thought of decay, in either case, would be the fact 
that the forces would enter into some other useful 
form of life. The same would be true of animals. 
In man it is different. There are qualities in him 
which transcend all the possibilities of material de- 
velopment. They are not exhausted in the activi- 
ties of even eighty years. We could easily conceive 
of their expansion indefinitely. The wisdom and 
experience of eighty years only fit a man the better 
to live. One of the sad thoughts, from a purely 
materialistic point of view, as one grows in knowl- 
edge, is that, as soon as one is fitted to live and 
work at an advantage, death overtakes him. No 



or, Nature's Best Word. 189 

one readily consents in his feelings to narrow his 
possibilities to the limited period provided in the 
brief existence which is accorded him in this fleet- 
ing life. 

The consummation of the moral purpose which 
seems to belong to human life, as it is now consti- 
tuted, is not realized in this life. If it be true that 
there are rare cases in which the rewards and penal- 
ties have been administered with equal justice, it is 
not true as the world goes. The noblest and grand- 
est deeds of self-sacrifice are never rewarded from 
the point of view of earthly and temporal distribu- 
tion. Most of the benefactors of the world have 
lived and died victims of the malice, contempt, and 
persecutions of those whom they tried to help. On 
the contrary, the most atrocious wrongs have been 
perpetrated against the most innocent and deserv- 
ing, and the perpetrators have lived in luxury, ease, 
and health, and have died in peace in the midst of 
their friends. Some of the best and purest lives 
have been spent in poverty and sickness, and some of 
the most selfish and sinful lives have been attended 
with all the circumstances of earthly enjoyment and 
freedom from temporal ills. Such a contradictory 
condition of things can exist in the moral govern- 
ment of a moral and good God only on the supposi- 
tion that there will be a final determination of the 
rewards and penalties necessary to make just and 
ethically equal the conditions and results of life. 
The ethical nature of God can be maintained in 

13 



190 God Revealed; 

reason only on the assumption that an existence re- 
mains to man after this life in which all these varia- 
tions from a standard of equal justice to all may be 
readjusted. 

Among the most remarkable facts connected with 
human life is this, that there is no exact correlation 
between growing age and infirmities or wasting 
sickness, and the activities of the soul. To the very 
last moment of life, not infrequently, the thoughts 
are just as clear and brilliant as in the greatest 
strength of manhood. Indeed, in many cases, un- 
usual activity characterizes the last hours of a hu- 
man life. This in itself, it is true, might not pass 
for a strong argument, since it is conceivable that 
under all these circumstances there may exist excit- 
ing conditions of the nervous organism which would 
account for such unusual mental activity. 

These cases, however, are so numerous and pecu- 
liar that they carry with them a strong presump- 
tion. When we add to them the triumphant hopes 
which have sustained and comforted many a dying 
one, and transformed dying into a glorious transla- 
tion, the argument appeals with great force to the 
heart of humanity. 

The universal belief in immortality may be men- 
tioned. That there has been the almost universal 
existence of this belief, in some form, is recognized. 
To say that it is the outcome of man's desire to live 
on, and the repulsiveness of the thought of a cessa- 
tion of life, is true enough ; but such a statement car- 



or, Nature's Best Word. 191 

ries with it the necessity that there should be in 
man's nature such powers and tendencies as would 
lead to such a desire. If we may suppose that it is 
the unreasoned conclusion to which man has been 
brought by the very constitution of his being, such a 
position would be in perfect accord with the facts in 
the case. A most persistent and powerful longing 
for immortality has affected the actions and thought 
of men in all ages and among all peoples. 

Mechanical evolution has made a place for man in 
its underlying doctrine of development. There 
must be room and possibility for development, in 
order that the process may be continued indefinitely, 
as the doctrine requires. The various stages in evo- 
lution are marked — the inorganic and the organic; 
and, under the organic, the great kingdoms of ani- 
mal and vegetable life; and under the animal the 
development continues, reaching its present com- 
pleteness in man. What will be the next stage? 
Will it be only the more perfect organization of the 
material and social elements and forms that now^ 
exist? This would seem to be the only possibility 
left to evolution ; but, while it might be a wonderful 
work to realize this possibility, to intelligence even 
this, as a final issue of all things, would not present 
anything very inspiring. For this reason some 
writers, representing Evolution, have proclaimed im- 
mortality for the race. This is a high-sounding ex- 
pression, but it means nothing. Immortality is of 
value only for immortal personalities. Immortality 



192 God Revealed; 

for an abstract humanity is utterly devoid of signifi- 
cance. The very necessity, however, recognized by 
many Evolutionists, points to the necessity, also, of 
the doctrine of immortality. Such a continued life 
will furnish ample scope for the fulfillment of the 
moral ideal which is ever going on before the 
thought to perfection and to the absolute moral 
real, the holy and eternal God. 

On the affirmation of intelligence and morality 
in the first cause, so clearly and strongly made by 
Theism, the truthfulness of that first cause, whom 
we call God, is at stake in the question of the immor- 
tality of man. He has certainly so constituted man 
that he longs for it and believes in it, and finds the 
completeness of his life alone in it. Can an ethical 
being, the infinite creator, be justified in constituting 
a being with such demands and presumptions, with- 
out any intention of meeting such expectations with 
a full and satisfactory realization? It is inconceiv- 
able. To a practical deception there would be 
added a justifiable cruelty. 

Professor John Fiske, in The Destiny of Man, 
says : "The materialistic assumption that there is 
no such state of things [as a future life], and that the 
life of the soul accordingly ends with the life of the 
body, is perhaps the most colossal instance of base- 
less assumption that is known to the history of phi- 
losophy. No evidence for it can be alleged beyond 
the familiar fact that during the present life we 
know soul only in its association with body, and 



or, Nature's Best Word. 193 

therefore cannot discover disembodied soul without 
dying ourselves." 1 

Again: "In past times the disbelief in the soul's 
immortality has always accompanied that kind of 
philosophy which, under whatever name, has re- 
garded humanity as merely a local incident in an 
endless and aimless series of cosmical changes. * * * 
On the other hand, he who regards man as the con- 
summate fruition of creative energy, and the chief 
object of divine care, is almost irresistibly driven to 
the belief that the soul's career is not complete with 
the present life upon the earth." 2 

The conclusion is preeminently worthy and ap- 
propriate. It is the only fitting termination of a 
life constituted as is the life of man. Were it other- 
wise, the unsolved and insoluble problems that 
would weigh human thought to the dust of sorrow 
and despair would be innumerable. Immortality is 
assured. Man's nature is fully satisfied. God's 
plans in the world are vindicated on the basis of 
ethical truth. A new and adequate motive is given 
to high and holy living. The completeness of the 
divine relationship to man of love and goodness is 
realized. An inhabitant of earth, man is also an 
heir of immortality. 

1 The Destiny of Man , p. no. 2 Ibid., p. in. 



AUG 17 1899 



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